Politicians, analysts
and ordinary people are concerned about the future
of Iraq, especially with the prospect of heightened
internal fighting between Shi'ite and Sunni groups.
No doubt this process will have repercussions for
the future of Kurdistan in Iraq. In fact, the fate
of Kurdistan is directly related to political and
security developments in the Arab part of Iraq.
State-building in Iraq has already failed. The
process took a definitive turn for the worse when
Saddam Hussein took over in 1979. Many specialists
and commentators argued that Saddam Hussein
strengthened Iraq, but in fact he contributed to an
accelerated process of state failure. In addition to
strong centralization of state power, Saddam Hussein
initiated a gradual fragmentation of Iraq as a
country by alienating the Kurds and Shi'ites. |
Khaled Salih, Senior Lecturer, PhD, Centre for
Contemporary Middle East Studies, University of
Southern Denmark |
|
His invasion, occupation and annexation of Kuwait
led to the creation of the no-fly zones in the north
and the south in 1992. Much of Kurdistan proper was
transformed into an independent entity, politically
and administratively. A gradual de facto separation
of the majority of the Kurdistan population from the
rest of Iraq became a political reality. Separate
political institutions (parliament, regional
government and political parties), infrastructure,
security arrangements and economic development all
contributed to this process.
However, with the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime
the rules of the game changed. While Arab Iraq
collapsed in terms of political authority and
administration, Kurdistan maintained its
institutions, police and security forces and
sustained its economic development. While the Bush
administration talked about "regime change" and
"nation-building", the actual process since mid-2003
has been about how to rebuild the state in Iraq.
Kurdish politicians, too, have been involved in
reconstructing Iraq, whether they realize, recognize
or deny it.
This has been important for Kurdistan on two levels.
First, Kurdish politicians have managed to protect
Kurdistan and its achievements since 1992. In
historical terms this is remarkable, because this is
the first time in centuries the Kurds have not been
the first to lose out on a major change sweeping the
Middle East. Second, political negotiations in
Baghdad have made it possible for Kurdistan to share
in the distribution of power, reconstruction aid and
revenues. In this process, Kurdistan's politicians
thus far have been able to secure both Kurdistan's
self-rule and its shared rule over the rest of Iraq.
Now, when the prospect of state rebuilding in Iraq
does not look very promising and fear of further
collapse of the reconstruction process is becoming
paramount, the people of Kurdistan are anxiously
watching events and pondering Kurdistan's fate in
the event Iraq falls apart. Several issues are at
stake. First, the future status of the region as
recognized now in the permanent constitution will be
jeopardized because the constitution, though
approved by a majority of voters in Iraq, will not
come into effect before a new government is sworn in
and, meanwhile, the constitutional state is not yet
fully consolidated.
Second, the fate of the Arabized regions, including
Kirkuk, will lead to a serious confrontation between
Kurdish groups and Arab groups. In such a scenario,
neighboring countries are likely to encourage and
support different factions. We are likely to see
Turkey assisting Turkmen groups, Iran assisting
Shi'ite and particularly Sadrist activists in Kirkuk,
and Syria assisting Sunni Arabs throughout the
region. Inter-communal and sectarian tensions and
confrontations are a likely outcome of such a
development.
Third, Kurdistan's share of income, such as aid
reconstruction and oil revenues, is likely to be put
on hold. In a worst case scenario, neighboring
countries will prove more than willing to encourage
and support Kurdish schisms in an effort to
undermine ongoing institution-building in Kurdistan.
Direct financial and military support to radical
Islamic groups and small Turkmen groups will
exacerbate any internal disagreement among political
groups in Kurdistan. If current security
arrangements and political deals crumble, we might
witness divisions along party, territorial and
economic lines, more or less resembling the fighting
of the mid-1990s, with additional groups across the
borders joining in (the PKK from Turkey and
Jihadists from Arab Iraq and Kurdistan).
But the political leadership in Kurdistan could also
somehow manage to sustain current trends and keep
Kurdistan safe, secure and stable. For this to
happen it would have to avoid institutional
breakdown, disengage from political negotiations in
Baghdad without alienating the Americans, and adhere
to internal political deals. In this event,
Kurdistan in Iraq might emerge as a prosperous
entity on which coalition forces could rely in a
regional context, as well as an ally for Turkey and
NATO. Tensions in Kirkuk and other Arabized
territories might be solved more peacefully than we
anticipate, due in part to strong unity among Kurds
and disunity among Arabs, but also because American
officials come to realize that a safe and secure
portion of Iraq is a better scenario than the whole
of Iraq sinking into internal conflict.-
Published
30/3/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org
Khaled Salih is a senior lecturer in Middle East
politics at the University of Southern Denmark. He
is coeditor (with Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry)
of The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq (University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2005).
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Khaled Salih
Senior Lecturer, PhD
Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies
University of Southern Denmark
Campusvej 55
5230 Odense M
Denmark
Telephone
+45 65 50 21 83 (Secretary)
+45 65 50 33 32 (Direct)
+46 70 672 22 77 (Mobile)
Fax
+45 65 50 21 61
E-mail
salih @ hist.sdu.dk
Web
http://middle-east.hum.sdu.dk/
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