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Plan Floated to Divide Iraq Along Ethnic
Lines: Interview
25.10.2006 |
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Transcript-Conversation. October 24, 2006 London
Interview with Peter Galbraith by BPS - Voice - MP3
24.10.2006
As the debate continues over the United States' next
steps in Iraq, some proposals have called for
sectioning the country along ethnic lines. Former
State Department official Peter Galbraith discusses
the de-centralization of Iraq in this second of a
Newshour series on the future of Iraq.
JIM LEHRER: There were calls today from
American officials for Iraqis to take a stronger
role running their own country. They came as the
issue of Iraq continued to stir the midterm election
rhetoric here, as well as propel our conversation
series on what to do next in Iraq.
Last night's was on ending the occupation. Tonight,
it's decentralizing Iraq along ethnic lines.
Two weeks ago, Iraq's parliament passed a law that
would allow the creation of autonomous Kurdish,
Sunni and Shiite regions, each controlling their own
affairs. A major proponent of this is Peter
Galbraith, a former State Department official who's
advised Iraqi Kurdish leaders on political issues.
He's also author of "The End of Iraq: How American
Incompetence Created a War Without End." I talked
with him earlier today from London.
Mr. Ambassador, welcome. |
Former State Department Official,
Peter Galbraith.
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PETER GALBRAITH, Former State Department Official:
Good to be with you.
JIM LEHRER: You favor a form of decentralized
partition for Iraq. Why?
PETER GALBRAITH:
The country has already broken up. And actually, I'm
opposed to using U.S. resources to try to put it
back together again.
Kurdistan in the north is already a de facto
independent state. It has its own elected
government. It has its own army. It flies its own
flag. The Iraqi army is not allowed to go to
Kurdistan. The Iraqi flag is banned there.
The Shiite south is governed by the Shiite religious
parties who enforce an Iranian-style Islamic law
with militias. It's also not governed from Baghdad.
Baghdad itself is the front line of a civil war
divided between a Shiite east and a Sunni west, and
the Sunni center is a battleground between the
coalition and Sunni insurgents.
So the country has already broken up, and this
result is actually incorporated into the Iraqi
constitution. The constitution creates a virtually
powerless center -- it doesn't even have the power
to tax -- and very strong regions that are allowed
to have their own armies, where regional law is
superior to central government law on almost all
matters, and where the regions have substantial
control of their own oil.
So if that's the result that has been endorsed by
the Iraqi people, I don't see why the United States
should try to put the country back together.
Dividing into three nations
JIM LEHRER: So specifically, then, you would
divide it into three independent nations?
PETER GALBRAITH:
I think eventually Kurdistan will become an
independent country. This is the result that is
desired by almost all the Kurdish people. They voted
in January 2005 in a referendum 98 percent for
independence.
But as with regard to whether the Sunnis and Shiites
have separate states, both of these groups consider
themselves as Iraqi. The trouble is they have very
different visions of what Iraq should be, and that's
why, if you keep a unified Arab Iraq, it seems to me
that that's a formula for endless war.
If you allow each of these entities to have very
substantial self-government or, perhaps if they so
choose, independence, it seems to me that that is a
better way for each of these communities to protect
their own interests and a way to minimize conflict.
JIM LEHRER: In other words, they would have
no reason to fight anymore?
PETER GALBRAITH:
There's going to be fighting over the boundaries,
but right now there's a full-scale civil war between
the Sunnis and the Shiites over the control of Arab
Iraq. Allowing each group to run their own affairs,
it's not going to solve the problem, but it provides
the best opportunity to minimize it.
Unifying a divided people
JIM LEHRER: As you know, the Sunnis have
opposed this on the grounds that most of the oil is
in Kurdistan and in the south where the Shiites
would be in control. Under your plan, how would you
deal with that problem?
PETER GALBRAITH:
The Iraqi constitution has a formula for the
distribution of oil revenues which gives the oil
revenues to each of these regions in accordance with
population. And I think that that is at least a
suitable interim solution.
There probably is oil in the Sunni areas. The
problem with Iraq is that most of its territory has
not been explored, and there just hasn't been much
exploration in the Sunni areas.
JIM LEHRER: Is it your position that the
United States and its coalition allies have been
trying to impose a unified Iraq on a group of people
that do not want to be unified?
PETER GALBRAITH:
That's certainly true of the Kurds, who not only
don't want to be part of Iraq, but actually they
hate Iraq. They see it as the country that committed
genocide against them. The Shiites have also chosen
a very decentralized form of state, and so there's
really no reason to bring them back under the fold
of a central government, either.
President Bush says our goal in Iraq is a unified
and democratic Iraq. But, in fact, he's not willing
to do two things that would be essential to bringing
about that result. The first would be to disarm the
Shiite militias and the theocratic governments that
exist in the south. And the second would be to use
U.S. troops as the police to end the civil war in
Baghdad and other mixed areas.
It's not realistic to think that Iraqi security
forces can end sectarian fighting, because it's a
civil war and the Iraqi security forces are
themselves partisans in the civil war. They're
either Shiite or Sunni.
The role of the United
States
JIM LEHRER: Does the United States have a
role to play in getting this done if, in fact, the
president and the administration should decide to
adopt what you're suggesting and carry out what is
in the constitution of Iraq? Does the U.S. have a
role to play in this or should they just leave?
PETER GALBRAITH:
Our ability to influence events in Iraq is extremely
limited. I see no purpose for a continued U.S.
presence in the Shiite southern half of Iraq.
It is true that, if we withdraw, it will be
theocratic. It will not apply the human rights
provisions in the Iraqi constitution, and it will be
dominated by Iran. But that's the case now, and we
aren't going to do anything to change it.
And if we're not going to end the civil war in
Baghdad, which would require us to become the police
in the city, I see no point in us remaining.
I do think that we can do two things: First, we can
assist in negotiating the borders of the regions,
particularly as between the Arabs and the Kurds,
because we have considerable influence in Kurdistan.
And, second, in our own interest, we need to be sure
that al-Qaida and other Sunni terrorist
organizations like it are not able to establish a
base in the Sunni area.
The current strategy for trying to do that, which
involves using what we call Iraqi troops to fight
Sunni insurgents, but which in reality are Shiite
troops, obviously is not working. The alternative
would be to encourage the Sunnis to form their own
region, with their own army, as allowed by Iraq's
constitution, and to assist that region and that
regional army in fighting the insurgents.
I would add one other part to this piece, which is
that we cannot be sure that a Sunni region will be
able to defeat the insurgency or will have the will
to do it. We know the current strategy won't work,
but we can't be sure the alternative will work. And
for that reason, as an insurance policy, I would
keep a small force in Kurdistan that could intervene
against al-Qaida, should it try to establish a base
in the Sunni-Arab area.
A timeline for changes
JIM LEHRER: Finally, using your plan as a
guideline, do you see -- is there an ideal time
line-type of scenario that you would see unfolding
that could actually resolve this thing peacefully
over a period of time?
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PETER GALBRAITH:
This thing is not going to be resolved peacefully.
The civil war is likely to continue for a prolonged
period of time, but I believe that the U.S. should
extricate itself from parts of the country as
quickly as possible because we're not doing any
good. We're not doing anything to contain the civil
war.
So I would say we could withdraw from the Shiite
south immediately, and we could withdraw rapidly
from Baghdad. Setting up a Sunni region might take
longer, but we should encourage that as quickly as
possible. And then we would only be left with a
residual force in Kurdistan.
JIM LEHRER: And the central government that
now exists under the prime ministership of al-Maliki
would just disappear?
PETER GALBRAITH:
Well, there might be some nominal central
government, but the important point is that the
central government right now doesn't govern
anything. It doesn't govern the south; it doesn't
govern Kurdistan; and it doesn't govern either the
center or Baghdad.
One problem with many of the strategies being
discussed is that they basically involve an
ultimatum to the Iraqi government to get its act
together or else we'll withdraw. But the Iraqi
government, even if it could get its act together,
wouldn't matter, because it has no influence outside
of the Green Zone, or only minimal influence.
JIM LEHRER: All right. Mr. Ambassador, thank
you very much.
PETER GALBRAITH:
Well, good talking to you.
pbs org
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Related issue
Peter W. Galbraith, Former U.S. Ambassador to
Croatia 19 Oct. 2006 The Cato Institute
Download or Listen to Podcast of the Event (MP3)
from The Cato Institute
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