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Kurdistan: The Quest for Statehood- Report
25.10.2006
By Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli |
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The Kurds are prone to
repeating the mantra that they are the largest
nation in the Middle East without a state, though
not for lack of trying, fighting, and sacrificing.
After decades of struggle, the Iraqi Kurds appear to
be finally in a position to live in peace and
prosperity within the safe boundaries of Iraqi
Kurdistan, whether it is a de facto state, a de jure
state, or just simply a broadly autonomous
"federated region" within the greater federation of
Iraq.
In the words of MEMRI's Baghdad analysts, the Kurds
are "the luckiest horse likely to collect the prizes
of the American war to bring down the Saddam
regime," and it is among the Kurdish people that the
Americans are most likely to find true friends and
allies.
The rest of the Iraqi provinces or governorates,
mired in terrorism and sectarian violence, envy
Kurdistan. It is a magnet for Iraqis seeking work or
seeking a safe environment. It is also a model for
the Iraqi Shi'a in the central and southern parts of
Iraq who are striving against heavy odds to create
similar federated entities for themselves.
The Kurds have put in place all the ingredients of a
modern state - reasonably well-defined borders,
common language and culture, a modern army subject
to command and control, a flag, an elected
parliament, a government, diplomatic/consular
representations by and in Kurdistan, international
airports, a bustling economy, and, above all,
national identity and a strong sense of
accomplishment. But, for now, sovereign Kurdistan is
not a reality, and the cause of Kurdish
self-determination has many opponents.
Historical Background
The Kurds were conquered by the Arabs in the seventh
century and have since lived under the rule of
others, including the Ottoman Empire from the 13th
century to the early part of the 20th century. With
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after WWI, the
victorious powers negotiated, with Turkey, the
Treaty of Sevres, which was signed on August 10,
1920. Under Article 62 of the Treaty, the entire
Kurdish population, including the parts now residing
in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, was to be granted
political autonomy. Article 63 stipulated that "The
Turkish Government hereby agrees to accept and
execute the decisions… mentioned in article 62
within three months…" [2]
The post-imperial Turkish government under Mustapha
Kemal (Ataturk) rejected the Treaty of Sevres
because of provisions it found unacceptable. A new
round of negotiations started, culminating in the
Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923. Turkey was no
longer obligated to grant the Kurds autonomy. The
treaty divided the Kurdish region among Turkey,
Iraq, and Syria, and it has remained divided since.
The Kurds of Iraq have had their share of troubles
and disappointments with the various governments of
Iraq since the monarchy was established in 1922 with
the help of the British government. These troubles
reached their zenith under the Saddam regime which
used chemical weapons and mass deportations to
suppress Kurdish national aspirations. In 1991,
encouraged by the United States, the Kurds, like the
Shi'a in southern Iraq, rose up against the Saddam
regime, only to be crushed by it when the United
States left both the Kurds and the Shi'a to their
own devices. Then, with public pressure mounting in
favor of the Kurds, the U.S. and Britain established
a no-fly zone for Iraqi planes over Iraqi Kurdistan.
This was a turning point in the history of modern
Iraqi Kurdistan.
The no-fly zone was followed in 1996 with 13 percent
of oil revenues earmarked for the "Northern
Provinces" [i.e., Kurdistan] from the proceeds of
the Oil for Food Program. This turned Kurdistan into
an increasingly prosperous part of Iraq, even while
the rest of the country was descending into poverty.
The progress that was made in Iraqi Kurdistan did
not go unnoticed in the rest of Saddam-controlled
Iraq, thanks to an uncommonly vivid and detailed
report on the situation of Kurdistan that was
published in the former Iraqi daily Babil, owned by
Saddam's son Uday. In the report from Kurdistan,
Babil's reporter made these observations:
This is supposedly an Iraqi land, but no one utters
the name 'Iraq'… Here they use cellular phones
called kurdistell, they watch a Kurdish TV… Its
people argue that they enjoy freedom unknown to
neighboring countries. Unbelievable changes have
taken place here. Imagine: Most of the children born
after 1991 do not speak Arabic…
The surrounding neighboring countries of Syria,
Turkey, and Iran do not wish to see [Kurdistan] as a
model for their minorities, even though they
represent 23 million people, the largest group
without a state in the Middle East." [3]
The fall of Saddam signaled the end of oppression of
the Kurds and lifted their spirits. But the Kurds
soon discovered that most of the Iraqi new political
leaders, who only a short while earlier, while
serving in the opposition, had promised to support
Kurdish national aspirations, were now beginning to
renege on old promises. The tone had changed. Iraqi
nationalism had quickly dominated the political
discourse in Iraq, and the Arab-Kurdish alliance had
begun to fray. Kirkuk, Iraqi leaders argued, was to
remain an Iraqi city; the whole issue of federalism,
which had been one of the cornerstones of the new
constitution promulgated on December 15, 2005, was
seen as a Kurdish ploy that needed to be brought
under the demands of multiple revisions. Kurdish
hopes for national reconciliation and for a full
Iraqi recognition of their unique status as a
federated region within a unified Iraq were
frustrated, and there was even a sense of betrayal.
Soon, voices began to be heard calling for secession
from Iraq and the establishment of a sovereign
Kurdistan. Thus, taking advantage of the current
turmoil and uncertainty in Iraq, the Kurds have
moved forward in cementing the foundations of their
federated status - a fait accompli that will be next
to impossible for any future centrally oriented
Iraqi government to undo.
Baghdad and Erbil - Violence vs. Construction
More than a decade after the visit of Babil's
reporter to Kurdistan (endnote 3), an Iraqi-born
reporter from the London daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat
described the dramatic contrast between Baghdad and
Erbil, the capital of Kurdistan, as he had viewed
both from an airplane window. When he approached
Baghdad, his birthplace, it looked desolate,
overwhelmed by garbage accumulating everywhere, and
covered by a dusty sky often mixed with the smoke of
gunpowder.
Three weeks later, as he flew from Baghdad to Erbil,
he was struck by the sight of cranes around the
Erbil International Airport engaged in the
construction of "a forest of residential and
commercial buildings." At the airport, a big sign
welcomes the passengers in three languages: Kurdish,
Arabic, and English. The airport itself is
undergoing a major expansion to facilitate the
landing of the largest aircrafts, both civilian and
military. Not far from the airport there is an area
surrounded by a colorful fence, where 1200 villas
are being built at prices ranging from $150,000 to
$700,000 per unit.
A significant indicator of the economic situation in
the two cities is that while unemployment is about
60 percent in Baghdad, in Kurdistan there is a
shortage of labor. Not surprising there is a flow of
Iraqi professionals and workers from the central and
southern provinces in Iraq into Kurdistan, seeking
employment opportunities and personal safety. [4]
Massive construction is also going on in Suleimaniya,
where just one of the construction companies from
the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait is investing up
to $60 million to construct a shopping mall, a
four-star hotel, and five high-rise commercial
buildings. [5]
The Unified Kurdistan Government
For almost 30 years, Kurdistan was run by two
parallel governments, one headquartered in
Sulaymaniyah under the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) headed by Jalal Talabani and the other
headquartered in Erbil under the Kurdish Democratic
Party (KDP), headed by Mas'oud Barzani. The
relationships between the two governments and their
leaders were often hostile, resulting in a military
conflict in the mid-1970s that was brought to an end
by the Clinton administration. In January 2006 the
two governments agreed to unify, and on May 7 the
111-member National Kurdistan Council (Parliament)
voted unanimously in favor of a unified government
made up of 27 ministries and 40 ministers, with the
two major political parties KDP and PUK each
controlling 11 ministries. The five remaining
ministries were assigned to smaller political
parties. Four ministries - Finance, Peshmerga,
Justice, and Interior, will continue to operate
separately in each of the two previous regional
administrations, but they are to be unified within a
year. This arrangement has left the impression that
the unification of the two administrations remains
somewhat tentative.
Under the unification agreement, the president of
the region and the prime minister will be from the
KDP, while their deputies and the speaker of
parliament will be from the PUK. This agreement will
remain in force until new elections are held at the
end of 2007. The ceremony for installing the new
government was witnessed by representatives from the
central government, including the vice president
Adel Abd al-Mahdi and diplomats from many countries,
including the U.S, the U.K., Iran, and Syria.
Noticeably absent was a diplomat from Turkey.
The oath of office taken by the regional prime
minister and the ministers is almost completely
separatist, both in word and intention. It reads: "I
swear by God the Almighty that I will loyally defend
the unity of the people and the land of Iraqi
Kurdistan, that I will respect the law and I will
serve the interest of the people." [6] The oath of
office offers no loyalty to Iraq or its
constitution.
In his speech welcoming the creation of Kurdish
Regional Government, Barzani made two significant
comments:
First, he asked that the government make serious
efforts to restore to Kurdistan, by "legal and
constitutional means," Kurdish territories that were
taken away from it; and second, he extended a hand
of friendship and cooperation to all neighboring
countries while emphasizing: "The style of threats
has gone for good. Henceforth, we shall not accept
threats from anywhere." [7]
The vote of confidence by the Kurdish parliament for
the new Kurdish government coincided with the
election of Jalal Talabani as president of Iraqi for
a second term. It is significant to note that while
most of the Iraqi press refers to him as "President
of Iraq," the Kurdish media refers to him as "The
President of the Federal Republic of Iraq" [ra'is
jumhuriyat al-iraq al-fidirali]. It is a message the
Kurds never tire of pressing upon the Iraqi
political public.
Symbols of Autonomy
Apart from regional elections for parliament and the
appointment of a regional government almost entirely
independent from Baghdad, there are other symbols
and other measures that the KRG has taken to
underscore its autonomy from the dysfunctional
government in Baghdad. Some stand as a reminder to
the Iraqi political establishment that the Kurds
will not hesitate to go it alone if some of their
fundamental demands, such as the inclusion of Kirkuk
into Kurdistan, are not met, or if the central
government in Baghdad tries to assert its authority
over the internal affairs of KRG. It is a delicate
balance that the Kurds are striving to maintain, at
least for now - on the one hand, expressing the
intention to remain as part of Iraq, and, on the
other hand, seeking to run their lives and their
regional government almost entirely independently
from the central government in Baghdad. This balance
is so delicate that any number of external shocks,
whether political or economic, could make it go out
of kilter.
The Kurdish Flag
National flags are symbols of a nation's identity,
history, culture and geography. Iraq was caught by
surprise when, in September 2006, Mas'oud Barzani,
the president of the Kurdish region, issued a
directive that all the government agencies under the
KRG should lower the Iraqi national flag in favor of
the Kurdish flag. But for Kurds, the current Iraqi
flag with Saddam Hussein's handwritten words "Allah
Akbar" is a symbol of atrocities committed against
them by the Saddam regime, and the Kurdish
leadership has vowed never to live under its shadow
again.
For Jalal Talabani, the president of Iraq and a
Kurdish national, the issue of the flag represented
the dilemma between affaire d'etat and personal
emotion. For Talabani no less than any other Kurdish
leader, the Iraqi flag symbolizes many of the evils
perpetrated against the Kurds by the regime of
Saddam Hussein. But, as he told an interviewer:
"This is the flag of Iraq until it is replaced. It
is true that it is the flag of the ancien regime but
it is the flag of Iraq, and in my capacity as the
President of Iraq, it is inevitable that I serve
under it." [8] When the flag crisis broke out
following Barzani's directive, Talabani never
wavered in his support for the Iraqi flag being
raised in Kurdistan and everywhere else in Iraq.
Talabani even withheld any public criticism of the
Barzani's decision. Always diplomatic, he attributed
Barzani's decision to what he characterized as "a
constitutional void" and pledged himself to respect
any Iraqi flag sanctioned by parliament. Other
Iraqis would argue that Barzani's directive about
the flag must be viewed as yet another challenge by
the Kurds to get Iraq accustomed to their ultimate
destiny.
Expanding Diplomatic Contacts
The Iraqi constitution permits each of the 18
provinces of the country to send a representative to
each of the Iraqi diplomatic missions abroad. The
Kurds have opted to establish their own
representative offices in a number of countries.
At the same time, there is a clamoring from
countries to open consulates in the Kurdish region,
and the permission to do so is sought not from the
Iraqi central government in Baghdad but from the
Kurdistan regional government in Erbil. The
countries that have either opened or plan to open
such consulates are the United States, the Czech
Republic, France, Italy, the United Kingdom,
Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran (two
consulates). It has also been announced that United
Nations will open in Erbil its largest office in the
Middle East. [9] In that connection, the UNDP
representative arrived in Erbil in May 2006 and was
received by the coordinator for the UN in the
province of Kurdistan. [10] The relatively high
degree of security and the assurance that they can
operate with a large measure of safety in Kurdistan
is the biggest incentive for foreign governments to
open their consulates there. But the push to locate
consulates there is also a reflection of the
economic and strategic significance of Kurdistan in
the context of both Iraq and the Middle East.
The visit by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to
Kurdistan in early October for discussion with the
Kurdistan regional government is another indication
that while, at least for now, Kurdistan remains
politically part of Iraq, it is nevertheless an
entity to be dealt with outside the formal
diplomatic channels with the central government.
In November 2005, Amr Moussa, the secretary-general
of the Arab League, visited Kurdistan. The President
of KRG, Mas'oud Barzani, visited the U.S. and was
received by President Bush. He has also traveled to
China and to a number of European countries where he
was received in a manner befitting a head of state.
American Air Bases
In his interview with The Washington Post, [11]
President Jalal Talabani called on the United States
to build two air bases in Kurdistan to protect it
from foreign incursion. This is perhaps another
example of Kurdistan's determination to be treated
as a separate entity from Iraq.
Arabic Language Reduced to Third Place
In presenting his government program the Prime
Minister of KRG indicated his government's support
for teaching the Turkmen, Chaldean, Assyrian,
Armenian and Arabic languages. The Arabic language
was mentioned last. He then proceeded to say that
the KRG will adopt the instruction of the English
language throughout Iraqi Kurdistan "in all stages
and for all ages." In short, Kurdish and English
will be the two leading languages, while Arabic,
like the languages of other minorities, will be an
elective subject. It is no secret that a whole new
Kurdish generation, including many who studied at
Kurdish universities, has little or no proficiency
in Arabic. That situation raises a serious question
about their future integration into a federated
Iraq.
Oil Exploration
One of the key issues pending between the Kurdistan
Regional Government and the central government in
Baghdad is that pertaining to the exploration of
natural resources, particularly oil and natural gas
in Kurdistani territory.
The Iraqi constitution, which was approved in a
referendum in December 2005, is ambiguous on this
issue. Under Article 111, "oil and gas are the
property of the Iraqi people in all regions and
governorates." However, the following article
distinguishes between existing and future oil and
gas fields. Article 112 assigns the central
government the responsibility for "managing the oil
and gas" extracted from existing fields together
with the producing regions, provided the revenues
are equitably distributed in accordance with the
size of population, and while taking into
consideration those regions that were unfairly
deprived by the Saddam regime. The draft Kurdish
constitution has interpreted Article 112 to mean
that all mineral and water resources will also fall
under the jurisdiction of the KRG, subject to the
approval of the Kurdish parliament. [12]
When the Iraqi oil minister Hussein Shahristani
questioned the KRG's right to sign exploration
agreements with foreign companies, the Prime
Minister of KRG, Nechirwan Barzani, basically told
the oil minister to mind his own business. He then
warned that if Baghdad continues to meddle in
Kurdish autonomous affairs, Kurdistan may opt to
consider seceding from Iraq. In a subsequent
interview with the Financial Times the Prime
Minister complained that the central government was
not transferring to KRG its share of oil revenues.
[13] In a testimony before a Congressional
Committee, Qubad Talabany, the KRG's representative
to the U.S., said Iraqi Kurds have little confidence
that "an Iraqi government in Baghdad, including one
with Kurdish ministers, will safeguard their fair
share of national resources." [14] At the same time,
President Talabani himself told the Iraqi press that
any agreement relating to the exploration of oil or
natural gas must be approved by the Ministry of Oil,
which is in the process of preparing a new law that
would regulate such agreements. [15] As noted
earlier, President Talabani often finds himself in
the unenviable position of having to act as
president of all Iraqis without sacrificing the
fundamental interests of his own people.
Signing of Oil Exploration Agreements
The Kurdish regional government signed in 2005 an
exploration agreement with the small Norwegian
company DNO to search for oil in the Kurdish region.
The first location selected for exploration was
approximately 12 miles east of the city of Zacho on
the Turkish-Kurdish border. DNO has announced the
discovery of approximately 100 million barrels of
light crude. Encouraged by the initial results, the
Norwegian company will expand its exploration
activities in the area. [16]
A politically more significant agreement is with the
Turkish-Canadian company General Energy, whose first
drilling resulted in the production of 5000
barrels/day. The company is committed to drill two
additional wells with a production capacity of
20,000 b/d. [17]
A Canadian company, Western Oil Sand, has also
started exploration in four different areas in
Sulaimaniyah. The initial topographical survey
indicates the existence of "huge quantities" of oil.
[18] Other agreements are being negotiated. [19]
Problems Ahead
Despite the Kurds' many accomplishments and their
determination to forge ahead toward independence at
some time in the future, the path which lays ahead
remains pregnant with difficulties, including
determining the future of Kirkuk, establishing
proper governance, and weighing the implications of
seceding from Iraq.
The Issue of Kirkuk
The Kurds maintain that the city of Kirkuk is the
heart of Kurdistan and should be integrated into the
Kurdish region, which currently comprises the three
governorates of Dahouk, Erbil, and Sulaimaniyah. It
is Kirkuk, not Erbil, the Kurds would insist, that
is the real capital of Kurdistan. In fact, the city
has two large minorities, Arabs and Turkmen, but the
Kurds maintain that the roots of Kirkuk are
geographically Kurdistani, even if the city is not
exclusively Kurdish in terms of population
structure. The Kurds are so determined to include
Kirkuk in their region that they have proceeded to
declare the city as their own in their draft
constitution and to include it in the administrative
map of the region.
The Kurds also have territorial claims on other
districts or cities which are geographically outside
the three Kurdish governorates but have a majority
Kurdish population. The Kurdish official map,
currently in use in Kurdistan, includes the
districts of Aqra, Sheikhan, Sinjar, Telaafar,
Telkaif (mainly Christian whose population prefers
integration into Kurdistan) and Qaraqosh (part of
the city of Mosul) in addition to some districts in
the Governorates of Dyala and Wassat. When asked
about the borders of their region, the Kurds
respond, "Wherever the camel stops is the border of
Kurdistan." [20]
The Kurds have stated forcefully and often that they
have absolutely no desire of reaching any compromise
on the future of Kirkuk other than including it in
the Kurdish region. [21]
Issues of Governance
While signs of prosperity are palpable across
Kurdistan there are also signs of corruption,
nepotism and, generally, poor governance. Also, like
in the rest of Iraq, there are shortages of
electricity and gasoline, which are causing a lot of
hardship to large segments of the Kurdish
population. [22] The shortage of electricity is
mitigated by the use of electric generators, which
seem to be common in many homes.
Further, there is the issue of poverty. Despite
rapid economic growth generated by local and foreign
investments, many families still live below the
poverty line. A reporter of the London daily al-Hayat
underscored the vast differences in the standards of
living in Erbil, the capital of RGK. Local residents
compared the differences in income and quality of
life between two quarters in Erbil, the rich quarter
of Azadi and the poor quarter of Bihar, as a
difference between the earth and the sky. [23]
The Kurdish Position in Case of Civil War
One of the intriguing questions is what the Kurds
would do in the event of a civil war breaking out in
Iraq and engulfing the Shi'ite and Sunni
communities. The Kurds will do their utmost to stay
out of such a conflagration, as they have been doing
so far. The Kurds would gain nothing by siding with
either of the two sectarian groups and, in fact,
there is much for them to gain by watching the
conflict from behind their defensive walls. A
full-fledged civil war may impel the Kurds to
separate themselves from the rest of the Iraq by
declaring their independence. [24] This was, in
fact, the tenor of a statement made by Barzani as
early as November 2005, and echoed since repeatedly
by other Kurdish officials.
The Kurds have also threatened to secede should the
central government in Baghdad be taken over by an
Islamist party. In the words of the First Lady of
Iraq, Hiro Talabani: "I am a Kurd to the marrow but
I would not want to live in a fundamentalist Kurdish
state for a single day." Another leading Kurdish
politician who served as a prime minister in
Sulaimaniyah, Kusrat Rusol, has also threatened to
secede should an Islamist political party take over
the central government. [25]
The Threat of Secession
The threat of secession from Iraq in the case of
civil war should not be taken too lightly. The
threat may be intended to be a warning to the two
other sectarian communities - the Shi'a and the
Sunnis - to avoid civil war as it would be
calamitous for the entire Iraqi people, the Kurds
included.
Virulent Reactions to Kurdish Aspirations
The most virulent reaction to Kurdish aspirations
was by the Iraqi Republican Bloc, a Sunni group
which is opposed to a federalized Iraq. It referred
to "decisions and laws" frequently issued by forces
seeking through "malicious conspiratorial
intentions" to harm the unity of the Iraqi people.
These forces "cannot exist without crises and they
lack the most basic requirement for proper
leadership." The statement both challenges the
provisions of the Kurdish constitution which
identify parts of Iraq's territory as properly
belonging to Kurdistan, and threatens that such
inclusion will not occur even "if seas of blood are
to flow." This statement was published in the
pro-Saddam daily al-Quds al-Arabi, and it is hardly
surprising that it has not been published in the
Iraqi mainstream newspapers. [26]
Conclusion
The Iraqi liberal daily al-Zaman points out that it
was difficult to claim that the Kurds are going
ahead with the creation of a state, but neither can
one claim with certainty that they are not going to
do so. For 13 years, they have built the foundations
of their state, but it has been a silent state. The
ultimate question will be the reaction of the Arab
countries to the creation of a non-Arab state in
their midst. [27]
The aspiration for an ultimately independent and
sovereign Kurdish state runs into the harsh reality
that such a state will be surrounded by hostile
countries in every direction. Turkey poses the
biggest threat to such an entity, particularly if
the Kurds succeed in incorporating Kirkuk into their
region. With its prospects for admission into the
European Union increasingly dimming, Turkey will be
increasingly less restrained to use force to
frustrate Kurdish sovereignty. At a minimum, Turkey
could close its borders with Kurdistan and prevent
the movement of people and goods across the border.
In the absence of access to ports and overflight
rights, an independent Kurdistan will be far worse
than an autonomous Kurdish region that enjoys so
much freedom and so few constraints.
Kurdistan also faces internal problems. It must
convert the slogans of democracy and political
competitiveness into reality by establishing the
foundations of proper governance and policies.
Finally, the Kurdish people must demonstrate genuine
unity, after years of intra-Kurdish disagreement and
even bloody clashes. The two historic leaders of
modern Kurdistan, Jalal Talabani and Massoud
Barazani, have agreed to unify their separate
administrations, but it is not certain that they
have buried the hatchet. The two men must convince
not only the outside world but also their own people
that henceforth they will march hand in hand to
achieve whatever they determine to be in the best
interest of the Kurdish people.
*Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli is Senior Analyst of MEMRI's
Middle East Economic Studies Program.
[1] Interview with
President Jalal Talabani on al-Arabiya TV, PUK
Media, August 30, 2005.
[2] The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Vol. 11,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York
1924.
[3] Babil (Iraq), October 16, 2002.
[4] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), June 16, 2006.
[5] Al-Qabas (Kuwait) February 11, 2006.
[6] Al-Hayat (London), May 12, 2006.
[7] Al-Mada (Iraq), May 8, 2006.
[8] PUK Media, August 30, 2005.
[9] Al-Mada (Iraq), December 7, 2005.
[10] Al-Taakhi (Iraq), May 27, 2006.
[11] The Washington Post, September 25, 2006.
[12] http://www.sotaliraq.com/articles.php,
September 29, 2006.
[13] The Financial Times (London), October 23, 2006.
[14] KRG Third Occasional Paper, September 28, 2006.
[15] Al-Zaman (Iraq), October 1, 2006.
[16] Al-Zaman (Iraq), June 13, 2006.
[17] Al-Hayat (London), September 29, 2006.
[18] Kurdish News Agency, March 2, 2006.
[19] Al-Zaman (Iraq), November 30, 2003.
[20] Al-Ahali weekly (Iraq), April 21, 2005.
[21] For more analysis on the subject please refer
to MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 215, "Kirkuk:
Between
Kurdish separatism and Iraqi federalism," March 31,
2005, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?
Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA21505.
[22] On the problem of governance in Iraq, see Bilal
Wahab, "Iraqi Kurdistan: Time to get serious about
governance," www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?
fa=view&id=1878&prog=zgp&proj=zme.znpp#iraqikurdistan.
[23] Al-Hayat (London), July 4, 2006.
[24] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), November 7, 2005.
[25] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), December 10, 2005.
[26] Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), October 1, 2006.
[27] Al-Zaman (Iraq), September 18, 2006.
memri org
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