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European Turkey Civic Commission EUTCC:
Report
12.2.2006
By Hans Branscheidt eutcc - Branscheidt @ eutcc.de
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EUROPEAN TURKEY CIVIC COMMISSION - EUTCC
PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND TURKEY
1. Introduction
The EU Turkey Civic Commission (EUTCC) would like to
present its views on the perspectives of the
accession negotiations between the European Union
and Turkey.
The EUTCC is genuinely supportive of Turkey’s
aspirations to become a member of the EU. We believe
this is the best opportunity Turkey will have to
become a truly democratic country, with full respect
for the rule of law and human rights. However, it is
obvious that Turkish membership must be conditional
on the full implementation of all accession
criteria, including respect for and protection of
minorities There must be no bargaining or reductions
in the standards of compliance for geopolitical or
other extraneous reasons.
After some observations on the 2005 Progress Report,
the present paper limits itself to discussing five
main problem areas, which in many ways represent an
acid test for Turkey’s aspirations to membership of
the European Union:
· Torture
· Freedom of expression
· Freedom of association - political parties
· The judiciary
· The role of the military
2. General observations on the Progress Report
The 2005 Progress Report describes in some detail
both the achievements and shortcomings with regard
to Turkey’s progress towards implementation of the
accession criteria. The EUTCC does realise that the
EU and the Government of Turkey are operating within
the framework of normal diplomatic relations. This
understandably colours the language of the Progress
Report, which tends to give the reader the
impression that the overall progress has been
substantial, and that the remaining problems are
limited, primarily relating to improved
implementation. This is also how the Report has been
interpreted in the media and the political circles
in Turkey.
However, when reading all the cases where no or only
limited progress has been achieved, the rather rosy
language in many parts of the Report is not
substantiated by the hard facts on the ground. Even
less rosy is the picture when one realises that the
cases referred to in the Report are just examples,
the tip of an iceberg.
Generally speaking, it is primarily at the level of
adoption of legislation that some real progress has
been achieved. And even at that level, much remains
to be done. In fact, in some cases, there has been
regression rather than progress. This includes what
was proclaimed to be the big step forward: the new
Penal Code. However, the reality is that there has
been a rush among members of the judiciary to clamp
down on freedom of expression, based on
authoritarian legislation such as the new Article
301.
It is noteworthy that most of the recent cases where
the Turkish judiciary has failed blatantly in
recognising and following European human rights
standards, are related to the situation of
“non-Turkish citizens”. This applies particularly to
the situation of the greatest non-Turkish
population, the Kurds. The cases have revealed and
emphasized, again and again, how deep-rooted and
sensitive the Kurdish issue is in a strongly
nationalistic state.
The EUTCC believes that this will prove to be the
major hurdle on the way to a genuine acceptance and
implementation of European values and standards.
Freedom of expression can be accepted generally in
Turkey, as long as it does not touch the raw nerve:
the nationalistic ideology and its sequel, the
Kurdish problem.
The Ottoman empire, with its multi-ethnic/cultural
and political structure gave the Kurdish people a
great degree of autonomy. In the new Turkish
republic, the Kurdish people were not able to find a
place either as a minority or as a
cultural-political identity group. The
discrimination against the Kurds and the
assimilation policies led to uprisings and unrest,
which have continued until our time. In turn, this
reinforced anti-democratic and authoritarian
political structures, hampering the development of a
genuine democratic society.
The EUTCC believes there can be no progress in this
field, unless the Turkish political establishment,
as well as major parts of the public, accept the
rights of the Kurdish population. This issue is not
focused on adequately and clearly in the Progress
Report. As a result, Turkish authorities, media and
large sectors of the population, were triumphant
when reading the Progress Report and discovering
that the Kurds were not described as a minority.
Nationalistic elements are using this as a shield to
protect their views, denying the identity and the
rights of 15 million Kurds.
The Turkish authorities have had little difficulty
so far in accepting the Copenhagen criteria, which
specifically obliges Turkey to ensure “respect for
and protection of minorities”. However, Turkey has
officially made it abundantly clear that this
acceptance is limited to those people who are
defined as minorities in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty.
In other words, Turkey claims the exclusive right
for itself to determine the extent of its
commitments to the EU and its standards and values.
So far, this has not been challenged explicitly by
the EU.
Instead of describing the Kurdish problem as a main
problem that Turkey must face and resolve, the
Report refers to “the situation in the Southeast”,
the expression favoured by Turkey. Only the Greeks
are directly referred to as a “minority”, again in
line with the Turkish official position, although
the Report does state that under relevant
international and European standards, “other
communities …. could [emphasis added] qualify as
minorities”.
This ambiguous terminology lends itself to
misleading the people of Turkey, including many
within the political establishment. Reading the
Report, they believe that the EU does not consider
or does not insist that the Kurdish population have
rights under international and European law and
standards, whether the Kurds are conceived as a
“people”, a “nation” or as a “minority”. A genuine
implementation of the Copenhagen criteria can only
come about after the Kurdish problem has been both
recognised and resolved.
Prime Minister Erdogan said in September 2005 that
he recognised the “Kurdish issue”, and that it must
be resolved through “more democratization”. His
statements could have given some degree of hope, and
to many Kurds it did. On the other hand it gave rise
to a wave of loud protest among nationalistic
circles, including critical comments from the
military. This shows the admittedly difficult
balancing act that the Government must perform
between the reforms required by the EU and the
demands of the established nationalistic ideology
and its proponents, including the military. This is
probably the reason why, half a year later, no steps
have been taken, not even at the verbal level,
towards a resolution of the Kurdish problem.
This lack of progress in the most difficult problem
Turkey is facing is not acceptable. The EU must
insist on a “roadmap” to solve the Kurdish problem.
3. The Realities of the Present Situation
a) Torture, Police
Brutality and Extra-judicial Executions
Although there are conflicting reports and views, it
appears that torture has become less wide-spread
than it used to be until recent times. This is
particularly the case at detention centres. On the
other hand there are increasing reports of torture
or degrading treatment outside of the detention
centres, e.g. during apprehension or transportation
to detention centres.
A complete picture of the situation on the ground is
for obvious reasons not easy to gather and document.
The Turkish authorities are not particularly
forthcoming in this regard. It is illustrating to
read in the report of 08.12.2005 from the European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT):
“Not for the first time during a CPT visit, the
Committee’s delegation found that certain law
enforcement establishments which (according to the
custody registers) regularly hold a considerable
number of detainees were practically if not totally
empty [emphasis added] during the time of the
delegation’s visit.” (Paragraph 6 of the Report).
In other words, these detention centres had been
emptied before the visit of the CPT to prevent
embarrassing situations for the Turkish authorities!
Nonetheless, the CPT report refers to “numerous
persons” alleging ill-treatment, e.g.:
· “blows to the body, including on occasion falaka)”,
· “suspension by the arms”,
· “stripping naked and hosing with cold water”,
· “squeezing the genitals”,
· “immersing the head in water”,
· “asphyxiation using a plastic bag”.
The CPT also expressed its regret that “the Turkish
authorities have not provided replies to a number of
issues” raised by the CPT during its visit in 2004,
some of which “were clearly of an urgent nature”.
The CPT also complained about “inadequate or
incomplete” response to its report on the September
2003 visit.
The CPT was in particular concerned about the
failure to implement existing regulations concerning
the medical inspection of detainees. The CPT stated
that in many cases, the law enforcement officers
were present during the medical examination, which
in many cases was very perfunctory.
The picture emerging from the CPT report is of a
systematic and deliberate procedure to evade the
responsibilities of the Turkish authorities, and to
protect those who are guilty of torture.
The reports of Turkish and international NGOs are
also not indicating much progress. According to the
records of the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT),
in its annual report dated 29.12.2005:
5 persons died in detention in 2005,
164 women, 10 children and 483 reported to the HRFT
torture rehabilitation centres having been tortured
or ill-treated (180 of them in 2005) and in more
than half of the cases the torture or ill-treatment
occurred outside detention centres,
52 persons were shot to death and hundreds were
wounded by security forces in connection with armed
clashes with PKK forces.
The training of police and security forces does not
appear to have had the desired effects. There are
too many reports of police brutality, particularly
connected with public demonstrations. The beating
and spraying with pepper gas of men and women on the
International Women’s Day in March are just one of
many examples. It was not helpful that Prime
Minister Erdogan criticized the press for having
made critical comments on the case.
It is sad to observe that the system of
extra-judicial executions performed by the state’s
security forces or with their collusion has not
disappeared. There have been various incidents,
notably the Semdinli affair, where it appears clear
that security forces have been guilty of executions
and killings.
The Progress Report notes that the security
situation has worsened, and blame this entirely on
“the resumption of violence by the PKK”. It does
note with concern that “the security forces
sometimes respond inappropriately”. However,
incidents like Semdinli indicate that this is not a
question of an “inappropriate” response to attacks
by PKK. The reality is that certain organized groups
within the state have carried out planned attacks on
civilians and then tried to hold PKK responsible for
these attacks.
Members of the Parliamentary Commission
investigating the Semdinli incident have
vociferously expressed their disquiet at what they
perceive as efforts to manipulate the presentation
of relevant evidence.
These incidents have resulted in protests and
clashes between civilians and security forces,
during which several people were killed and many
more injured. The situation is volatile. Some
Turkish media have speculated that “elements in the
‘deep state’ are trying to provoke instability in
order to win a freer hand in the South East”
(Turkish Daily News [TDN], 17/01/2006).
The military and other parts of the “deep state”
continue to accuse the PKK of organising and
carrying out all these killings.
b) Freedom of Expression
The Progress Report optimistically predicts a
“continued reduction in the number of prosecutions
and particularly convictions” in freedom of
expression cases, although it notes that there
remain various provisions in the laws which are a
“potential” threat to freedom of expression. Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gul proclaimed proudly to the
Turkish parliament on 21 December that there was no
person in Turkish prisons convicted for the
expression of non-violent thoughts (HRFT annual
report, 29/12/2005).
At the end of 2005, the situation on the ground
looks much bleaker. It has become clear that several
articles of the new Penal Code are not only
“potential” threats, but are part of the daily
reality in Turkey. The present report would become
far too voluminous if all the individual cases were
to be discussed here. Some of them are widely known,
others do not reach the headlines in the media.
The most illustrious example is perhaps the infamous
new Article 301 of the Penal Code. Rather than
widening the freedom of expression, it has been used
as a powerful tool of repression. According to a
recent report from “Reporters without Borders”, this
article has been used to charge or convict at least
22 journalists and writers since June 2005. The
latest conviction was on 27 December, when Zulkuf
Kisanik got a six months prison sentence for writing
a book investigating the destruction of Kurdish
villages.
A realistic and sad picture of the Government’s
priorities is given by the Justice Minister’s
attitude relating to the Pamuk case. Firstly, he
refused to consider prompt action to remedy the
obvious anomaly, saying he needed to see how the new
article would be applied in practice. 22 cases in
six months were obviously not sufficient for him to
discover the anomaly. Secondly, he criticized Pamuk
for not making “conciliatory remarks” and hinted
that such a move “would have prevented his
prosecution”. He advised Pamuk to state publicly: “I
apologize to the nation”! (TDN, 07/01/2006). As if
that was not enough, the Justice Minister, while
admitting the flaws in the justice system, added
that “Pamuk was also guilty”(Zaman, 27.01.2006).
According to the Turkish Publishers Union 2005
report, 37 writers were tried in 2004-2005, and
cases initiated against 43 books and 4 compilations
from 25 publishing houses. According to the HRFT,
(29/12/2005) only in the month of December there
were trials in cases against:
2 executives of political parties,
26 journalists, editors, correspondents, TV
producers, translators, photographers,
3 human rights defenders,
1 news agency,
6 publishing houses.
Not a single private broadcaster has so far been
permitted to broadcast in Kurdish (HRW, Annual
Report 2005).
There are some new and disturbing developments in
freedom of expression cases. One is the trend of
nationalistic groups and individuals (often with
connections to the “deep state”) to file complaints
and urge the prosecutors to “do their duty”! This
has resulted in several cases being opened, which
are manifestly unfounded under European standards
(one of the cases referred to the newly coined
expression: “the deep judiciary”!). In addition,
these nationalistic groups interfere with an orderly
conduct of the trials,which the judges seem unable
to control. The training provided by the EU to the
judiciary (15 mill € allocated for 2005) seems to
have had only limited effect so far.
Another trend is based on a bizarre interpretation
of the article that prohibits attempts to influence
the decisions of the judiciary, as an alternative
crime to “insults” against the court. These
provisions are now being construed so as to stifle
any negative comments on decisions within the
judiciary, in cases that are uncomfortable for the
nationalistic ideology. For Turkey the goal seems to
be to ensure that radio and TV programs in Kurdish
are fully controlled by the state.
Not surprisingly, no prosecution has been initiated
or proposed against Prime Minister Erdogan for
having condemned in strong words several court
decisions. Nor was General Büyükanit investigated
for having declared immediately after one of his men
had been arrested in connection with the Semdinli
affair, that the man could not possibly have
committed any crime. Not surprisingly, he said he
believed the PKK was behind the Semdinli bombing.
Some examples of recent freedom of expression
cases are:
- the charges made against Hrant Dink and four other
persons for “attempting to influence the judiciary”
(FIDH-HRA-HRFT, 28/12/2005. Their offence was to
criticize the sentence against Dink in October for
“denigrating the Turkish identity”. The charge
followed a complaint by the nationalistic Union of
Jurists.
- A similar case was announced in December 2005
against five journalists (ibid). Their offence was
to criticize the court decision to ban the
conference on the Armenian issue. This case is also
based on a complaint from the Union of Jurists.
- Fatih Tas was sentenced to six months imprisonment
for publishing “They say you are missing”, about a
journalist who went missing in the 1990s (Amnesty
International-AI-, 23/01/2006).
· Fatih Tas is also prosecuted for publishing a
translation of “Spoils of War: Human Costs of
America’s Arms Trade” (Human Rights Watch,
01/12/2005). The book evaluates the effects of the
US arms industry, and is seen to be “insulting to
the memory of Kemal Atatürk”.
- Halil Altindere goes on trial on 13 April for a
photograph exhibition that allegedly “insults” the
army (AI, 23/01/2006)
- On 6 April the case of Abdullah Yildiz will be
heard, relating to his translation of the book “The
Witches of Smyrna”, which allegedly portrays Turks
in a bad light (ibid.).
- Worst of all, Ibrahim Kaboglu and Baskin Oran,
former members of the Human Rights Committee (under
the Prime Ministry’s Office, will be tried on 15
February for the report produced on Minority and
Cultural Rights, at the request of the Prime
Minister himself(!) (ibid.).
- The decision of the prosecutor of Diyarbakir to
open investigations against 56 mayors from the
Kurdish areas, following a letter urging Denmark not
to close down Roj TV.
- Even the Ministry of Interior has decided to make
its own investigation of the Roj TV case.
- Two former DEP Members of Parliament, Selim Sadak
and Hatip Dicle are being charged for praising PKK
leader Öcalan, by terming his conditions in jail as
“isolation”, and saying that “this will never be
accepted by the Kurdish people”. If found guilty,
they face a prison sentence of up to two years (TDN,
28/01/2006).
c) Freedom of Association
and of Assembly – Political Parties
Although some reforms have been made in the
legislation, the harassment of associations that are
critical of government policies continues in
multiple forms. There is also a need for further
reforms in the legislation, e.g. to remove the ban
on political parties “using languages other than
Turkish” (read: Kurdish).
The new law on associations and its implementing
regulations have not prevented the authorities from
intervening in the internal affairs, and placing
obstacles for their registration, etc.
From November 2004 to December 2005, 55 cases and
six investigations were initiated against the
executives of 14 branches of the Human Rights
Association (HRA). The chairman and board members of
the Bingöl branch of the HRA were subjected to some
92 investigations and 51 court cases since the
branch was opened in 2001. (HRFT, 29/12/2005). With
a record like this, one may wonder how the HRA has
time and resources to carry out its important task
in the Turkish society.
The case against the teachers’ trade union,
Egitim-Sen, is also illustrative of the methods
employed to control associations. Faced with a
threat of being closed down after a long battle in
the courts, Egitim-Sen had no choice other than
deleting from its statutes the reference to its
objectives including the teaching of mother tongues.
Its application to the European Court of Human
Rights will take a long time to be decided, and in
the meanwhile the Turkish state ideology will
prevail, in spite of critical remarks from the EU
and other European institutions.
The case against the pro-Kurdish party DEHAP is
continuing, although its functions have been assumed
by a new political party, in the traditional
response by party members to attempts by the
authorities to close down parties critical to the
prevailing ideology.
Other examples of restrictive, harrassing and
repressive practices are:
In June 2005 the Ankara Governor refused to
authorize the Kurdish Democracy Culture and
Solidarity Association (Kürt-Der), claiming that its
program “to secure the social and cultural rights of
Kurds” was unconstitutional.
In July the Bingöl governor fined the chairman of
the local branch of HRA for printing the
association’s letterhead in Kurdish as well as in
Turkish, in breach of the requirement of the
Associations Law that correspondence must be
exclusively in Turkish (HRW Annual Report 2005).
The infamous case from 1994 against Kurdish MPs,
Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan and Selim Sadak,
is now in its 12th year, with a retrial in its 3rd
year. The last hearing was on 3 February, where
among other things the court refused the defendants’
request to have a witness heard (TDN, 04/02/2006).
Hatip Dicle and Selim Sadak are in addition charged
under article 215 of the Penal Code, for having
characterized the prison conditions of PKK leader
Öcalan as “isolation” (DIHA, 04/02/2006).
d) The Judiciary
By now, many efforts have been made by the EU to aid
the Turkish authorities in securing compliance, or
at least better compliance, with European standards,
at great expense to European taxpayers.
Thousands of the members of the judiciary and the
security forces have been given training, manuals
and directives about the requirements of European
standards. Even those who have not still
participated in formal training programs must by now
have become aware that, for example, the European
Convention on Human Rights is a binding part of
Turkish domestic law, and even takes precedence over
domestic law that may be in contradiction with
domestic law and jurisprudence.
Against this background, it is disturbing, to say
the least, that prosecutors and judges (with a few
honourable exceptions) act as if they had no notion
of the stipulations of the Convention. For example,
the courts fail to distinguish between critical, but
peaceful opinions, and opinions inciting to
violence.
Another “technique” is to assume that a defendant
who has expressed an opinion, e.g. on mother tongue
teaching, which coincides with statements by the PKK,
is himself a terrorist or at least a supporter of
terrorism.
With this kind of “jurisprudence” and precedents, no
peaceful discussion is possible about important
problems in society. It is also troublesome to
observe cases where the judiciary, instead of
applying clear precedents from the Strasbourg
courts, follow signals from the military and other
nationalistic elements of the “deep state”.
Given all the training and information available to
the judiciary, it cannot be for lack of knowledge
that they so often, for various reasons,
deliberately choose to follow the “deep state”
logic. Paradoxically, it may be said that the
judiciary is too independent of the Government,
which after all has given many signals that it
wishes the judiciary to comply with European
standards.
The few selected cases referred to above give
witness to this contradiction. They also demonstrate
that the task of change is enormous and that a
resolution most of all requires the uprooting of the
nationalistic ideology.
As mentioned above, the numerous cases which shock
the European public are just the tip of an iceberg.
Orhan Pamuk will never have to go jail. What is
really worrying is the huge amount of cases that do
not catch the attention of the media, the
politicians and the EU.
These are the thousands who daily suffer torture and
degrading treatment at the hands of the security
forces, harassment by the police and prosecutors,
unjust sentencing and cruel and inhuman treatment in
prisons and detention centre.
Take the example of the man, apparently somewhat
mentally disturbed, who had spray-painted a few
statues of Atatürk in some school yards. The
sentence for this crime against “the memory of
Atatürk” was 22 years in prison! More than many
other cases, this one illustrates a judiciary gone
blind by an authoritarian and outdated ideology. It
also illustrates the need to eliminate this
paranoia, which it must be hoped is not indicative
of the sentiments of the vast majority of the people
of Turkey.
It is an unworthy and unacceptable situation that
Turkish and international NGOs, as well as the EU
itself, have to play the role of some kind of a
“guardian of the court” in the numerous cases where
freedom of expression has been denied or punished.
The Turkish authorities themselves have demonstrated
that they are unable, or unwilling, to prevent, or
even to rectify, human rights violations.
This failure is partly due to an unwillingness to
change the nationalistic ideology, and partly to
strong pressures from the “deep state” and other
nationalistic elements. Whatever the reasons, the
situation may be summarized, as it was done recently
by Hurriyet columnist Bekir Coskun: “We all know
justice doesn’t exist” (quoted in TDN 25/01/2006),
or by TÜSIAD Chairman, Ömer Sabanci, complaining
about “courts making decisions as if there have been
no changes made in the laws concerning freedom of
expression and cultural rights” (TDN 27/01/2006).
This appalling situation should not be allowed to
persist. Europe must now demand that Turkey must
take much more vigorous steps than it has so far
been able or willing to take, in order to put its
house in order. The Turkish system of justice must
be brought up to European standards, as a matter of
urgency. To take those steps is not the task of
Europe, but of Turkey itself. Failure to take such
steps should have consequences for the accession
negotiations.
e) The Role of the Military
Although on paper the privileged, political role of
the military has been reduced to some extent, the
realities remain much the same. The military
obviously still feel free to intervene in the
political agenda, with public statements and other,
more subtle forms of pressure. Various cases against
persons expressing opinions contrary to the military
ideology have been opened by prosecutors, eager to
follow clear signals from the military.
A recent article in Foreign Affairs
(January/February 2006) spells it all out quite
clearly. The article is written by a Turkish
professor and two majors of the Turkish Armed
Forces. The article points out the cohesive nature
of the Armed Forces (TGS) and that the military
“speaks with one voice”. The authors have not even
inserted the traditional caveat that the views
expressed are their own personal views. One can
therefore safely assume that the article represents
the official view of the military. The article
raises (and attempts to answer) the question: How
much further will the TGS go?
Among the many interesting statements of the TGS
position are the following:
“None of the reforms the EU still requires of the
Turkish government can be achieved without the
military’s backing”. In other words, the TGS retains
ultimate control and veto over Turkey’s foreign
policy.
“It remains to be seen how much further the Turkish
military leadership will be willing to retreat”,
i.e. that is the exclusive privilege of the TGS to
determine.
“The military fears that various lobbies can unduly
influence voters’ political choices … [and] is
willing to tolerate these social divisions only if [TGS]
is tasked with monitoring them … but in no case can
they [the social divisions] be allowed to undermine
the [TGS]. In plain language, the TGS does not
believe in democratic processes.
The article describes the various mechanisms used to
prevent “the officer class from being influenced by
external ideologies that could upset the military’s
homogeneous worldview”. “The result is a singular,
self-replicating class of generals, towering over an
institution with a single mindset”. This philosophy
is a far shot from the European perspective of the
role of armed forces, and is more reminiscent of
authoritarian regimes that Europe has experienced in
the past.
After assuring that the TGS is in favour of EU
membership, the article states that “Whatever
resistance it (TGS) may have occasionally displayed
… has stemmed .. from .. a significant degree of
mistrust toward some EU policies”. In other words,
while assuring that the TGS is in favour of
membership of the EU, it mistrusts the EU policies.
The article quotes as a “major [emphasis added]
concession by the TGS”, a statement in its policy
document from 2001, that the country’s citizens
“should have their cultural and local linguistic
characteristics be considered as individual rights
and freedoms”. This “major” concession is of course
in line with the official ideology, which does not
recognise an obligation to respect and protect
minorities (except those three minorities recognised
in the Lausanne Treaty of 1924), which is an
essential element of the accession criteria.
The article predicts that the military may go along
with further “moderate progress … so long, that is,
as those reforms do not challenge its [TGS’]
internal integrity or that of Turkey at large. As
the country’s ultimate guardian, the military will
carefully balance the EU’s demands for reforms,
especially (emphasis added) those regarding cultural
diversity [read “the Kurdish problem”], with
national security”. This statement confirms that the
TGS will not give up its self-determined role as the
“ultimate guardian” and that the Kurdish problem is
seen as the most precarious “red line”.
Finally, the article concludes that the EU “should
not hasten to ask for the removal of the military’s
remaining footholds in Turkish civilian society …
The TGS is likely to hold on to the tools and
methods [sic!] it has long used to keep soldiers in
line … [and] will not relinquish their proven
methods until they are confident that the …
institutions, policies, and, ultimately, the
promises of the EU are viable”. So, we must conclude
that the TGS will retain their traditional hold on
society as long as they wish.
One may safely assume that this article is
representative of TGS policy, and that the TGS will
never negate its message. It reveals, in a coherent
manner, a military that has not wanted to understand
what a democratic society is. For the EU, it must be
difficult to continue negotiations with the Turkish
Government, when it has been explained so explicitly
by the “ultimate guardian” of Turkey that the
Government may say what it wishes in the
negotiations, but the decisions are at the end of
the day taken, not by the Government but by the
military.
4. Concluding Remarks
The EUTCC believes that:
Considerable progress has been achieved by Turkey
towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Much
remains to be achieved, both in terms of legislative
reform, and particularly in implementation It must
be recognised by all actors involved that the
problems of achieving full compliance with the
accession criteria are enormous.
This is not merely a question of changing “hearts
and minds” within the bureaucracy, or fine-tuning of
the legislation, as some believe.
The root of the problem is in the Turkish
nationalistic ideology, sanctified in the existing
Constitution, and providing the basis for the
suppression of minorities and oppositional groups,
in particular of the Kurdish people...
In order to achieve European standards and meet the
accession criteria, Turkey must shed the state
ideology that has prevailed for almost 90 years, and
replace it by a philosophy where cultural plurality
is seen as positive, not as threatening.
Uprooting the nationalistic ideology is no easy
task, even if the will existed among the
politicians, the judiciary and the military.
Unfortunately, so far there are few signs that this
is understood in Turkey.
At the political level, there is generally a will to
comply with the Copenhagen criteria, but the main
hurdle is the sensitive Kurdish problem, itself a
result of the nationalistic ideology.
Unfortunately, the Government does not yet have a
realistic picture of the causes and magnitude of the
problem, nor of the solutions that may be found.
Furthermore, even in introducing moderate reforms,
the Government is torn between the demands of the EU
and the demands of the nationalistic ideology,
pronounced by the military and other segments of the
“deep state”, including some of its own members and
voters.
The Progress Report indicates the EU itself does not
consider the Kurdish problem as a main political
problem hindering compliance with the accession
criteria. It blurs the primordial nature of this
problem, by referring to it as “the situation in the
East and Southeast”. The problem is not one of
geography, nor even primarily of a “socio-economic
nature”, but goes much deeper.
The Kurdish problem is primarily of a complex,
political nature. The problem will not go away of
its own. Nor can it be resolved through continued
repression.A solution requires fundamental changes
in an antiquated state ideology that has prevailed
for more than 80 years.
The European experience and history have shown that
ethnic or nationalistic conflicts of a nature and
gravity similar to the Kurdish problem have never
been resolved with guns, but through dialogue and
conciliation.
Whilst the reforms required for Turkey to comply
with the accession criteria must continue at an
accelerated pace, the EU must in addition encourage
and insist that the underlying Kurdish problem must
find its solution through a dialogue between the
parties involved.
The EU should, within the framework of the accession
negotiations, act as an honest broker in fostering
the dialogue.
Elements of such a process, should include:
A roadmap prepared by the EU, and agreed between the
parties involved
Benchmarking of the steps required,
A “Truth and Reconciliation” commission,
In the final stages of the process, a general
amnesty for the Kurdish guerrilla.
Altea, Spain, 11 February, 2005
Jon Rud
Secretary General
EU Turkey Civic Commission
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