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U.S. officials may have limited influence on the
direction of the new government, including its
stance toward American troops.
WASHINGTON — For the last two years, U.S.
authorities have had firm control of the mission in
Iraq. They have set rules for military operations
and worked with Iraqi leaders blessed by Washington.
But the arrival of an elected government this month
will take the partnership in new directions that the
Americans may find difficult to control.
The ambitious new Iraqi leaders have their own ideas
and, with elections ahead, are sensitive to
grass-roots pressure. And with the Americans
increasingly reluctant to be seen running the
country, the Iraqis have taken the initiative in the
relationship.
No top Iraqi leader has pushed the Americans to
leave the country or challenged basic terms of the
relationship, including the status of U.S. forces in
Iraq. But in the months ahead, as they write a
constitution, Iraqis will start rethinking the
fundamental ways in which they deal with the
Americans, U.S. officials say.
"They're molding and shaping their government," said
a Bush administration official, who spoke on
condition of anonymity. "So far, we're not hearing a
lot of demands for change. But we know these
questions are coming."
The most sensitive questions ahead are those
concerning the U.S. military. When the new Iraqi
administration takes over, the United States will be
in the unusual position of providing an army for a
country that another government controls.
U.S. military officials say there has been no
indication that the transitional government wants to
negotiate the basic accord — called a status of
forces agreement — under which U.S. troops will
operate. Some military officials predict that the
Iraqis will be preoccupied with writing a new
constitution and that the military treaty will be
left for the permanent government. Under
transitional law, the permanent leaders are to be
elected no later than Dec. 15 and to assume office
by Dec. 31.
Pentagon officials and U.S. commanders don't want
such an agreement at this point, arguing that it
could dangerously restrict them as they battle a
lethal insurgency.
But without such a written pact, rules governing
U.S. troops' activities will remain subject to
informal agreements that Iraqi leaders can seek to
change.
Iraqis could ask for new rules on the treatment of
insurgents and tighter controls on foreign troops at
checkpoints and on foreign security contractors, who
now enjoy a status much like coalition troops in the
way they carry and use weapons.
One signal that Iraqis might seek a new approach on
some issues came last week, when new Iraqi President
Jalal Talabani said he wanted to offer insurgents a
broad amnesty and left open the possibility that
this could include Iraqis who had attacked coalition
troops.
On Friday, a prominent Sunni Muslim cleric urged
Talabani, a Kurd, to follow through on the amnesty
pledge. In his weekly sermon, Sheik Ahmad Abdul-Ghafoor
Samarrai, a cleric in the influential Muslim
Scholars Assn., said Talabani should free all Iraqi
detainees and refuse to "obey and kneel to pressure"
from Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.
Among other issues, Shiite Muslim leaders also may
pressure the U.S. military not to train former Baath
Party members, who many Shiites believe secretly
support the insurgents. At the same time, American
officials are groping for ways to keep Sunnis
involved in the new administration and avoid
angering and alienating a large segment of the
population.
Michael Rubin, a former political advisor to the
Coalition Provisional Authority, the temporary
U.S.-led governing body, said he believed that
Iraqis would clamor for changes on several security
issues. A fight over the U.S. training of former
Baathists "could bring on the first Iraqi
sovereignty crisis," said Rubin, now a scholar at
the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute.
Rubin predicted that U.S. officials would find it
difficult to manage these issues, in part because of
their desire to stay at arm's length from Iraqi
government decision-making.
President Bush has made it clear that he wants Iraqi
democracy to take its course, and U.S. officials
don't want to undermine the government's legitimacy
by making it appear that the Americans are still
pulling the strings. Yet there are strong
temptations to step in.
Such as when Talabani made his amnesty comments. The
Bush administration felt strongly that "people
who've committed violence against coalition troops
shouldn't just get a pass," said a U.S. official,
who declined to be identified. But "we didn't want
to go out and take issue with it publicly. We don't
want to cause problems for him with the local
population."
In recent weeks, as newly elected representatives
argued over formation of the government, various
Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni Arab leaders privately
asked the Americans to intervene with the other
groups to force a solution. U.S. officials declined,
temporarily throwing the negotiations into even
greater turmoil.
On several occasions, however, the Americans have
spoken up.
As U.S. concern mounted that a purge of Baathists
would slow the establishment of an Iraqi army,
Rumsfeld warned last week that "anything that would
delay [a functioning army] or disrupt that as a
result of turbulence, or lack of confidence, or
corruption in government, would be unfortunate."
Dealing with the new government will be tricky for
the Americans in part because of its complexity.
Under interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, U.S.
officials were able to deal with an American
favorite who had broad control over the government.
Now, with the arrival of new executive branch
officials and an elected legislature, there will be
several power centers.
The new leadership is trying to bring influential
tribal and political leaders into the government,
hoping to build its support base. So far, Prime
Minister Ibrahim Jafari has appointed 31 ministers.
It is expected that some of these officials will not
hesitate to criticize Iraqi leaders or the
Americans. There is speculation, for instance, that
a deputy prime minister post could go to Ahmad
Chalabi, the controversial former exile and Pentagon
ally who, in trying to build political support,
recently criticized the U.S. mission in Iraq,
American officials say.
The diversity in the government could create
headaches in Washington if religious and ethnic
sensitivities cause clashes within the leadership
over anti-insurgency efforts, U.S. officials say.
One senior U.S. defense official speculated that
tensions might flare over military operations in
Sunni-dominated central Iraq.
"What if you have a Sunni in charge of the Ministry
of Defense, and we say we want to go back into
Fallouja, and he doesn't want us to?" the official
asked. "Will Jafari be able to run roughshod over
him?"
Another potential issue is the status of U.S. bases
in Iraq. The Pentagon has made no formal request to
establish permanent installations here — partly for
political reasons, officials acknowledge. It is
unclear whether Iraqi politicians who will be
elected to a permanent government next year will
support a long-term U.S. presence.
"It would be silly for us to come out and say we
want permanent bases, and then have somebody get
elected on a platform of no U.S. bases," a second
senior defense official said. "That could happen."
At the same time, many inside the Pentagon believe
that any permanent U.S. foothold in Iraq would only
fuel anti-American sentiment and foster suspicion
that the U.S. invaded Iraq to gain control of its
oil reserves.
And, with U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf states of
Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates,
as well as in Central Asian countries such as
Afghanistan, many believe that there is little
strategic need for such facilities here.
Yet for the most part, Pentagon officials profess
confidence that they will have a generally smooth
relationship on security matters with the new
government. "So far, we're not concerned," the first
defense official said. "But we don't yet have reason
to be concerned."
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