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So,
this is what a liberal constitution in an ethnically
diverse, Islamic Middle Eastern country looks like,
this draft constitution of Iraq.
The unwillingness of Sunni negotiators to go along
with the draft is a serious loss. But a review of
the document itself quickly reveals just how dubious
the Sunni objections to it are.
It makes obvious sense for Iraq to have a federal
structure in which substantial authority devolves to
its major regions: Kurdistan in the north, the
Shi'ite regions in the south, as well as the Sunni
region in the center. A unitary Iraqi state is a
complex puzzle to put together outside the context
of rule by force. Any voluntary association has to
be built on a foundation of significant local
autonomy. Without reassurance along those lines,
ethnic populations would find it difficult to feel
much in the way of allegiance to the central
government. In the long run, that is a recipe for
possibly violent splintering.
The Sunnis are a minority of about 20 percent of
Iraqis. What ought to be the biggest concern of such
a group is the protection of minority rights. Sunnis
should be eager to embrace provisions allowing for
the legal creation of a Sunni region capable of
seeing to the organization of its own affairs. An
Iraq with a strong central government capable of
nullifying any and all regional laws and decrees
that contradict those of local authorities — which
is to say, an impossible Iraq to create, given the
sentiments of most Iraqis — would inevitably be
dominated by the country's Shi'ite majority.
It'sameasureofthe progress of democratic sentiment
in Iraq that Shi'ite negotiators understood the need
for regional autonomy and didn't try to pursue a
path that would have led to their lopsided dominance
over all matters Iraqi. Unfortunately, Sunnis
haven't been able to make that leap, at least not
yet.
Why not? The temptation is to think that the answer
must be because of a dream that one day, Sunnis will
dominate Iraq as they did during the reign of Saddam
Hussein. They don't want a federal Iraq because they
want once again to call all the shots from Baghdad.
That could be the reason, and no doubt it is
orthodoxy among the insurgents. But as to how you
get from here to there, it's hard to see. Suppose
the United States loses heart in the face of a
gaining insurgency. Would a U.S. bug-out be so
complete as to abandon the Kurds and the Shi'ites to
a new Ba'athist Sunni regime? Even if the United
States gives up on the Sunni triangle, it's hard to
see why the Shi'ite areas and especially Kurdistan
will have to go undefended. Moreover, the Kurds and
the Shi'ites themselves have something to say about
the return of Sunni dominance. In a worst-case,
civil war scenario, the Sunnis are at greatest risk.
If the rejection of the constitution is meant to
open the road to power by conquest, it's a dubious
proposition.
One provision of the draft constitution is
worryingly anti-Sunni, at least in potential, and it
pertains to the not inconsequential matter of oil
revenue. In the unofficial translation of the Aug.
24 draft, Article 110 provides: "The federal
government will administer oil and gas extracted
from current fields in cooperation with the
governments of the producing regions and provinces
on condition that the revenues will be distributed
fairly in a manner compatible with the demographical
distribution all over the country."
So far so good. But the provision continues: "A
quota should be defined for a specified time for
affected regions that were deprived in an unfair way
by the former regime or later on, in a way to ensure
balanced development in different parts of the
country. This should be regulated by law." That
begins to look like an ill-advised warrant for
reprisal and reparations of a kind that could doom
chances of winning Sunni support for the new
constitutional order.
Still, it seems to me a more plausible reason for
the Sunni rejection than legitimate grievance or
fantasies of a return to power is the acutely
dangerous state of politics in Sunni Iraq. It is,
quite simply, a very dangerous time to be a
dealmaker.
If two-thirds of the voters in three of Iraq's
provinces, four of which are majority-Sunni, reject
the constitution, it fails. Sunni leaders are said
to be organizing voters.
To which one must reply: Good. Participation in the
political process is what matters, and a large
turnout in Sunni Iraq in opposition to the
constitution might just show Sunnis how much they
have to gain by embracing a democratic Iraq.
Moreover, one lives and learns, but I think Sunni
rejectionist elements who are confident that they
can defeat the constitution once Sunni Iraqis are
voting in large numbers by secret ballot may be
mistaken. And, of course, if Sunnis do not exercise
their option of scuttling the constitution, its
ratification will create a new opening for Sunni
participation in the new government.
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