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The Kurds and the ISG: losing friends,
losing the war
20.12.2006
By Dlawer Ala'Aldeen |
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December 20, 2006
The implementation of the Baker report would be a
betrayal of Iraq's Kurds and a defeat for the United
States itself, says Dlawer Ala'Aldeen.
After nine long months and endless speculation, the
Iraq Study Group (ISG) published its report with
recommendations for a change of course in Iraq on 6
December 2006. The report contains many solid, often
objective, conclusions. However, it also consists of
numerous ill-conceived assertions and
recommendations in direct conflict with President
George W Bush's mission for "liberating" Iraq, and
with America's fundamental values for constitutional
democracy. If adopted, the report will constitute an
alarming reversal in Iraq policy, whereby the United
State risks losing the goodwill of its local allies
and, ultimately, the war on terror.
In a retrograde step, the ISG unapologetically makes
five potentially damaging recommendations:
- suspension and/or gross manipulation of the
democratically adopted constitution
- inhibition of the constitutionally agreed
referendum on the fate of the arabised city of
Kirkuk, representing yet
another major betrayal of the Kurds
- centralisation of power in Baghdad, in a return to
dictatorial central government
- rewarding extremists by their integration into the
Iraqi state machinery
- reaching out to appease terrorists and their
sponsoring countries.
Thus, the US's arch-enemies - Iran, Syria, al-Qaida,
Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi army and Saddamists - are
among the winners; so, too, are Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. Bush's policymakers and
their main Iraqi allies (Kurds and some Shi'a) are
the chief losers.
The lesson of history
After extensive research, the ISG was expected to
provide visionary solutions to help establish peace
and democracy in Iraq, and justify a programmed and
timely withdrawal of American troops. Instead, the
group - chaired by former secretary of state James A
Baker and former congressman Lee H Hamilton -
provides a 20th- century-style Realpolitik that is
typical of the era of Henry A Kissinger (and indeed
of James Baker himself).
A solution to historic and political quagmires
requires long-term commitment and shared ownership
and responsibility. Colin Powell, when he was
secretary of state, allegedly advised the president
to follow the "Pottery Barn rule" in Iraq policy and
"own it" if he breaks it. In stark contrast, Baker
urges a quick-fix-and-run outcome.
Much against Bush's mission of "liberation", the ISG
report is written with an occupying colonialist
language and mentality. As a result, it reflects
weakness in the superpower's confidence in handling
its enemies, opting for deals-on-wheels with eyes
fixed on America's short-term interests. This same
chronic failure created the strong sense of betrayal
among Iraqis in the past (e.g., in the aftermath of
the 1991 Gulf war, conducted during the presidency
of Bush's father, George HW Bush, to drive Iraq
forces from Kuwait). The culmination of that sense
of betrayal was the Shi‘a refusal to cooperate
during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Bush and the US forces are currently harvesting the
Baker-Kissinger seeds of the 1970s-1990s period.
Saddam Hussein, despite his record, remained the two
elder statesmen's favourite, and Saddam's opposition
was considered not worthy of negotiations, even
during the 1991 war, when the US was in need of the
Iraqi people's support.
The people of the Kurdistan region willingly offered
their unreserved support to the US efforts for a
regime change in Baghdad and gave the liberating
army a floral welcome. In the context of the
anti-American climate in the middle east, this
proved costly for the Kurds. Instead of a big
reward, the Kurds are being alienated by the ISG and
offered as scapegoats to the extremists, terrorists
and their sponsoring countries. This grave
miscalculation, if followed through, will inflict a
double wound on the Americans: they will fail to win
the support of their arch-enemies while losing that
of the Kurds, their only genuine allies in Iraq.
The ISG report makes minimal reference to the
Kurdish political parties, and where it does, it is
in defining the two rival leaders, Jalal Talabani
and Masood Barzani. The two are only mentioned with
reference to their mutual distrust, past infighting
and ongoing rivalry. They are not in any way
acknowledged for their highly influential roles in
brokering peace between the belligerent Sunni and
Shi‘a factions, and for their vital role in keeping
the government intact. The two leaders also control
the richest and most strategic fifth of Iraq's
territory, and govern over five million people who
have vivid memories of past betrayals by the United
States and Britain.
A defeat for America
The Kurdish political leaders' support and
unreserved commitment to a unified Iraq is
unquestioned. The Kurds willingly supported the new
constitution and current government in Baghdad, in
the hope that their aspirations and prosperity will
be realised within a democratic Iraq. The Kurds'
enthusiasm to remain within Iraq goes as far as Iraq
being constitutionally democratic. Thereafter, they
will find no justification for supporting the US
efforts to keep Iraq stable and united.
The ISG's recommendation on Kirkuk is alarming to
the Kurds. It asks for postponement of the planned
2007 referendum (as per the constitution) and
finding "another" solution acceptable to all Iraqis
(and neighbouring countries). But there will be no
solution acceptable to the Kurds that does not
implement Article 140 of the constitution; no other
option will keep Iraq intact.
To state the obvious, it is most unlikely that the
US will be able to contain violence in Iraq without
the help of Iraqis. This can only be accomplished by
implementing the constitution, allowing local
authorities within each province (federal unit) to
fortify their boundaries and take control of their
security and administration. Therefore, in reality,
Bush has little option but to support the
federalisation of Iraq to secure a lasting peace and
conduct a programmed withdrawal of the US troops.
Whether or not the ISG report influences Bush's
strategic decisions in the region, it is clear that
opponents of the president received the report with
satisfaction, while America's closest allies in Iraq
were gravely concerned by it. The neo-conservative
agenda in the middle east is now facing defeat,
thanks both to the extremists, terrorists and their
sponsors and to US hesitation and lack of
confidence.
The ISG report seems destined to reward violence and
appease US enemies at the expense of the Kurds. In
the era of war on terror, the US will continue to
need the Kurds as much as the Kurds need the US.
Abandoning the Kurds again will add them to the list
of the angry and will guarantee America's total
defeat in Iraq, with dire consequences for the
superpower's long-term future.
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