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Three years after the
Coalition invasion, Iraq is now at a crucial turning
point in its history. The country is on the
precipice of civil war and possible fragmentation,
but when future historians look back on the years
following Saddam's removal from power, they will
probably point to several events that precipitated
the resurrection of the fissile Iraqi identities of
religion, ethnicity and nationalism that have led to
this crisis.
Three years after the Coalition invasion, Iraq is
now at a crucial turning point in its history. The
country is on the precipice of civil war and
possible fragmentation, but when future historians
look back on the years following Saddam's removal
from power, they will probably point to several
events that precipitated the resurrection of the
fissile Iraqi identities of religion, ethnicity and
nationalism that have led to this crisis.
The first event was the deconstruction of the Iraqi
state in the early period of the occupation,
encouraging localised political groups to grab power
in their "own" areas.
At the same time, the demobilisation of the Iraqi
army - originally believed to be a very good idea in
order to prevent future military coups - was then
seen to be a very bad idea, as the occupying forces
were suddenly faced with determined insurgent
enemies possessing local knowledge and enjoying
localised support.
And the Coalition forces themselves cannot escape
blame: the suppression of Fallujah, and those
photographs from the Abu Ghraib prison have all
played their part.
However, future historians may also consider that
the terrible situation of Iraq in 2006 had deeper
origins. The trauma inflicted upon Iraqi society by
a decade of sanctions following a decade of war with
Iran; the existence of an all-pervasive totalitarian
state that broke social bonds and played upon
differences in society to preserve the regime; the
continued Kurdish rebellion against the Iraqi state,
resulting in the emergence of a Kurdish de facto
state in the north; and the rise in political
Shi'ism in the 1990s were all in place long before
George W Bush's attention was brought so forcibly to
Iraq in the days following September 11.
Whatever the reasons, there is no doubting the
critical position in which Iraq now stands. The
destruction a month ago of the Shia shrines in
Samarra - a site of immense spiritual importance -
was an act aimed to further polarise sectarian
loyalties. This it certainly did, with retaliatory
killings taking place in Baghdad, and evidence of a
new, harder line emerging from within the ranks of
the Shia religious establishment.
This new wave of sectarian violence is taking place
against a backdrop of an increasingly moribund
political process. Following the elections of
December 2005, the Iraqi National Assembly belatedly
convened only this month, due to the inability of
the political players to agree upon who would be
Prime Minister.
The arguments surrounding the rights and wrongs of
Ibrahim Ja'afari's candidature shed some light on
the problems that will haunt Iraq in the coming
months. The Kurds do not trust Ja'afari, as they
consider that he has not implemented the process to
decide upon the status of the northern oil-city of
Kirkuk. And the Arab Sunnis object to Ja'afari, as
they believe he did little to combat the atrocities
being committed against them by Shia militia forces.
Although politicians and academics are arguing about
whether there is already a civil war raging in Iraq,
the fact is, violence remains localised and there
still exists a great deal of sentiment and hope
among ordinary Iraqis - as expressed by political,
religious and social leaders - that calmer heads
will still prevail in these difficult times.
However, with scores of bodies being found almost
every day, it seems their voices are being
increasingly ignored. If it is not yet a civil war,
it is not far off being one.
What now needs to be addressed is what to do if the
situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate. Does the
Coalition sit back and watch what would be a chaotic
unravelling of Iraq, with militias acting to defend
their own communities and attack others (as is
increasingly happening), and with the once
cosmopolitan cities of Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and
Basra exposed to the horrors of sectarian
blood-letting?
Or should the Coalition, perhaps, be proactive in
enforcing a managed partition of Iraq,
decentralising political authority to the Shia in
the south, the Kurds in the north, and the Sunnis in
the centre? The fact is, this has already happened
to a great extent, with the Kurdistan Region now
codified, and Basra effectively out of the political
orbit of Baghdad.
So the real questions are: How would this "regional"
dimension be managed, particularly with regard to
Iranian influence not only in the south (where it is
already very prominent), but also in Kurdistan,
where Turkey also has key national interests at
stake? And how should security in "divided" cities
be managed?
From the perspective of the Coalition, there are few
good options left at this point. A lack of action
and the withdrawal of an outside military presence
would almost certainly see militias turn on militias
(even within their own communities - it is quite
likely that the men of the Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq would turn upon their
Shia brothers in Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi army), and
the most powerful political parties act to create
political realities on the ground (such as the Kurds
taking Kirkuk, once and for all).
A re-drawing of the map of Iraq, identifying
communities according to their religion or
ethnicity, would reek of neo-imperialism. It would
also generate considerable political opposition -
with the risk of military intervention - in the
wider region. Yet it would perhaps result in a less
chaotic situation in Iraq (or what we now consider
"Iraq") itself.
Put simply, from the perspective of the UK and US,
none of the options available can be considered to
be good. We have got to the point where the country
is on the verge of collapse, and the only options
left are unsavoury and problematic. What was
unthinkable three years ago - a partitioned or
rigidly federal state - might now be the only hope.
Gareth Stansfield is Reader in Middle East
Politics at the University of Exeter, and Associate
Fellow at Chatham House.
www.telegraph.co.uk
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