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Iraq's
Jan. 30 elections have been heralded as a triumph of
democracy and national unity. For the first time in
decades, a legislature that is truly representative
of Iraq's diverse ethnic and religious groups will
govern.
But whether political alliances forged in opposition
to Saddam Hussein can lay the groundwork for a
rejuvenated Iraq remains in doubt. The difficulties
in creating a committee to draw up the constitution
are vivid reminders. Even more glaring is the
growing divide between the country's Kurds and
Arabs.
Some estimate that up to a million younger Kurds —
including most professionals — cannot speak Arabic
(this is the legacy of 14 years of de facto
separation from the rest of the country). The next
generation of Kurdish political and business leaders
has few ties with their counterparts in the south.
Without a common vernacular or shared experiences,
the social, political and economic connections
needed to hold Iraq together as a single country
will begin to fray. Within a generation, Iraq's
Kurds may see no justification for continuing a
political and economic union with Iraq's
Arabic-speaking populations, especially if language
barriers impede communication.
But no analog to Jawaharlal Nehru (India's socialist
leader who fought against the British Empire and
eventually became prime minister) has arisen able to
propound an "idea of Iraq" for why its peoples
should remain freely associated together in a common
state. The loss of common frames of reference —
including a shared language — makes forging a common
future a more difficult enterprise.
And democracy may not provide the solution to Iraq's
ills. Consider Bosnia, where efforts to forge a
unified country among three hostile ethno-religious
groups has proven extremely difficult — even when
the parties share a common language. We forget today
how Bosnia's first free elections in November 1990
were cited as a triumph for democracy. Sixteen
months later, Europe's most destructive conflict
since the end of World War II erupted.
As in Bosnia 15 years ago, most Iraqi voters
eschewed non-ethnic parties to cast votes for ethnic
and religious coalitions. This means that the main
dividing lines in the new National Assembly will not
be over issues (federalists versus centralists,
free-marketeers versus social democrats and so on)
but identity-language, ethnicity and faith.
In Bosnia, politicians elected as ethnic advocates
found it nigh impossible to reach the compromises
necessary to hold the country together. It didn't
matter that the different nationalist parties had
divided up the spoils of government, assigning the
presidency to a Muslim, nominating a Croat as prime
minister and appointing a Serb as speaker of the
legislator. This failed to prevent civil war. Having
a Kurd as president, a Shia prime minister and a
Sunni parliament chair is no guarantee of stability
if most of Iraq's new legislators see themselves as
representatives of group interests rather than
national leaders.
Some observers feel that assigning positions to
representatives of different ethnic, linguistic and
religious groups will compensate. But Cyprus'
experiment with quotas based on ethnicity and
language — designed to reconcile the interests of
the Greek majority and Turkish minority — proved
unworkable. Nor did provisions which gave the
Turkish community a veto right over national
legislation create a basis for trust. Today, the
island remains divided along ethno-linguistic lines
(a southern Greek zone and a northern Turkish one).
As in Cyprus and in Bosnia, the problem facing Iraq
are radically different conceptions of its future.
For the Shia, Iraq should be defined by its
majority: Arabic in language, Shia Muslim by faith.
For the Kurds, the way forward is not reintegration
with their Arabic-speaking countrymen but a "velvet
divorce" that will facilitate the emergence of an
independent Kurdistan.
But other Iraqis may not be willing to countenance
secession. Ibrahim al-Jafari made this clear: "Our
Kurdish brothers are in a good position. … [But] if
they go beyond these rights we could prevent
them"... this language is similar to that employed
by Bosnia's Muslim president Alija Izetbegovic when
presented with the demands of Bosnia's Serbs for
substantial autonomy after independence.
A disintegrating Iraq would be a geopolitical
nightmare, destabilizing the entire Middle East. The
United States remains committed to the territorial
integrity of the Iraqi state. So, on paper,
federalism appears to be the most logical solution,
with significant devolution of authority to local
authorities.
But Iraqis of all backgrounds must also buy into the
new arrangements. No one suggests that any Iraqi
should be forced to give up his culture as a price
for unity. The failed policies of Ataturk's Turkey
or Suharto's Indonesia must be avoided. But Iraq
cannot move forward if Shia majoritarianism replaces
Sunni minority rule as the basis for governance. And
while not speaking Arabic may be a point of pride
for Kurds who suffered at the hands of Saddam
Hussein's regime, it is a necessity if they are to
take full part in national life and the forging of a
common destiny.
Iraq can avoid the fate of Bosnia or Cyprus only if
its politicians put the national interest above
ethnic politics and the international community
invests the resources necessary to give Iraqis of
all backgrounds a stake in defending a federal,
democratic Iraq.
Let's hope a time bomb to civil war hasn't started
ticking in Baghdad.
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