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Radical cleric rising as a kingmaker in
Iraqi politics
16.2.2006
By ROBERT F. WORTH and SABRINA TAVERNISE Feb 16.
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BAGHDAD, Iraq,
Feb. 15 — Late Saturday night, on the eve of a
crucial vote to choose Iraq's next prime minister, a
senior Iraqi politician's cellphone rang. A
supporter of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr was
on the line with a threat.
"He said that there's going to be a civil war among
the Shia" if Mr. Sadr's preferred candidate was not
confirmed, the politician said.
Less than 12 hours later, and after many similar
calls to top Shiite leaders, Mr. Sadr got his wish.
The widely favored candidate lost by one vote, and
Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the interim prime minister, was
anointed as Iraq's next leader.
"Everyone was stunned; it was a coup d'état," said
the politician, a senior member of the main Shiite
political coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance. |
Shiite cleric Moktada
al-Sadr |
It was a crowning moment for Mr. Sadr, whose sudden
rise to political power poses a stark new set of
challenges for Iraq's fledgling democracy. The man
who led the Mahdi Army militia's two deadly
uprisings against American troops in 2004 now
controls 32 seats in Iraq's Parliament, enough to be
a kingmaker. He has an Islamist vision of Iraq's
future, and is implacably hostile to the Iraqis
closest to the United States — the mostly secular
Kurds, and Ayad Allawi, the former prime minister.
Mr. Sadr's militia fighters have been quieter since
the uprisings, but they are suspected in a range of
continuing assassinations and other abuses that
American officials have pledged to stop. Mr. Sadr
himself was accused by the American of arranging a
killing in 2004, though the arrest warrant was
quietly dropped.
"It will be harder to take on the Mahdi Army with
Jaafari as prime minister," said a Western official
in Baghdad who spoke on condition of anonymity
because he did not want to be seen as interfering in
Iraqi politics. "Jaafari could not have been elected
without Sadr's support."
In one sense, his participation represents the
realization of a central American goal: to bring
populist, violent figures — whether Sunni or Shiite
— off the battlefield and into democratic politics.
Mr. Sadr's new influence and his populist roots may
even help achieve the American goal of a broad-based
government that includes all of Iraq's sects and
ethnic groups.
American officials have worked especially hard to
include the Sunni Arabs, who dominate the
insurgency, in the government. And the Sunnis are
much closer to Mr. Sadr on some key matters of
policy than they are to his Shiite rivals.
Like the Sunnis, Mr. Sadr has said he opposes the
creation of semiautonomous regions in Iraq, at least
for the moment. He shares the Sunnis' hostility to
the American presence, and even sent some of his
followers to fight alongside Sunni Arab insurgents
in Falluja in 2004.
"We have good relations with Sadr," said Alaa Makki,
a leader of the Iraqi Accordance Front, the Sunni
group with 44 seats in Parliament. "We are close to
him on some points."
That sense of shared purpose may be more important
than the hatred many Sunni leaders may feel toward
Mr. Jaafari, whose government is widely accused of
running death squads in Sunni areas.
It is true that some Sunni Arab leaders favored Mr.
Jaafari's rival, Adel Abdul Mahdi, a more secular
and pragmatist figure, for prime minister. But
others said Mr. Jaafari was no worse than Mr. Mahdi,
whose party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq, or Sciri, has strong backing in
Iran and is also suspected of killing Sunnis.
Even on the issue of Iranian influence, Mr. Sadr's
position is no worse from an American point of view
— and may even be better — than that of his Shiite
rivals who have been running the government for the
last year. Although Mr. Sadr recently traveled to
Tehran and cast himself as a defender of Iran, part
of his popular appeal comes from his stance as a
homegrown nationalist.
"Sadrists often define themselves as anti-Iranian
and accuse Sciri of being Iranian stooges," said
Rory Stewart, a former Coalition Provisional
Authority official in Amara, a poor southern city
where the Mahdi Army holds immense sway. "It's the
main reason why people like them."
Mr. Sadr's new political power burst into view last
weekend, as the United Iraqi Alliance coalition,
which won the largest share of votes in the December
election, was trying to decide whom it would name as
the next prime minister. In the past, the coalition
has mostly worked in a top-down fashion, and this
time most party leaders agreed that Mr. Mahdi, who
was not tarnished by the mistakes of Mr. Jaafari's
government, would be the winner.
But Mr. Sadr made clear to his 32 followers in
Parliament that he favored Mr. Jaafari. He told them
to put out the word that they would pull out of the
alliance, throwing Iraqi politics into chaos, if
they did not get what they wanted. The tactic
worked, pushing some independent Shiites to vote for
Mr. Jaafari out of fear that the alternative would
be chaos.
Mr. Sadr had decided to back Mr. Jaafari after his
followers met with the prime minister and presented
him with a 14-point political program, said Bahaa
al-Aaraji, a member of Parliament and spokesman for
Mr. Sadr's movement.
"We saw that Jaafari was closer to implementing this
program," Mr. Aaraji said, than Mr. Mahdi was.
The 14 demands, he said, include a timetable for the
withdrawal of American troops from Iraq; a
postponement of any decision about creating
autonomous federal regions; more action on releasing
innocent detainees from Iraqi and American prisons;
and a tough stand against Kurdish demands to
repatriate Kurds to Kirkuk, an oil-producing city in
the north.
Some of those demands have broad support among Iraqi
leaders. But the Sadrists' hostility to Kurdish
claims in Kirkuk could lead to a damaging political
showdown.
Gaining control of Kirkuk is for a primary goal for
the Kurds, and last year they repeatedly accused Mr.
Jaafari of stonewalling on the issue. With Mr.
Sadr's followers urging him to resist Kurdish
pressure, Mr. Jaafari could face a Kurdish
rebellion.
There have already been signs of tension with the
Kurds and with Mr. Allawi's secular coalition. On
Sunday, Iraq's president, Jalal Talabani, a Kurd,
warned that the Kurdish alliance, with 53 seats,
would not bow to demands that Mr. Allawi's group be
barred from the new government. Mr. Talabani did not
say it, but he was referring to demands made by Mr.
Sadr, who has never forgotten Mr. Allawi's role in
putting down the Mahdi Army rebellions in 2004.
"There is not enough room in Iraq for Sadrists and
Allawi," Mr. Aaraji said. "He killed many Sadr
followers and has a personal position against
Moktada. We cannot sit with him."
By far the most troubling aspect of Mr. Sadr's
political power is the persistence of his militia.
It is difficult to know how much control Mr. Sadr
has over the Mahdi Army. Membership is loose and
informal, and there appear to be rogue elements
working outside of anyone's control; street
criminals sometimes operate under a Mahdi Army
disguise.
But there is no doubt that the Mahdi Army carries
out widespread abuses, including killings. They
rigidly apply Islamic rules in areas they control,
including Sadr City, the Shiite slum in northeastern
Baghdad. They have hunted down and killed hundreds
of Iraqis with ties to Saddam Hussein's Baath Party.
"They operate Shariah courts in Sadr City," the
Western official said. "It's almost a state within a
state, and it's a serious problem."
The Mahdi Army has also worked clandestinely with
police commandos in Iraq's Interior Ministry,
supplying them with names of people they want
arrested or even executed, said an Interior Ministry
official who spoke on condition of anonymity out of
concern for his safety.
The Mahdi Army, together with Sciri's militia, also
control much of southern Iraq, picking fights with
the British Army over arrests of their members and
even merging with the official police.
"No one can challenge them," said Abd Kareem al-Muhamadawi,
a tribal sheik from Amara. "They can do anything,
and no one asks why."
Secular Iraqis express alarm at their growing power.
At the Baab al Muatham campus of Baghdad University,
groups of men patrol common areas and ask to see
identification when they spot behavior they deem
improper, like couples' sitting alone, said Anmar
Khalaf, a student. In one incident, Sadr supporters
beat up a professor of the media department for his
ties to the Baath Party, students said.
"When they see a boy sitting with a girl, they feel
something inside of themselves," Mr. Khalaf said
last month, after guards warned him against speaking
with a foreign reporter. "The university is
unbearable because of them."
www.nytimes.com
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