|
Iraq: divide or die
23.11.2006
By Liam Anderson, Gareth Stansfield |
|
|
|
An ethno-sectarian
solution is the only way to preserve Iraq as a
coherent entity, argue Gareth Stansfield and Liam
Anderson.
Much of the recent debate surrounding the future of
Iraq is irrelevant to unfolding realities on the
ground. A discussion of the merits or otherwise of
Iraq's division into ethno-sectarian regions ignores
the reality that there are really only two plausible
future trajectories for Iraq's political
development.
The first follows the path defined by Iraq's
constitution voted on in October 2005. This almost
inevitably culminates in the division of Iraq into
four or five largely autonomous regions loosely
governed from the centre. Whether this outcome is
desirable or not, these regions will be largely
congruent with the ethno-sectarian distribution of
the population.
The second trajectory deviates for whatever reason
from the procedures outlined in the constitution and
ends in the disintegration of the state itself.
The division of Iraq is already an institutionalised
reality. The Kurdistan region, defined as the
territories governed over by the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) as of 2003, has existed since 1991;
it is formally recognised in Article 113 of the
constitution. Article 115 further provides that one
or more provinces of Iraq can vote to form a larger
federal region. This is almost certain to lead to
one, perhaps two regions being formed in the
Shi'a-dominated south and mid-Euphrates area.
By default, this leaves the three provinces largely
dominated by Sunni Arabs with the choice of
remaining as separate entities or merging to form a
larger, more powerful, region. The logical course of
action is the latter.
Greater Baghdad is a complex mosaic of ethnicities,
religions, and sects. It is too significant
symbolically and demographically to be incorporated
into existing regions and will need to have a
separate regional status.
The anomaly of centralism
Those who oppose this outcome -Sunni Arabs,
definitely, and Shi'a leader Muqtada al-Sadr,
possibly - lack the power to change the
constitutional process through political means. The
Kurds, moreover, have veto power over any
constitutional amendments affecting the status of
their region. So, if the political process unfolds
in accordance with the provisions of the
constitution, the logical product is a division of
Iraq along ethno-sectarian lines.
Those who reject the end-product of this
constitutional process are, logically, rejecting the
process itself. Yet, any alternative yields
significantly worse outcomes as there are none that
result in anything other than the chaotic break up
of Iraq into separate independent states.
The reason for this is simple: if there is any
deviation from the constitutional process - either
in an attempt to placate Sunni Arab demands for a
unitary state, or if the process itself collapses
due to the outbreak of full-scale civil war between
Shi'a and Sunni (a distinct possibility) - the Kurds
have made clear that they will have no alternative
but to secede and accept the consequence of their
actions.
The exercise of decentralised power is scarcely
unique in Iraq's history. Indeed, when considering
the wider sweep of the history of the region, it is
centralised rule that is the anomaly. It was also
largely responsible for weakening the cosmopolitan
social and political structures that had
characterised Iraq's cities for nearly half a
millennium.
The return of history
Under the Ottoman empire, the three provinces that
would later become Iraq - Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul
- were largely autonomous units, each being
administered from the leading urban centre and each
displaying distinctive ethno-sectarian compositions.
Links evolved naturally through economic interaction
between the provinces, not through a centralised
political structure administered from Baghdad, and
each of the provinces prospered from autonomous
trade links with its neighbours.
This pattern was erased by the invention of the
state of Iraq by the British in the 1920s. The
blueprint of a strong central government was largely
responsible for allowing the dominance of the state
by Sunni Arabs, and the final manifestation of
minority rule in the form of Saddam Hussein's
authoritarian regime.
The eighty years of the 20th century in which Iraq
was a unitary state undoubtedly created new dynamics
within the country - including, arguably, Iraqi
nationalism - but it seems abundantly clear that the
older ethno-sectarian identities have been
resurrected and are now the main organising forces
of Iraqi political life.
An Iraq of loosely governed ethno-sectarian regions
is not ideal, but it is the only way that Iraq can
now survive as a coherent territorial entity. Those
who argue against this are tilting at windmills.
They simply fail to understand it as the logical
outcome of the existing constitutional process - but
it is incongruous to accept the legitimacy of the
process while rejecting its logical product.
Meanwhile, those who oppose the existing
constitutional process have an intellectual
obligation to furnish a viable alternative, and
explain how an increasingly powerless United States
intends to impose this on groups already committed
to the current process.
Liam Anderson , Liam Anderson is associate
professor of politics at Wright State University,
Ohio.
Gareth Stansfield, Gareth Stansfield is reader in
middle-east politics at the Institute of Arab and
Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter, and
associate fellow of the middle-east programme at
Chatham House.
opendemocracy net
Top |
Kurd Net
does not take credit for and is not responsible for the content of news
information on this page
|
® 