|
Last
March, for the first time in the modern history of
the Middle East, the Kurdish language became part of
a Constitution when the Iraqi Transitional
Administrative Law was written in both Arabic and
Kurdish. That came after Kurdish leaders had assumed
high political office in the interim Iraq
government, and shortly before Kurdish leader Jalal
Talabani was named Iraqi president following the
January 30 elections.
However, Syria's Kurds, whether openly or not, see
their own situation in a far different light. They
argue that there are some 300,000 Kurds who do not
hold Syrian nationality, and that Kurds do not enjoy
the same political rights that their brethren have
steadily gained in Iraq and Turkey (particularly
after Ankara sought to gain membership in the
European Union).
Syria's Kurds feel discriminated against and believe
there has been a substantial regression in the level
of development in Syria's northeast, where Kurds are
concentrated. Some Kurds also believe that Damascus
"sold them out" when in 1998, following the Adana
agreement between Damascus and Ankara, it lifted its
support for the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and
expelled its leader Abdullah Ocalan, as well as
handed over to Turkey around 58 other party leaders.
Syrian Kurds have other beefs as well. They were
angry with the Syrian regime for preventing them
from accepting condolences after a series of
terrorist attacks killed Iraqi Kurds in northern
Iraq in February 2004. Soon afterward, Kurdish
disgruntlement led to more violent protests in
Qamishli and Aleppo (particularly the northern part
of the city, where PKK supporters live.
Demonstrators held up banners with slogans never
before seen among Syria's Kurds, such as
"liberation," "free Kurdistan," "kick out the Arab
settlers," and "Intifada until the occupation ends."
For the first time in their political history, the
Kurds, who had hitherto demanded only their
cultural, political and social rights within a
unified Syria, expressed the issue as one of
liberation.
The violence that ensued led to the deaths of around
40 people, including members of the police, and to
the burning by Kurds of public and private
institutions and schools. In retaliation, some 2,000
Kurds from all over Syria were detained. Most of
them have since been released. The authorities used
considerable force to curb the Kurds' rebellion.
Now, however, it seems they are leaning toward
finding a more practical political solution to the
issue. Following the one-year anniversary of the
Qamishli events, the appointment of Talabani to the
Iraqi presidency and the success of the Iraqi
Kurdish alliance in the Iraqi elections, the Syrian
regime seems willing to be more conciliatory.
The Kurds and the Syrian authorities came to an
agreement in March. Kurds in the province of Hasakeh
staged a demonstration in support of Syrian
President Bashar Assad and refrained from
celebrating their traditional Nawrouz feast, an
occasion to reaffirm Kurdish identity. In return,
Assad granted an amnesty to 312 Kurdish detainees
still imprisoned after the 2004 rioting.
Well-informed sources confirmed to me that the
authorities have also started conducting a census
and are working out the modalities of granting
Syrian nationality to Kurds, and giving it back to
those from who it had been withdrawn. Estimates
indicate that of the 300,000 Kurds without
nationality, 225,000 were deprived of it after the
1962 census, while 75,000 are said to be "of unknown
origin." However, a potential source of disagreement
is that, according to official Syrian sources, the
number of stateless Kurds is closer to 150,000.
Kurdish representatives told me that the authorities
also planned to establish a Kurdish council to look
after the interests of the community "within the
Syrian context." The council would mainly deal with
cultural, social and language issues.
The positive signals that Damascus sent to Talabani
after his appointment and its subsequent granting of
permission to his supporters to organize a large
reception in the center of Damascus, during which
the Kurdish national anthem was played and guests
wore traditional garb, were signs of a new attitude.
Why did the Syrian authorities change so abruptly?
There are several overlapping reasons, as there are
several points of view within the Syrian regime on
how best to address the Kurdish issue. There are
nationalist extremists, but also practical
politicians, and it seems that for now the latter
have gained the upper hand. This is a good thing,
since it is time to realize that the destiny of the
Kurds in neighboring countries has irrevocably
changed. Moreover, the United States is exerting
considerable pressure on Syria, both for specific
regional reasons and because of its human rights
record. There is also no doubt that the Syrian
authorities realized full well that the Kurds hold
considerable political power.
Looking closely at the situation in Syria, one
discerns three distinct political forces: the regime
with the security, political, military and others
means at its disposal; the Islamists, who have
religion and the mosques, but otherwise no other
political means at their disposal; and the Kurds,
whose behavior may have considerable influence on
Syria's stability if their situation is not
adequately dealt with.
With at least 11 different unlicensed political
parties, the Kurds have proven that they are well
organized, that their leadership and people are
closely knit, and that the Kurdish street can be
mobilized at will.
They can rely on regional networks through their
political, family and tribal relationships with
Kurds in Iraq and Turkey. They can bank on
international support thanks to the sympathy the
Kurds have aroused over the years in Europe and the
U.S. They can also reportedly resort to ties with
the Islamists, and I've been told that the Muslim
Brotherhood has proposed that the two sides explore
joint action for the future.
All this proves beyond a doubt that the Kurds are at
the nexus point of a series of domestic Syrian,
regional and international dynamics. The Syrian
authorities did well to change their attitude from
intransigence toward the Kurds to something more
pragmatic and spontaneous.
They will prove even more astute if they translate
this heightened realism and sensibility into
concrete action by granting the Kurds their rights.
Ibrahim Hamidi is a journalist living in Damascus
and an expert in Syrian affairs. He wrote this
article for THE DAILY STAR.
www.dailystar.com.lb
Top |
® 