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Iraq's spiral of deadly sectarian violence has been
between Arab Sunnis and Arab Shi'a. But if Iraq
fragments, it will be along ethnic lines that pit
Arabs against Kurds. The Kurds seek a secular
republic with Kirkuk as the capitol of a federal
Iraqi state called Kurdistan. If the constitution
addresses their core demands, the Kurds might be
flexible on other issues that threaten to break
consensus during current negotiations on Iraq's
permanent constitution.
Most Iraqis agree that the best way to balance the
competing demands for democracy and unity is through
a federal structure that assigns specific
authorities to the national government while
decentralizing control to regional and local
governments.
As envisioned, powers would be reserved for federal
Iraqi states unless they are specifically allocated
to the national government. Federalism is a contract
between equal groups; it is preferable to autonomy,
which is bestowed by the national government to a
lesser party and can be more easily revoked.
Although federal Iraqi states should be composed
using geographic criteria, they should also take
into account regional interests and cultural
affinities. Saddam Hussein's policy of "ethnic
correction" reapportioned territories within several
northern provinces including Kirkuk. Consistent with
Article 58 of the interim constitution, a system of
property claims and compensation should be
established so that displaced persons have the right
to return to their homes before the Iraqi government
conducts a census and organizes a popular referendum
allowing them to determine their federal Iraqi state
affiliations.
Other northerners — Arabs, Turkmen and Assyrians —
are nervous about domination by Kurds in a federal
Iraqi Kurdistan. Though federalism goes hand in hand
with minority rights, the best way to guarantee
their group rights is through a robust bill of
individual rights enshrined in the Iraq
Constitution. Given Iraq's history of
ethno-religious conflict, the constitution should go
even further by including explicit provisions
protecting groups from discrimination, promoting
equality and enabling them to preserve their unique
identities.
The role of religion in Iraqi governance is another
potential deal-breaker. The Kurds, who are staunchly
secular and pro-Western, strongly resist efforts by
clerics to apply Islamic law nationwide without
restraint. Yet Islam is a powerful force shaping
Iraqi society.
The circle can be squared by making Islam the
official religion of Iraq and requiring that
national legislation be consistent with Islamic law.
The constitution should not, however, require the
application of Islamic law to family matters such as
marriage, divorce and inheritance. Consistent with
the principle of decentralization, family law should
be left to federal Iraqi states, which may enact any
law they see fit, subject to the requirement that
the law does not violate the rights of equal
protection in the constitution. The Quran is subject
to interpretation; conservative clerics must not
push too hard.
If the constitution guarantees federalism and
secularism, Kurdish leaders would be flexible on
other contentious issues. For example, the Kurds may
surrender exclusive control of the rich Kirkuk oil
fields and allow the national government to control
Iraq's national oil wealth, provided that revenues
were distributed to federal Iraqi states based on
their percentage of the total population.
Kurdish fighters — called peshmarga ("those who walk
before death") — enjoy a revered position in Kurdish
society for protecting Kurds from Saddam's genocidal
campaigns and from the intrusion of Turkish troops.
Though Kurdish leaders are likely to resist
demobilizing and disarming the peshmarga, they might
allow the whole units to be co-opted in the Iraqi
national army, join federal Iraqi state civilian
defense forces, perform local police functions or
retire with a pension.
Compromise and consent will not be easy. If Iraqis
fail to use negotiations of the permanent
constitution as a tool of national reconciliation,
violence could worsen and start to fragment. In this
event, it would be in the United States national
interest to withdraw its forces to Kurdistan, secure
the Kirkuk oil fields, and protect the last bastion
of democracy in Iraq. A moral dimension also exists:
It would be wrong for the U.S. to sell out the Kurds
as it did in 1974 and 1991.
David L. Phillips is a senior fellow at the
Council on Foreign Relations and author of "Losing
Iraq."
www.dcexaminer.com
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