|
Turkey warms to talk, not action, in Iraq |
|
Kurd Net
does not take credit for and is not responsible for the
content of news information on this page |
|
Turkey warms to talk, not action, in Iraq
27.1.2006
By Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel
|
|
|
|
Turkey suddenly finds
itself in the limelight as international concern
over Iran's nuclear program grows, and the chances
of Tehran being hauled before the United Nations
Security Council increase.
Porter Goss, director of the US Central Intelligence
Agency, visited Turkey on December 12 and informed
Prime Minister
Redep Tayyip Erdogan that the US was seriously
considering striking Iran some time in 2006, and he
asked the Turks to share intelligence on Iran.
More important, from a Turkish point of view, Goss
also told Ankara that if it cooperated, the US would
"green light" a Turkish cross-border attack on the
People's Liberation Army, the armed wing of the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), now known as the
Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress. The PKK
has a 10,000-strong militia in the mountains of
northern Iraq.
Turkey is fearful of an independent Kurdish state
being established in Iraq as this could ignite its
Kurdish minority in its eastern provinces. Turkey
fought a war with the PKK in the mid-1980s.
Moreover, Turkey is concerned that if the Kurds
seize the oilfields of Kirkuk and Mosul in Iraq,
independence would be a foregone conclusion. This in
turn could revive separatist demands in the Kurdish
populations in Syria, Iran and, of course, Turkey.
According to Conn Hallinan, a foreign-policy analyst
for Foreign Policy In Focus, these developments
suggest a quid pro quo between Washington and
Ankara. This would mean that the US attacks Iran,
with minimal protest from the Turks, while at the
same time Ankara hits the PKK and derails the
formation of a Kurdish state, with minimal comment
from the US.
This falls into the realm of speculation. On the
ground, there are indications that Turkey is coming
to the realization that armed intervention is not
necessarily the answer.
Recipe for disaster
The seeds for hostility were sown in the aftermath
of the fall of the Ottoman Empire, as Kurds were
denied self-determination and two main swaths of
Kurdish land were submersed into Iraq and the newly
founded Turkish republic. Suddenly, Turkey found a
large Kurdish minority on its doorstep, with a
further Kurdish headache in its back yard that,
unchecked, would threaten the very foundations of
the republic.
Battles ensued in both Iraq and Turkey
intermittently, as a concoction of repression and
rebellion dominated society. With the ruthless
regime of Saddam Hussein taking adequate care of the
Iraqi Kurds, Turkey could more evidently concentrate
on its own far bigger problem - its own restive
Kurds, thought to number about 15 million and long
denied cultural and ethnic rights.
When the PKK took up arms in 1984, it was in the
middle of the Iran-Iraq War. Southeastern Turkey
became a daily battlefield, as successive Turkish
governments largely failed to overcome militants,
increasingly causing havoc on the economy.
However, in 1991, somewhat ironically, the tables
turned as a mass of Kurdish refugees arrived at the
Turkish border in frantic flight from Ba'athist
repression, in the middle of the war with the PKK.
With a fierce spotlight on Turkey, it eventually had
no choice but to provide partial humanitarian relief
and eventually support the establishment of a "safe
haven" in the north of Iraq.
Turkey found it difficulty to accept its new Kurdish
neighbor, which embraced autonomy, a cultural
renaissance and literal freedom. If unchecked, a
discomforting paradox could soon develop, with one
side of the border denying any existence of Kurds
and the other side proudly welcoming visitors to the
"Kurdistan of Iraq" at the border crossing.
Perhaps from then on, a sense of inevitability hit
Turkey, realizing that it could not actively control
the dealings of the Kurds on both sides of the
border. The Iraqi Kurds, although landlocked, had
the benefit of much sympathy, with their plight
brought into the international arena, and crucially
they had support from the United States and the
United Kingdom via daily air patrols.
In turn, Turkey's focus shifted to solving the PKK
dilemma. Behind the scenes, a different stance was
adopted and diplomatic cross-border relationships
soon prospered. After all, creating two battles was
almost unwinnable where the setting was in the
middle of the Kurdish plains. Trade and commerce
thrived.
However, the United States' invasion of Iraq served
to cement Turkish fears as the Iraqi Kurds rejoined
the greater Iraq, with guaranteed sovereignty and an
influential role on the new blueprint of Iraq.
Certain ride lines set by Turkey, such as control of
oil-rich Kirkuk, now all but a certainty, with this
being a key Kurdish stipulation, were soon discarded
as the Kurds continued on a new path to promise.
They won control of leading ministries as Iraqi
coalition partners and became close allies of the
US.
Turkish fears were highlighted further with most of
the key Kurdish demands being enshrined in the Iraqi
constitution and Kurdistan proclaiming its first
official president - Massaud Barzani.
In this light, a continuing blind eye to the
proceeding across the border would be
counterproductive and dangerous.
This resulted in a more cooperative era between
Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, with commerce thriving
and billions of US dollars' worth of contracts been
awarded to Turkish construction firms in the
process. Booming cross-border trade was highlighted
by the commencement of daily flights from Istanbul
to Arbil and Sulaimaniya, to facilitate popular
demand for a more accessible route.
Perhaps as a more political solution was sought to
the Kurdish problem, there came a realization that
working with the Iraqi Kurds could actually bring
about much-needed stability to Turkey itself. With
Iraqi Kurds the potential benefactors of a land
awash in oil, Turkey could kill two birds with one
stone - solve its own Kurdish dilemma and also
benefit from the democratic and economic
developments in Iraq.
Massaud Barzani recently acknowledged the thawing of
ties and confirmed that he would be happy to mediate
between the PKK and Turkey.
After all, the options left for Turkey are fast
fading. If Iraqi Kurds win a strong federation, or
even outright independence conducted via democratic
means, a border blockade by Turkey would be
catastrophic for the Iraqi Kurds, who heavily rely
on Turkish supply lines, but this would not be
sustainable. Any armed invasion, threatened on more
than one occasion, would lead to mass bloodshed and
would all but end Turkey's elusive dream of joining
the European Union.
Bashdar Ismaeel is a London-based freelance
writer who also holds first-class bachelor of
science degree honors. The focus of his work is
primarily on Iraq, the Kurds and Middle Eastern
current affairs.
www.atimes.com
Top |
Kurd Net
does not take credit for and is not responsible for the content of news
information on this page
|
|
|
® 