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TALK
to anyone interested in the future of Iraq these
days and you are likely to hear a note of
frustration. "What are they doing in Baghdad?" asks
a senior British official, expressing London's
feelings about the long delay in the formation of
the new Iraqi government which has just been
unveiled.
It took almost three months, from the day Iraqis
turned out in record numbers to vote in their first
free elections, for Prime Minister-designate Ibrahim
al-Jaafari to submit his ministerial list to the
three-man presidential council for approval before
presenting it to the National Assembly.
There is concern that the same slowness could
prevent Iraq from meeting the various deadlines it
has set for itself — to write a new constitution,
submit it to a referendum, hold a general election,
form a permanent government and then negotiate the
phased withdrawal of the U.S. forces, all in the
course of the current year.
The snail-pace method of forming the government has
allowed some Western opponents of the liberation to
conclude that Iraqis and Arabs in general, are not
ready for pluralist politics and had better be left
to stew in the despotic juice of their history.
There is, however, another way of looking at the
current Iraqi experience. The repeatedly delayed
formation of the government could, in fact, be
regarded as a sign that the new Iraqi leadership is
bending over backward to play pluralism. This
leadership has used the past three months as a crash
course in learning the art of political negotiations
and compromises.
ALTHOUGH the election was held on Jan. 30, the final
results were not officially announced until
mid-February. And those results gave no single party
or group a majority in the National Assembly, thus
making coalition-building imperative.
Coalition politics is an arduous proposition at the
best of time, even in mature democracies.
In the case of Iraq, this was further complicated
because the two big blocs that took part, the main
Shiite list and the Kurdish list, were themselves
the fruits of coalitions formed prior to the
election.
The Shiite list consisted of almost a dozen
different parties — with those parties sometimes
containing markedly rival wings. The Kurdish list
brought together six parties and groups, including
some that had a long history of mutual enmity. This
meant that each of the two big coalition groups, the
Shiites and the Kurds, had first to sort things out
within its own sphere before entering into talks
with others over power-sharing.
The last two weeks of February were thus taken up by
horse-trading within the United Iraqi Alliance, the
principal Shiite bloc backed by Grand Ayatollah Ali
Sistani.
The key issue was the choice of a prime minister.
There were four candidates in the field,
representing the four main blocs within the
alliance. At one point, all the groups went to
Sistani and asked him to choose the prime minister.
He refused — because he wanted the new leadership to
remain accountable only to the Iraqi electorate.
Once al-Jaafari had been chosen as a compromise
candidate for premiership, the fight started over
who should fill the other key posts of the new
administration, notably the three-man presidential
council, the speakership of the parliament, and the
key ministries.
THE task was further complicated by the Transition
Administration Law (TAL) left behind by Paul Bremer,
the American "pasha" who ruled the country until the
transfer of power to Premier Iyad Allawi's interim
government last June. The TAL requires that all key
positions be agreed upon with a two-third majority.
Theoretically, the united Shiite list and its
Kurdish counterpart, which together do have a
two-third majority in the parliament, could have
filled all the posts as they pleased. They decided
not to do so because they knew that Iraq's fragile
democracy needed the largest possible measure of
participation if it is to defeat its armed enemies.
Thus the entire month of March was devoted to
negotiations between the leaders of the Shiite and
Kurdish lists.
Reaching consensus was not easy. The Kurds insisted
to retain a right of veto under any future
constitution. They also refused to disband their
separate armies, known as the "Peshmerga," despite
the fact that they had de facto control over the
Defense Ministry. At the same time, the Kurds
continued to press their claim to Kirkuk and taking
measures to change its ethnic composition to their
own advantage.
UNDER other circumstances, any of these issues could
have led not only to a breakdown of coalition talks
but to civil war. The fact that the worst did not
happen is to the credit of Iraq's new pluralist
system, in which problems could be resolved through
negotiations and compromise rather than fighting and
ethnic cleansing.
The main Shiite list could have made a deal with
Allawi's list and formed a purely Shiite Cabinet.
That, however, would have been a recipe for civil
war while provoking most of Iraq's neighbors.
Forging a compromise with the Kurds, however, was
only one stage of the process. It was equally
important to bring the Arab Sunnis on board.
Unlike the Kurds — who, thanks to their experienced
leadership, have won a share of power bigger than
their demographic strength would warrant — the Arab
Sunnis have badly suffered from their internal
divisions.
Broadly speaking, Arab Sunnis are divided into three
groups. One group has thrown its lot in with the
insurgency in the hope of restoring the remnants of
the Ba'ath Party to power in Baghdad. Another group,
led by people like Ghazi al-Yawar and Adnan Pachachi,
has shown genuine attachment to the democratic
project and, at times swallowing bitter pills, has
remained in the game.
A third group, probably the largest, has hedged its
bets. This group tried to impose Mishaan al-Jabouri
as Speaker of the National Assembly — but failed.
Based on their demographic strength, the Arab Sunnis
should have had at least 40 seats in the National
Assembly. But because many Sunnis either boycotted
the polls or were prevented by terrorist threats
from voting, there are only 17 Arab Sunni members in
the newly elected assembly.
Theoretically, the Shiite-Kurdish coalition could
have ignored the Arab Sunnis or, at most, granted
them only token representation. But this did not
happen either. Both Shiite and Kurdish leaders went
out of their ways to cajole the Arab Sunnis back
into the political game. Thus the new Cabinet headed
by al-Jaffari includes seven Arab Sunni ministers,
including some in key positions such as defence.
Arab Sunnis have also already won one of three seats
on the presidential council which is headed by
Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani.
DESPITE the fact that the insurgency has been
encouraged by the delay in forming the new
government in Baghdad, Iraq's new leadership was
right in taking time to put together a solid
national coalition. It was important that the new
leadership got it right from the start. If elections
are to offer an alternative to civil war, it is
imperative that Iraq's new democracy give all
segments of society as much as possible without
compromising the nation's unity and territorial
integrity.
After Jan. 30, it became clear that the insurgency
and its terrorist allies have no chance of winning
power in a new Iraq where power emanates from the
will of the people. The delay in putting the new
transitional state structures together should be
regarded as a positive sign that the new Iraqi
leadership is learning the art of power sharing.
Iranian author Amir Taheri is a member of Benador
Associates.
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