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Different sources have given different figures for
the PKK presence in KRG areas, but it is widely
believed that there are some 3,000 PKK guerrillas in
the remote areas near the Iraq-Iran-Turkey border
(locally called the triangle areas). In the 1990s,
PKK forces in the KRG areas posed a direct or
indirect military threat to Kurdish forces and
authority, but that does not seem to be the case
anymore - except for their ability to collect taxes
and food in remote villages.
In the last few years the PKK (whether under old or
new names) has created political difficulties for
the KRG and in Iranian Kurdistan by establishing new
political parties that compete with existing
political forces. In Iraq (outside the KRG-controlled
area) the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party (PCDK)
and in Iran the Kurdistan Renaissance Party (KJP)
are known to be PKK-linked and are locally viewed as
"troublemakers." While the PCDK did not gain a
substantial number of votes in the January Iraqi
elections in KRG areas, the KJP is accused of
encouraging confrontation between protesters and
Iranian security forces in several Iranian Kurdish
cities, leading to arrests and casualties.
Recent PKK military activities inside Turkey have
also raised the question of the timing and aim of
such confrontations while Turkey is increasingly
involved in negotiations with the European Union.
One interpretation I have heard repeated in
Kurdistan is that, whether intentionally or not,
these activities serve the Turkish military, partly
by providing grounds for maintaining a hefty
military presence in Turkish Kurdistan and partly by
helping the military argue in favor of playing a
prominent role in politics and preserving its
independence on budgetary issues.
These renewed military activities could have
additional ramifications as well. In addition to
limiting the debate over ways to combat terrorism,
the economic deprivation of Kurdistan in Turkey
would be allowed to continue, peaceful political
dialogue and confidence-building would suffer
substantially, other Kurdish political organizations
would have little if any chance to create a wider
democratic space, no general amnesty would be
allowed in Turkey for former guerrilla soldiers, and
reconstruction of demolished villages would be in
doubt.
In KRG areas, renewed PKK military activities are
seen in a different light. While the Kurds in Iraq
are working hard to secure their region and struggle
in the constitutional negotiations to ensure a fair
share in a reconstructed Iraq, the Turkish military
could exploit PKK military activities to intervene
in the KRG areas with the pretext of fighting the
PKK, despite the fact that the PKK based in the KRG
areas are not used for military attacks inside
Turkey. Many commentators and politicians are openly
suspicious about the Turkish aim of resuming
confrontations.
Yet it seems highly unlikely the Turkish military
would embark on a military adventure in KRG areas,
despite the Turkish military presence (approximately
1,000 troops) since the mid-1990s in four villages
in Iraqi Kurdistan. First, it would be unwise for
Turkey to open a new military front with the KRG
while the country is struggling with the EU to find
a political solution for the Cyprus issue. Second,
any military attack inside KRG territory would mean
the immediate halt of accession negotiations with
the EU. Third, Turkey has, in reality, developed
strong economic interests inside Iraqi Kurdistan.
Turkish firms and businesses are visible in many
places in the major cities of Dohuk, Irbil and
Sulaimaniyya. Cross-border commercial activities are
beneficial for both sides.
Then, too, the U.S. presence in Iraq is in itself a
deterrent to any Turkish military action there.
Kurdistan is the only area where U.S. and
multinational forces do not need to fight, and
opening a new military front against the PKK to
appease Turkey is not an option for the time being.
Politically, it would be difficult for American
politicians to defend the right of the Kurds in
Iraq, yet help the Turkish military enter Kurdistan,
despite the fact that the PKK is regarded as a
terrorist organization by the U.S. This would
destabilize the only secure and stable region in
Iraq.
Indeed, it would be difficult for European and
American politicians to propose peaceful solutions
for the Kurdish issue in Iraq while supporting a
military option for the Kurdish issue in Turkey.
Khaled Salih is a senior lecturer in Middle East
politics at the University of Southern Denmark. He
is co-editor (with Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry)
of "The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq" (University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2005). This commentary first
appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an
online newsletter.
www.dailystar.com.lb
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