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Reality of the PKK-ceasefire and its
consequences
3.10.2006
By Khalid Khayati |
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At the foot of the
Qandil Mountains, the representatives of PKK
declared a unilateral and unconditional ceasefire
with the Turkish military forces.
The truce, which would take effect the day after its
announcement, has been earlier ordered by the PKK
leader, Abdullah Öcelan from his prison on the
island of Imrali.
It has been stressed the implementation of a
ceasefire would conclusively put an end to a 22 year
old long-lasted violence that has hitherto claimed
the lives of more than 35000 people and to open for
" a democratic union between Turks and Kurds".
Moreover, it has been outlined that the PKK
guerillas would not use their weapons unless they
are attacked by Turkish forces "with the aim of
annihilation". |
Top PKK military leader Murat Karayilan speaks to
the reporters in his mountainous Qandil compound |
All PKK-affiliated organizations have been
instructed in the declaration to reorganize and
prepare themselves for the new period as soon as the
ceasefire takes effect. Nevertheless, the
announcement of the cease-fire by the PKK, which has
been observed by an overwhelming part of the world
mass media can be seen as an important political
action that induces us to rise following questions.
Which are the involving factors that make the PKK-leadership
to call for a ceasefire and what would be the
plausible political consequences of the truce in the
region, above all in the long term?
According to many Kurdish political observers and
also an important part of the political actors who
are engaged in the Middle East's "higgledy-piggledy
disorder of the things", the PKK's armed struggle
against the Turkish forces and subsequently does not
fit in with the new geopolitical reality of the
region.
In other words, the PKK's resumed war has been
perceived as counterproductive which brings nothing
new than further aggravating the chaotic situation
of the Middle East.
This is why putting an end to the "problematic of
the PKK" in a reasonable way, became even a
political priority for the United States who in the
beginning of September 2006, appointed the retired
Air Force General, Joseph Ralston as a special envoy
together with his Turkish (retired General Edip
Baser) and Iraqi counterparts form a co-ordinating
tripartite solution mechanism on the issue.
In this respect, intensive diplomatic activities
have taken place in the region. Iraqi President
Jalal Talabani who was on a visit in the U.S. last
week has announced that the PKK "had already been
persuaded to observe a ceasefire within coming
days".
Even if the Turkish Media has as usual started a
defamation campaign vis-à-vis Mr Talabani, but there
are voices that say contacting the PKK was a
perfectly co-ordinated act between the Turkish
government and the Iraqi president.
The approval of the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah
Öcelan that was made public by his lawyers on
Wednesday 25th September was nothing than a final
symbolic act, added to an already well-calculated
and meticulously elaborated ceasefire project.
Political observers say that there is a risk of
sabotaging that could come mostly from the Turkish
and even from the PKK's side, but the truce would in
the long run benefit "everybody" including a tired
and worn PKK that can no longer afford to keep
fighting the very aggressive Turkish army at a so
high level.
Deeply busy with the political conflicts and daily
carnages in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Americans are
not in any way inclined to have a supplementary
conflict in northern Iraq that would run the risk of
getting Turkey involved in it. In this respect, the
optimal situation for the US might be the preserving
of the stability in this part of the world and may
be keeping a "passivated" but organized PKK for
probable use vis-à-vis Iran and Syria in the future.
For Turkey and Turkish who intend to become a full
EU-member in coming years, the ceasefire will
provide them further occasions for working of their
political and juridical reforms, extremely necessary
for the membership; at the same time that it can
help them to better overcome their Kurdish phobia if
they want to profit peacefully from the economic,
cultural and political developments in the region.
Additionally, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
would also take advantageous of the ceasefire not at
least because of the fact that the absence of the
armed incursions that the PKK used to undertake
occasionally inside the Turkish territory will in
all probability deprive Turkey of an ever-lasting
pretext that it used with the aim to invade the
Iraqi Kurdistan.
For the Kurdish people in Turkey, the truce will
pave the way for further enforcement of the civil
society and public appearances, even for those
political forces that are not affiliated to the PKK.
The achievement of the political recognition becomes
thereby a pure democratic and political struggle.
kurdishglobe net
The use of the term "Kurdistan" is vigorously
rejected due to its alleged political implications
by the Republic of Turkey, which does not recognize
the existence of a "Turkish Kurdistan".
Others estimate as many as 40 million Kurds live in
Big Kurdistan (Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Iran, Armenia),
which covers an area as big as France, about half of
all Kurds which estimate to 20 million live in
Turkey.
The Kurdish flag flown officially in Iraqi Kurdistan but
unofficially flown by Kurds in Armenia. The flag is
banned in Iran, Syria, and Turkey where flying it is
a criminal offence"
Southeastern Turkey:
North Kurdistan (
Kurdistan-Turkey) wikipedia
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