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Training of Iraqi army and police by the Americans
has been extensive. The result has been to undermine
its very purpose, unintentionally helping to
strengthen sectarian Shiite militias, whose members
have largely infiltrated the forces. Sunnis view
both the police and army as mostly if not entirely
doing the bidding of various Shiite factions. This
contributes to the continuing rising slaughter of
civilians and the steadily increasing American
casualties from more frequent attacks.
In this crisis, which could in the worst case result
in Iraq becoming a failed state, the U.S. should
turn to the Kurds, who in their virtually autonomous
enclave in Kurdistan region (northern Iraq) have
amassed a reputable and disciplined force of 60,000
to 100,000 men known as the Peshmerga (Kurdistan
National Guards).
Numbers of them have been trained over a dozen years
or so by American instructors. During the American
invasion they played a key role, taking control of
the major northern cities of Mosul and Kirkuk.
In the past nearly four years of turmoil they have
protected Iraqi Kurdistan as a haven safe enough to
attract Iraqi Sunnis fleeing for their lives. Yet
Kurdish troops have been largely limited in their
operations by the U.S. to their three home provinces
-- because of unease among Iraq's neighbors.
The Peshmerga could have greater credibility with
both Shiite and Sunnis than either would have with
forces mainly made up of members of the other's
religious sect. Although the Kurds are Sunnis, they
are not Arabs and have their own quarrel with Iraqi
Sunnis. Under Saddam Hussein, Arab Sunnis were
shipped wholesale to Kurdish areas to dilute Kurdish
dominance in the oil-rich territory in the northern
part of the country.
As to their relationship with the dominant Shiites,
the Kurds share with them the distinction of having
been the targets of Saddam's oppression. Up to
150,000 Kurds were killed by Saddam's minions.
Unlike the Sunnis and Shiites, the Kurds are strong
supporters of the Americans, who sheltered them from
Saddam's attacks since 1991 with a no-fly zone. That
permitted the Kurds to establish self-rule and
develop their cultural identity.
The Kurds are not the perfect solution, but they
would be an immediately available stopgap to restore
Baghdad, the epicenter of the various insurgencies,
to a tolerable level of life. Their expanded role
might serve to compel the necessary compromises to
stabilize the country that the ineffectual al-Malaki
government has been unable to undertake.
Employment of the Peshmerga, nominally a part of the
national Iraqi army, outside of its home grounds
would come with a cost. In Iraq itself, it likely
would engender fears of the Kurds winding up in any
eventual settlement with a greater share of the
national pie -- meaning oil -- than their 4 million
portion of the national population would warrant.
Shiites are the most numerous, Sunnis the second
most.
Iraq's neighbors, for their part, are what
customarily is described as "restive" whenever Kurds
are involved. That's because 41 percent of Kurds
live in Turkey, which has fought a long intense
battle to keep them from autonomy or secession.
That goes to a lesser degree for Syria, with 6
percent of the Kurds, and Iran, with 31 percent.
U.S. diplomacy would have to reassure the Turks, who
are allies, that the wider employment of Kurdish
troops, and perhaps additional training of more of
them, would be strictly limited to containing the
destabilization of Iraq, which also threatens
Turkey.
As for the Syrians and Iranians, who are fishing in
Iraq's troubled waters, the Kurds' wider deployment
would serve as a warning to them to help facilitate
compromise rather than continuing to encourage
disorder in Iraq. Harry Rosenfeld is editor-at-large
of the Times Union. He can be reached at 454-5450 or
by e-mail at hrosenfeld@timesunion.com.
timesunion com
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