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(Q): You are sensitive to the importance of
Arab-Islamic relations among the politicians. Do you
pin any hope on these relations?
(Allawi) Certainly, I was the one who took the
initiative to call for Sharm al-Sheikh meetings as a
framework for resolving the problems of Iraq and the
region. I considered Sharm al-Sheikh conference,
which was hosted by Egypt and attended, in addition
to the Arab League and the United nations, by the
eight major powers, the Security Council member
states, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and
the GCC, a framework for resolving the problems of
the region, if we had a mechanism to stop the
tensions. Unfortunately the process ended with the
conference.
Therefore, I believe that calling on the Arab and
Islamic states to play their role in the region by
helping Iraqis fill the vacuum that occurred after
the war, create a clear means for dialogue, and hold
talks to remove the tensions, is important and
basic. Proceeding from this belief, I am visiting
the Arab and Islamic states to present this
proposal.
(Q): You have proposed and worked for the formation
of the National Security Council. How important is
it to the critical situation in Iraq?
(Allawi) The idea to form the National Security
Council came up in my meeting with brothers Jalal
Talabani (leader of the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan) and Masud Barzani (leader of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party) in Kurdistan, as I was
the only Iraqi politician to be invited to attend a
meeting of the Kurdish Parliament marking the
unification of the two administrations in Kurdistan.
And, in a closed meeting, I presented my concept for
a national unity government founded on three
pillars, the sides of the national unity government.
This government would have a program consisting of
the major subjects of security, economy, and
provision of services.
Next is participation of the government in the
decision making. This means participation in the
government will not be represented by the number of
seats or ministries for this or that entity, but the
participation of all the sides in the government in
the decision making.
Brothers Talabani and Barzani supported the
proposal. We then discussed it with the Arab leaders
and the ambassadors of the major states. They
unanimously supported this trend. We decided that
one mechanism for participation in the decision
making is the formation of a national security
council. We also presented other important ideas,
such as that the Ministries of Defense, Interior,
Intelligence, and National Security will not be
assumed by ministers who believe in communal quotas
or armed militias outside the government. So we said
that when we speak about a national unity government
we must first find the keys to resolve the
intractable problems in Iraq. The formation of a
national unity government is a means and not an end.
It is an important means to build Iraq on modern
civilized bases. Iraq must be for all Iraqis. Iraq
with all its forces and resources must be an
important part for the stability of the Arab and
Islamic regions. This government must dissolve the
militias, restore the rule of law, and stay away
from communal quotas. It must also build the state's
control and military capabilities and work for
stimulating the economy and ensuring services.
There are two important aspects to the National
Security Council: First, it will be a means for
making decisions, especially strategic decisions;
and second, it will be truly in charge of the
security apparatus in Iraq, including the army,
intelligence, and Interior Ministry. This is the
important question, which, if resolved, it would
enable us to resolve the other problems in Iraq.
(Q): What, in your opinion, is the solution to the
Iraqi government crisis today?
(Allawi) The problems lies with the (Shiite) Unified
Iraqi Coalition. They now have two options. The
first is to conclude an agreement with one of the
parliamentary blocs and form a coalition government,
depending on the results of the elections, which, as
admitted by the International Committee, were not
correct or sound due to the major violations that
took place. If a government was formed in this
manner, this would mean the partition of the
country, because they (Shiites) are now in an
alliance with the brother Kurds. We have witnessed
that the alliance between the Kurds and Islamists
has led to a deterioration of the political,
security, and living conditions in Iraq. I don't
believe that this is the best solution for Iraq
under the present circumstances. I believe that the
solution is a national agreement on overcoming the
crisis in Iraq until we reach the shore of safety
and peace.
(Q): Do you believe that the coalition is the cause
of the crisis?
(Allawi) Certainly, and it is obvious that the
coalition itself does not pursue democracy.
Immediately after the elections, the brothers in the
coalition held an election to choose a candidate for
the post of prime minister. Ibrahim al-Jaafari won
the election. If they in the coalition insist on
adhering to democratic methods, Al-Jaafari must
remain their candidate for the post of prime
minister, irrespective of our objections and those
of the other blocs to his nomination. It is our
right to object. But the coalition is now creating a
big uproar against the continued nomination of Al-Jaafari
and his continued presence as prime minister.
They (the coalition) want to stick to the results of
the elections that took place at the end of last
year despite the admission by international quarters
that they were unfair and there were violations.
This is because the results were in their interest.
This is one thing. The other thing is that they do
not want to adhere to the results of the elections,
which they held within the coalition and nominated
Al-Jaafari on their basis. This is a kind of
duplicitous thinking on their part. They either
believe in the results of the general elections and
elections, which took place within the coalition and
Al-Jaafari continues as their candidate, or they do
not believe in the results of the general elections
and their own elections and proceed toward the
formation of a national unity government to find a
common factor for resolving their internal problems.
Were it not for the problems within the coalition,
the government would have been formed a long time
ago. But they are the biggest bloc and they have not
reached any results so far.
(Q): Would you agree to the continuation of Al-Jaafari
as he candidate for the premiership?
(Allawi) We have not adopted any person actually and
we do not object to anyone. But, we have adopted a
program, and whoever believes in this program is
most welcome. But Al-Jaafari has proven that he does
not believe in the program during his period as
prime minister. He dismissed and curtailed.
Therefore, we in Al-Iraqiyah List said that we must
search for the one who believes in a program that
leads to the formation of a real national unity
government. If this happened, it would resolve many
of the problems. Otherwise, the situation would
worsen. The question is not Al-Jaafari as a person.
But, he (Al-Jaafari) is the product of an experiment
called the coalition. He does not work in isolation
of the coalition. We do not know what they want in
the coalition. Sometimes they say we have a red line
against such and such a person and a green line on
such and such a person. Then they retreat and change
their idea. Then they come back a few days later
after changing all their stands. They must settle
their affairs and choose the one they consider
suitable, and they have chosen Al-Jaafari.
We are waiting for the result. They either admit
their choice and we will find the alternative. And
we say that the alternative in Al-Iraqiyah List is
neither a coalition (Shiite) government nor an
accord (al-taaluf, Suuni) government. We say that
the government must include even those who lost in
the elections. In my opinion, we must include in a
future government some of the armed Iraqi sides, but
certainly not the terrorists. We must build the Iraq
of new concepts.
(Q): What is your opinion of Al-Jaafari's statement
about including Al-Mahdi Army militias in the Iraqi
Army?
(Allawi) I don't know what Al-Jaafari wants. But I
know that there is Law No. 91, which I issued and
began to implement when I was prime minister. It
clarifies things concerning the issue of the armed
militias in Iraq. We said then that the militias
must not be included in the army. There are
solutions to their issue and it will be possible to
deal with their members as isolated cases. We said
that some of the militia members could be included
in the armed forces and others in the public sector,
and yet others in the private sector. As to turning
the army and police into groups representing
political entities, blocs, and militias, this will
mean that they will turn into conflicting sides
within the state's security entities. Therefore, the
call to include the militias in the army or police
is incorrect and will not achieve the purpose. We
must consider Law No. 91, which was signed by all
the Iraqi political entities.
(Q): Muqtada al-Sadr is being presented today as a
political leader. Yet, he is wanted legally for
killing the religious scholar Abdul majid al-Khoei
and Haydar al-Ruqay'i and Mahir al-Yasiri in Al-Najaf
in 2003. How can that be possible in a state, which
is determined to uphold the rule of law and justice?
(Allawi) I do not doubt that he (Muqtada al-Sadr)
exists in the political arena and has wider presence
in the Coalition List and that he was received
positively by the religious authority and the forces
comprising the coalition. Thus, he became part of
the political process. I believe that this legal
case must be settled. It must not remain pending .
It must be settled as soon as possible in accordance
with the existing norms, whether legally or
tribally.
(Q): There is a strange relationship between the
religious authorities, Shiite and Sunni, and state
officials. How do you explain this relationship?
(Allawi) The religious authorities, whether the
higher religious authority in Al-Najaf or the
Association of Muslim Scholars, do not interfere in
state affairs. There is no law other than the State
Administration Law and the Iraqi constitution that
says that the religious authorities have the right
to interfere in state affairs. But the contrary is
happening. State officials check with the religious
authorities to seek their permission or opinion on
this or that issue. The one to be blamed is he who
tries to deviate from the legal frameworks that
define the behaviors and the rights of Iraqi state
officials. These officials place commitments and
duties on the religious authorities. State officials
must stop embarrassing the religious authorities,
whether Shiite, Sunni, or Christian with simple
issues, while these authorities must remain in their
high, noble, and honorable places.
(Q): In your opinion, is there any hope of
announcing the formation of the government?
(Allawi) As you know we are now in the fourth month
since the elections and it is possible for this
period to drag on. Despite the lapse of four months
we have not yet named the prime minister, the
president of the republic, or the speaker of the
parliament. This is not to mention the subsequent
problems of naming the ministers and distributing
the seats and key ministries with all the squabbling
involved. Therefore, we Al-Iraqiyah List have been
and still are for proposing programs and criteria
and not names. Whoever believes that will apply the
criteria to the persons according to the programs.
This would simplify matters. Otherwise, we will
continue moving in a vicious circle.
Unfortunately, US Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw are
currently visiting Baghdad to settle outstanding
problems. I regret that because I feel that the
Iraqi sides themselves should settle these problems
among them and reach what will serve the country and
keep it away from personal conflicts. This one wants
this post and that one wants the other post. We in
Al-Iraqiyah List do not follow this approach and the
proof is that I have been outside Iraq for 10 days
now and the members of our list, who are negotiating
in Baghdad, have not raised the issue of the
ministries or the names because what interests us is
the program. If we cannot agree on a program, there
is no need to participate in the government in the
first place. What concern us is to see Iraq stable,
peaceful, and strong representing all Iraqis.
Calls are coming from the United States and Iraq and
others from other states, saying: Let them
negotiate. I considered the presence of Iran in
Sharm al-Sheikh conference as correct in a correct
international climate for a dialogue to achieve
balance and security in the entire region and not
just Iraq.
Now the talk is about bilateral meetings, which will
not be useful if we are looking for a lasting
solution for the region. If the United States and
Iran are looking for solutions to their problems,
let them enter into bilateral talks. But if they
want solutions for the region, they must include the
representatives of the governments and peoples of
the region, including Iraq, which must include a
political bloc in the dialogue since we lack a
proper government. There is a government in Iraq and
also political forces that have real presence on the
ground, even if they are not represented in the
parliament. We must not jump over them. Therefore,
the question of the US-Iranian dialogue is
important, but within the dimensions I mentioned. I
told US official about that. I also discussed it
with the leaders of the region.
aawsat.com
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