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The difficulties of forming the New
Government in Iraq
1.3.2006
By
Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli*
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Introduction
In the second parliamentary elections in Iraq,
conducted on December 15 of last year, four
political groups emerged with an overwhelming
control of the seats in parliament. These groups,
together controlling 252 of the total 275 seats, are
the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) associated with
Shi'ite political parties (130 seats) [1] ; the
Kurdish Alliance (53 seats); the Iraqi Accord Front
representing the Sunnis (44 seats); and the Iraqi
National List of former prime minister Ayad Allawi
primarily comprising secular candidates (25 seats).
The remaining 23 seats are divided among various
parties and individuals, the most significant being
the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, another Sunni
party, whose 11 seats complement the 44 seats of the
Iraqi Accord Front.
The results of the elections were contested on
grounds of fraud and irregularities, which delayed
the final allocation of seats by almost two months.
The investigation by a team of U.N. and Arab League
experts found few irregularities: The ultimate
results announced by the Independent Electoral
Committee on February 10, 2006 were nearly identical
to the preliminary results. The international team
also identified "the pressing need at this juncture
of Iraq's history for a veritable national unity
representing all the segments of the Iraqi people."
[2]
The Leading Political Figures
The four leading winning groups in the elections are
made up of various components which, in a crunch,
may follow their own religious, sectarian, tribal,
regional, or even personal interests. Indeed, the
tensions and disagreements within and among them
could undermine the prospects of forming a stable
and effectively operating government in the next
four years.
The UIA itself is a confederation of four political
parties and independent candidates - the Supreme
Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
under Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim; al-Da'wa Party, under
the current Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja'fari; the
Fadhila Party [Virtue Party] under Dr. Nadeem al-Jabiri;
and the Sadrists, the supporters of the young
Islamic radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The Kurdish
Alliance is made up of the two leading Kurdish
parties - the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
under Jalal Talabani, the current president of Iraq,
and the Kurdistan Democratic Party under Mas'oud
Barzani, the President of Kurdistan.
There are four leading figures and groupings in the
Sunni parties. The Iraqi Accord Front, including the
Conference of the People of Iraq, under 'Adnan al-Duleimi;
the Islamic Party, under Tariq al-Hashemi; the
National Dialogue Front, under Sheikh Khalaf al-'Alyan;
and the Council for National Dialogue, under Saleh
al-Mutlak.
The Selection of a Prime Minister
Under the Iraqi constitution, the party with the
largest number of seats designates the prime
minister, although it is the President's Council
(the President of the Republic and his two Vice
Presidents) which asks a member of parliament to
form a new government.
While the election results were being contested, the
UIA, the group with the largest number of
parliamentary seats, was engaged in an intense
internal contest for the selection of its candidate
for the post of prime minister. Initially, four
candidates competed, but eventually the real
competition was reduced to that between the current
Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja'fari from al-Da'wa
Party and 'Adil Abd Al-Mahdi, the vice president
from SCIRI. The new prime minister will serve for
four years under the constitution approved in a
referendum in October 2005.
The Method for Selecting the Prime Minister
The two key candidates and their supporters
advocated two opposing methods of selection: Abd
al-Mahdi supporters favored selection based on
consensus; al-Ja'fari supporters favored selection
by a vote among the 130 UIA members of parliament.
The second method emerged with the upper hand,
thanks greatly to the weight of the 30 Sadrists who
all voted for al-Ja'fari. The London daily Al-Sharq
Al-Awsat has reported that, on the eve of the
voting, Muqtada al-Sadr called some of the Shi'ite
leaders and threatened a civil war if al-Ja'fari was
not selected. [3] Given al-Sadr's record of erratic
behavior, the story cannot be readily discounted. It
was also suggested that as a quid pro quo for the
Sadrists' votes for him, al-Ja'fari will drop all
legal cases against them, most of them arising from
the rebellion in Najaf and Karbala in 2004 and, more
significantly, the arrest warrant pending against
al-Sadr for the murder of a major Shi'ite figure,
Abd al-Majid al-Khoei, shortly after the occupation
of Iraq. [4]
When the votes were counted, al-Ja'fari received 65
votes and Abd Al-Mahdi, 64. Al-Ja'fari was declared
the winner, but his margin of victory represented
neither a great vote of confidence for someone who
had already been serving as a prime minister for
almost a year, nor a propitious start for the
challenges ahead.
Al-Sadr emerged from this exercise as a person with
political clout, which he quickly used in a series
of well-publicized visits to neighboring countries
where he was treated as a significant political
figure. In the course of less than four weeks, he
was received by the heads of state of Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, and Jordan. One way or another, al-Sadr
has become part of the Iraqi political landscape - a
force to be reckoned with. Al-Sadr has two potent
opponents - the Kurds and Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, the
leader of SCIRI. If these two political groups
should join forces with Allawi and the Sunnis, an
entirely new political situation could emerge.
Foreseen Delays in Forming a Government
The formation of the first Iraqi government
following the elections of January 30, 2005 took
approximately four months. At that time, there were
only two major groups negotiating a deal, and one of
the two, the UIA, had an absolute, though not a
two-thirds, majority in the National Assembly. This
time, there are four major groups in the
newly-elected parliament, and none with an absolute
majority. To form a new government, and with it the
right to govern, a candidate needs the support of
all of the UIA and at least one more group from
among the four. Given that al-Ja'fari is not popular
outside his own Da'wa party and the Sadrists, who
jointly control fewer than half of UIA's 130 seats,
it is hardly surprising that various groups are
already maneuvering to identify alternative
candidates.
The process of forming a coalition is likely to be
neither easy nor quick. Already many of the
potential partners have declared their conditions,
or red lines - a euphemism for a veto - about
potential candidates and about critical issues.
Notwithstanding his admonition that whoever draws
these lines "will find himself [entangled] inside
them," [5] Talabani reminded the UIA that nomination
does not necessarily mean appointment, and that
while al-Ja'fari can be approved in parliament by a
simple majority of 138 members, he would in fact
need 184 votes, or two-thirds of the members of
parliament, to be able to govern effectively, and to
effect certain changes that would require two-thirds
of the votes in parliament. [6] The Kurds have their
own conditions about the federalism of Kurdistan and
about the future of Kirkuk, as will be explained
below.
Contentions About Political Figures
The political figure who raises the highest level of
contention is al-Ja'fari himself. He has been
criticized for performing poorly as prime minister.
The country remains in a severe state of turmoil and
is subject to daily terrorist attacks. Frightened by
random violence, many Iraqis rarely venture out of
their homes. The supply of electricity and gasoline
remains irregular, and the high rate of unemployment
shows no sign of abating. Above all, al-Ja'fari is
now seen as beholden to the erratic Islamist cleric
Muqtada al-Sadr, whose supporters' votes were
crucial to putting al-Ja'fari ahead of his closest
competitor. There is a genuine concern that al-Ja'fari's
government might, under pressure from al-Sadr, pull
Iraq further into an Iranian-style theocracy.
The other political figure who raises a great deal
of contention is Ayad Allawi, the former prime
minister, who is a secular Shi'ite. Al-Ja'fari, and,
even more, the Sadrists who supported him, have
declared their opposition to Allawi's joining the
new government. Al-Ja'fari's objection may have to
do with Allawi's past Ba'thist association, and the
Sadrists cannot forgive him for crushing, with
considerable force, their rebellion against the
Shi'ite marja'iyah in Najaf and Karbala and against
the multinational forces in 2004. Moreover, Allawi's
secularism is anathema to a group which firmly
believes that the only good government is a
government based on shari'a (Islamic law). [7]
Political Maneuvering
There is a broad consensus among the various
political groupings, including elements of the UIA,
that the new government should be a government of
"national salvation," that brings under its umbrella
all the political forces in Iraq. The United States
stands firmly behind this proposition, for it is
indeed unlikely that the Sunni-guided insurgency can
be brought under control unless the Sunni
representatives in Parliament are fully represented
in the new government.
The two Sunni groups in Parliament, which together
control 55 seats, have entered into a broader
coalition with Allawi's National List, thereby
creating the second largest faction in Parliament
with 80 seats. The new group is called the Council
for National Action (majlis al-'amal al-watani),
which will act as an integrated parliamentary
faction in negotiations with the designated prime
minister on the formation of a new government. They
expect to increase their number to 88 by attracting
individuals or representatives from small groups. In
the words of one of its members - Izzat al-Shahbandar
- all the faction's components are nationalist
groups which reject ethnic politics. Its mission "is
national unity, without which Iraq will descend into
the abyss." [8]
Another problem for al-Ja'fari is posed by the head
of the UIA, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, who heads SCIRI
and who believes that the post of prime minister
belongs to his party because it has a much larger
political base than al-Ja'fari's Da'wa Party, and is
negotiating with prospective coalition partners
behind al-Ja'fari's back. While he is on record in
support of the democratic choice of al-Ja'fari, his
actions are not consistent with his words. He is
known to have been holding talks, jointly with Adil
Abd Al-Mahdi who was defeated by al-Ja'fari by one
vote, with the Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani and
with the Sunni leader 'Adnan al-Duleimi. Al-Hakim
has also met separately with the other Kurdish
leader Mas'oud Barzani, the president of Kurdistan.
[9] Given Al-Hakim's disappointment at the selection
of al-Ja'fari over SCIRI's candidate Abd al-Mahdi,
it is a safe assumption that he is not exactly
conducting meetings to mobilize support for the
candidacy of al-Ja'fari.
While SCIRI and its leader al-Hakim have maintained
a strategic alliance with the Kurds, al-Ja'fari, as
prime minister, has had less than warm relations
with Jalal Talabani, the president of Iraq. Their
conflicts and disagreements made front page news for
a long time in the free Iraqi press. The Kurds have
been particularly disappointed with al-Ja'fari's
refusal to place the Kirkuk issue on the agenda.
Talabani and al-Ja'fari have even feuded over one of
Saddam's palaces, an issue finally resolved with the
help of the Kurdish militia, the Peshmerga.
Al-Ja'fari must also not ignore the fourth component
of the UIA, the Fadhila Party [the Virtue Party]
which has its own agenda and its own demands which,
if not satisfied, might cause it to bolt into the
arms of a different political configuration. The Al-Fadhila
party seems not to have taken part in the
negotiations for the next government.
Another criticism of al-Ja'fari, voiced by the Najaf
News Network, is that by insisting on his reelection,
Al-Ja'fari has galvanized all the forces, national
and international, that are opposed to the Shi'a
rise to power in Iraq, thus forcing him to make
concessions to the detriment of the Shi'a and to
their fundamental interests. [10]
Critical Issues Facing the Formation of
Government
When the maneuvering subsides, and the actual
bargaining goes into high gear, there will be a
number of issues, some extremely thorny, placed on
the negotiating table. Among them are the following:
The Coalition Government
Since no political party commands an absolute
majority in the new parliament, a coalition
government is inevitable. The questions are what
kind of coalition will be formed, who will be in it
and at what a price.
The starting issue is whether the new government
will be another coalition between the Shi'a and the
Kurds, or a national unity government that will
include, in addition to these two groups, the Sunnis
and the secular members of Allawi's party. Hamid
Majid Mousa, the Secretary General of the Communist
Party and a member of Allawi's group, has asserted
that the attempts to keep Allawi out have foiled
attempts to form a new government. [11]
In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the
Shi'a shrines on February 23, the likelihood of a
national government has increased. There is,
however, a growing assumption that the heads of most
of the political parties, with the open support of
the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq, will demand that the
UIA come up with a candidate other than al-Ja'fari.
In this context, the convening of the parliament,
required by the constitution to take place on
February 25, was postponed for two weeks in order to
give the various factions more time to negotiate.
[12]
The Issue of Federalism
There is a broad consensus in Iraq that the Kurdish
region should remain federated - in other words,
autonomous - under a unified Iraq. Al-Hakim, the
head of SCIRI, has repeatedly announced his
intention to create a similar federated region in
southern Iraq. The Sunnis, supported by the Sadrists,
strongly oppose this idea because it will deny the
Sunnis the benefits of oil revenues, as these
revenues will accrue solely to the Kurds and the
Shi'a. The opponents of federalism demand a
constitutional revision that would render such a
federal structure unconstitutional. The UIA is
opposed to major revisions in the constitution which
would deny them the option of federating the
southern governorates on the pattern of the Kurdish
north.
The Issue of Kirkuk
The Kurds argue that al-Ja'fari has reneged on a
commitment that the government would discuss the
issue of Kirkuk's future - an issue that they rank
second in importance only to federation of the three
autonomous Kurdish provinces. They want the issue
resolved through a referendum which they believe
they have the votes to win. The Kurds are unlikely
to support any prime minister who does not offer to
deal with this issue in a manner favorable to their
aspirations.
As a condition of supporting al-Ja'fari, the Kurds
demand a commitment by the prospective prime
minister to conduct a census of Kirkuk, to be
followed by a plebiscite that would determine
whether the city will be incorporated into
Kurdistan. They also demand a major role for the
Kurdish ministers in the new government. [13]
The Kurds realize, as they have said through one of
their negotiators Fuad Ma'ssoum, that they can tip
the scales between the UIA's candidate and the newly
established Allawi-Sunni Coalition's candidate. [14]
In practice, the Kurds would prefer a UIA candidate,
provided that candidate is not al-Ja'fari.
The Issue of Deba'thification
There are two extremes on this issue. On one side
are the Sadrists, who demand that the
deba'thification of Iraq must go ahead at full speed
with the summary execution of Saddam Hussein; on the
other side are the Sunnis, who feel that they have
been sufficiently victimized by the policy of
deba'thification, and that it is time to move on and
unify the country. Holding a middle ground is the
Allawi group, which has taken a pragmatic view about
deba'thification, namely that the policy should be
applied only to the most senior elements of the
former ruling Ba'th Party. This view is also shared
by the Kurds, whose leader, Talabani, has vowed
that, as president, he will never sign execution
orders for Saddam Hussein.
The Issue of a Timetable for Withdrawal
The Sunnis and the Sadrists find themselves in
agreement regarding the demand to set a timetable
for the withdrawal of multinational forces from
Iraq. They share the view that insurgency, terrorism
and economic dislocation are caused by the
occupation forces, and that the sooner they leave,
the better Iraq is likely to be. For them, setting a
timetable for the withdrawal of foreign forces is
second only to preventing the federalization of
Iraq. The Kurds want the multinational forces to
stay until the resistance has been brought under
control and the Shi'a, with the blessings of their
spiritual leader Ayatollah al-Sistani, have taken a
pragmatic view.
The Issue of the Militias
There are three significant militias - the Kurdish
Peshmerga, SCIRI's Iran-supported Badr Brigade, and
al-Sadr's Jeish al-Mahdi, which may also be getting
support from Iran.
In rather blunt language, the U.S. Ambassador to
Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, said the United States will
not agree to the existence of militias connected
with sectarian elements in the new government. He
said the American taxpayers wish to see their tax
money spent properly and they do not wish to see it
spent on [military] forces run by sectarian
ministers. [15] The ambassador's admonition may have
been directed primarily at the Badr Brigade, which
is suspected of committing murders and acts of
terrorism against the Sunnis. (See next paragraph.)
Key Security Ministries
There are four key security posts - the Ministry of
Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, the National
Security Adviser, and the head of the intelligence
service. The U.S. Ambassador, who is directly
involved in many of the negotiations between party
leaders about the formation of the new government,
has expressed the view that all the four positions
should be held by individuals not connected with
sectarian parties. [16] The most controversial
figure is the Minister of Interior, Banyan Jabber
Solagh, whose ministry was found to be running
illegal prisons and torture chambers, most of whose
victims are Sunnis. The Sunnis also claim that the
police and security forces under the Ministry of the
Interior are responsible for the assassination of
numerous Sunni clerics, and they want Solagh out.
However, he is a member of SCIRI, which is supported
by the Badr Militia. Should al-Ja'fari succeed in
forming a government, it will be difficult for him
to replace Solagh, as doing so would offend the
other branch of the UIA, whose support for al-Ja'fari
is far from solid. [17]
Al-Ja'fari was equally blunt, characterizing the
statement by the U.S. Ambassador as "his
government's point of view." He asserted that Iraq
"makes its own decisions, by Iraqi methods and
through Iraqi vision, without the intervention of
any [other] country." [18]
When agreement is reached on the issues indicated
above - and some will no doubt be swept under the
carpet for consideration at a later date - a new
round of negotiations will start concerning the
allocation of the so-called 16 sovereign posts: the
president, the prime minister, and the speaker of
the parliament - each with two deputies; the
ministers of foreign affairs, finance, interior,
defense, and petroleum; the national security
adviser; and the chief of intelligence. And,
finally, the parties will have to agree on the size
of the cabinet and how the posts will be distributed
among competing demands and party interests.
Criticism of the U.S. Ambassador
The U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad has maintained
a high profile in the various meetings regarding the
formation of a new government. He also been seen
sharing the podium in news conferences involving
senior Iraqi leaders, including the president.
It is not surprising that the ambassador is not
well-liked by most of the Shi'a, who refer to him as
"Ambassador of the Sunnis" and as "Abu Omar" or
"Mullah Khlil," after Mullah Omar of the Taliban.
[19] Even the daily al-Sabah, a semi-official
newspaper, published an article bearing the headline
"The American Ambassador carries out the
responsibility of the high commissioner." In the
opening sentence, the daily said, "The difference
between the function of an ambassador and that of a
high commissioner designated by his country to
govern an occupied land has disappeared." [20]
Conclusion
This paper has sought to highlight some of the
complexities and issues involved in the formation of
a new Iraq government that is supposed to govern a
country in deep crisis for the next four years.
The chances of concluding the arduous process of
forming a coalition may have been enhanced by the
recent terrorist attack on major Shi'ite shrines in
Samaraa, and the subsequent retaliation against
Sunni mosques in many parts of Iraq. The danger of a
civil war resulting from violence against the holy
places of both communities could spur action to
reach a compromise faster than would otherwise have
been possible. But even a faster process may be
slower than what Iraq needs in terms of a strong and
stable government that is capable of addressing the
burning national issues of security and economic
reconstruction. The decision on who will be Iraq's
next prime minister will be of decisive import for
the question of how the country might be
successfully navigated through turbulent waters.
* Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli is Senior Analyst of
MEMRI's Middle East Economic Studies Program.
www.memri.org
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