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Outside view: Reconciling Kurds and Shias
19.7.2005
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WASHINGTON -
Despite the new Iraqi government's democratic
founding, the governing coalition is still held
together largely by the self interest of the two
dominant parties, the Kurds and the Shiites. While
they presently cooperate to quell the domestic Sunni
insurgency and develop the legal framework for
Iraq's permanent constitution, these parties still
cannot agree on what form the future government will
take.
Their conflicting interests stem directly from
social, political, and economic inequalities, many
of which existed before the U.S. invasion two years
ago. To date, attempts to address these inequalities
have been the main sticking points for these groups.
If the United States wants to preserve Iraqi
stability, it must give the Sunnis more specific
financial stakes in the process and political
incentives among the Kurdish and Shiite leaders to
make concessions to develop more common ground
between all the main factions to what form the
future government will take.
U.S. policymakers often overlook two core elements
of formulating a strategy toward Iraq: (1) the
difficult political questions the future Iraqi
government must contend with to establish itself as
the country's central governing agent and (2) they
underestimate the real threat to future stability
these issues entail.
The inequalities found among the Shiites, Kurds, and
Sunnis could erode the tenuously stable relationship
between Iraq's leading political parties. The United
States should distribute more economic resources to
reduce these inequalities and minimize the prospects
of future violence.
The deteriorating security situation bleeds into all
facets of daily economic life and magnifies local
inequalities. Security took hold slower in central
and southern Iraq, and health care workers and
financial investors could not do their job while in
the northern region humanitarian organizations were
already established and security began to take root.
Moreover, due to the ongoing insurgency within
Sunni-run regions, reconstruction in central Iraq
has lagged behind southern and northern efforts.
International aid organizations report there has
been almost no rise in diseases in northern Iraq,
and the World Health Organization has developed a
track record of restocking local clinics with
medical supplies.
On the whole, the northern provinces controlled by
the Kurds are financially better off than southern
(Shiite) and central (Sunni majority) Iraq. Baghdad
itself is predominantly Shiite, especially the slums
of East Baghdad. These economic inequalities
heighten the tension between Kurds, Sunnis, and
Shiites that manifests itself in targeted violence.
These attacks, particularly sensational Sunni
attacks on Shiite mosques and ongoing fighting in
Kirkuk, contribute to a sense of continued Kurdish
and Shiite victimization.
Consequently, the Kurds and the Shiites, the two
most powerful communities in the new Iraqi
government, still feel victimized by Sunni
aggression. It is unclear to what extent they may
utilize this perception of victimization to justify
punitive action against Sunnis.
Economically, the Sunnis will have to contend with
the reality that the financial prospects in the
country are against them because the bulk of the
country's oil reserves are in the Shiite South or
the Kurdish-dominated region of Kirkuk in the North,
much less so with the Sunnis.
Militarily, the inequalities are far worse. The
Kurdish Peshmerga forces are estimated to be around
80,000 strong and battle-hardened after a decade of
resisting the Saddam regime. By contrast, the
U.S.-trained forces in Iraq are newly trained and of
questionable reliability. Most of these troops are
trained for policing action with only few able to
perform conventional military operations. The entire
force is also expected to undergo significant
restructuring under the new assembly government with
the removal of former Baathists and Sunnis currently
serving in senior officer positions.
Given these factors, the Kurds have political levers
to push for the acceptance of semi or full autonomy
and will likely be able to extend that autonomy to
the disputed region of Kirkuk as well. Shiite
efforts to oppose these moves could lead Iraq to
civil war.
The Shiites and Kurds have some common ground. They
both were betrayed by the White House and both have
track records of coordinating and cooperating with
Iran. The problem is a fundamental disagreement
between leading Shiites and Kurds on core political
issues: Kurdish authority over the Peshmerga
(Kurdish militias), the extent of Kurdish control
over Kirkuk, and the role that Islam will play in
Iraqi law formation.
In order to ease the resolution of these issues, the
United States must undertake actionable measures to
improve local economic and political inequalities
that will be financially costly. The high financial
costs that Washington must expend will be more
palatable than the long term threat of ethnic and
religious violence that can be avoided in the
future.
(Eric Hilmo has a masters degree in security studies
from Georgetown University. Samuel Blatteis is a
Fulbright recipient to the Persian Gulf, 2005-2006.)
(United Press International's "Outside View"
commentaries are written by outside contributors who
specialize in a variety of important issues. The
views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of
World Peace Herald or United Press International. In
the interests of creating an open forum, original
submissions are invited.)
http://about.upi.com
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