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As
the August 15 deadline for a draft constitution
approaches, Iraq's Kurds are locked in an uneasy
power struggle with the Shiite majority that could
be the precursor to a Kurdish falling out with the
Iraqi political process. The influence of the United
States over the constitutional drafting process,
which has been considerable, despite American and
Iraqi government rhetoric suggesting the contrary,
has thus far been unfavorable to the Kurds. One of
the chief demands of Kurdish negotiators has been
that there should be regional rather than national
control over natural resources. This would give
Kurds authority over oil-rich Kirkuk, the so-called
"heart" of Kurdistan. This is seen as essential by
the Kurds, mainly because of their unwillingness to
be beholden again to the Iraqi central government
for funds. Kurdish supremacy in Kirkuk is also an
essential contingency in case Iraq's current
instability worsens.
The Americans, on the other hand, are worried that
integrating acceptance of regional control over
resources into the constitution will encourage those
who want to secede in the north, and those who want
to ally themselves with Iran in the south.
Iran-leaning Iraqi Shiites, like the Sunni Arabs,
continue to be unfavorably disposed to American
influence over the Iraqi political process, while
the U.S. fears that allowing some form of regional
autonomy in the south will be to its disadvantage as
it seeks to turn Iraq into a stable source of oil.
While the U.S. has made its preference clear on
oil-related issues, it has also, much to the dismay
of the Kurds, decided to steer clear of other social
and political complexities that could plague the
nascent Iraqi constitution. Both Kurds and
non-Shiite Arabs are alarmed by the supposed desire
of the majority to include Iranian-style Islamic
features in the constitution. There has even been
talk of including a (mostly ceremonial) post of
"supreme guide," an idea which makes Iraq's
non-Shiites cringe. While it is debatable whether or
not the Kurds genuinely have a problem with an
Islamic civil code, they do have more difficulties
with the use of Islam in the constitution than do
the other parties, and this puts them at a
disadvantage.
The Kurds have also put forth highly controversial
demands. Many of these can be interpreted as part of
a Kurdish bargaining technique to secure things such
as veto power over legislation. The Kurds, for
example, have suggested that they be entitled to a
regional referendum in eight years' time to
determine whether or not they approve of
independence. While this is unlikely to be allowed
by any Iraqi government, even if it is written into
the constitution, it would be a justification for
Kurdish independence down the road if things turned
sour in the rest of the country. Understandably, the
"I" word is not being taken well by the other
parties at the table, who are already suspicious of
Kurdish intentions.
The current negotiations are tough and complicated,
and the Kurds are also the only ones who seem to be
going at them alone. Kurdish leaders were the most
ardent Iraqi supporters of the U.S. invasion, and
Kurdistan is still the only part of Iraq considered
safe for American troops. The Kurds put their
Peshmerga militia at the service of the U.S. to
secure a number of key areas near the north, and
almost everyone suspects that the Kurds were the
real captors of Saddam Hussein, at least in terms of
providing the intelligence that led to his
discovery.
Yet despite all of this, the U.S. is concerned about
the image a strong U.S.-Kurdish alliance sends to
the Arab world, and has failed to provide rewards
for Kurdish cooperation. Complicating the issue
further is the fact that Turkey remains very uneasy
with Kurdish moves.
The Sunni Arabs on the other hand - many of whose
active representatives today were once aligned with
Baath - have been courted incessantly by the U.S.
Their very place in the Iraqi constitutional
drafting process is a direct result of this American
desire to be accommodating: the parties at the
table, at the firm request of the Bush
administration, were asked to ignore the fact that
very few Sunni Arabs turned out to vote in the Iraqi
elections, hence ensuring far fewer representatives
in the constitutional negotiations.
The Americans have also sought to appease the
majority Shiites. However, conspicuously less talk
is heard about the integral advisory role that Iran
is playing in support of the Iraqi Shiites. Tehran
has behaved as a sophisticated big brother to the
Shiites, and seeks to ultimately ensure that the
community gets all that the constitutional drafting
process can offer them.
In all likelihood, the Kurds will be the party
forced to settle for less. Their minimal package of
demands does not square with the maximal concessions
the other Iraqi communities are willing to offer.
The constitution itself will be drafted shortly, but
its repercussions will be more evident in about a
year's time, when the Kurds will have had time to
work within a structure they find problematic. A
Kurdish backlash, requesting revisions to the
constitution or something more serious, will be very
likely then.
Ali Ezzatyar is a doctoral candidate in law at
the University of California, Berkeley. He wrote
this commentary for The Daily Star.
www.dailystar.com.lb
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