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BAGHDAD, Iraq - (KRT) - Iraq's Sunni Muslims
have little role in the long and erratic
negotiations to form a new government. The Shiites
and Kurds won the most votes. The Shiites and Kurds
are the ones haggling over land, money and power.
But the Sunnis are hardly forgotten. The insurgency
makes sure of that.
As Shiite and Kurd leaders barter over Kirkuk, oil
revenues and who gets to run the Interior Ministry,
they are also struggling to carve out a piece for
the Sunnis. One problem is deciding which Sunnis to
bring into the government. Another is figuring out
how much is enough to satisfy them.
This is about self-preservation, not generosity. The
Shiite and Kurd goal is to make peace with a
profoundly disaffected minority - Arab Sunnis
represent an estimated 20 percent of Iraq's
population - who have a frightful capacity to push
Iraq into ruin.
The Sunni issue is just one of many dogging the
Shiite-Kurd talks. Negotiators have been saying for
weeks that an agreement is near. But nearly two
months have passed since Iraq's unprecedented
elections, and still the nation has no transitional
prime minister, no Cabinet and no president to lead
the way.
The Transitional National Assembly announced Sunday
that it would convene Tuesday for the first time
since its ceremonial opening March 17. The proposed
agenda, however, is limited: Choose an assembly
speaker and two deputies.
A Sunni is expected to get the speaker's post. It's
not powerful, but it is high profile. Sunnis also
are being considered for a handful of Cabinet slots,
including one security ministry, according to Shiite
and Kurd negotiators.
"If we want a successful political process, all the
Iraqi people definitely should be involved," said
Sheikh Abdullah Hassan al-Hadithi, imam of al-Khudairi
mosque in Baghdad. "If their intentions are honest,
and their actions match their words, that will be a
good step.
"But if the next days prove that it was only
propaganda, that will aggravate the problem of
Iraq," the imam said. "There can be no successful
political process if the Arab Sunnis are absent."
The Shiite and Kurd hope is to allay Sunni fears
that in losing at the ballot box the Sunnis have
lost everything, to show the Sunnis that armed
resistance is not their only recourse and to split
the insurgency.
Defeating the insurgency militarily is not possible,
American officials in Iraq say. So the strategy is
to keep the pressure on with force but also use
political and economic levers to splinter the
guerrilla groups.
The insurgency is mostly Sunni Arab, and most
guerrillas harbor a deep distrust of the Shiites and
Kurds who have risen to prominence after the fall of
Saddam Hussein. Attacks are becoming more sectarian
in nature. Insurgents are targeting Shiite and Kurd
civilians and members of the security forces - in a
way that seems designed, sometimes successfully, to
provoke violent revenge and fuel more sectarian
conflict.
Yet Iraq's various armed bands are rivals as well as
allies, competing for the same funding that drives
much of the insurgency. They have wide differences
in agendas, methods and ideologies. Many in the
insurgency do not share the wishes of the mujahedeen
to turn Iraq into an orthodox Islamic state.
Unlike the jihadists, some of the nationalists and
former Baathists who have taken up arms against
American forces and the U.S.-installed interim
government might be willing to lay those arms down
for a seat at the table of power.
If that happens, U.S. and Iraqi forces would be able
to squeeze the space around the hard-core militants.
Publicly no group has presented itself as a
political wing of the insurgents. In fact, the Sunni
political world is marked by a lack of unity and
poor organization, as even Sunni leaders readily
admit.
But privately some Sunnis have approached the
Americans suggesting they have influence over the
fighters and asking about a deal. Time magazine also
reported last month that U.S. diplomats and
intelligence officials are in direct contact with
insurgent leaders.
A key obstacle, U.S. officials say, is that many
Sunnis outside the political process resist talking
to the Shiite and Kurd leaders who will take over
Iraq after the National Assembly approves a
transitional government.
The Sunnis expect the Americans to broker an
agreement and then impose it on all parties. The
Americans are telling the Sunnis to talk to their
fellow Iraqis. The United States can advise and
influence, they say, but it will not dictate.
"They want us to make a deal," said a U.S. Embassy
official who spoke on condition of anonymity. He
said the Sunnis in particular are acting as though a
supreme leader such as Saddam or the king or the
British viceroy are still in charge of Iraq. All the
groups had to do was find the right key, do what the
leader asked, and they would get their share.
"But that ended on June 28," the American official
said, referring to the date in 2004 when the
U.S.-led occupation authorities officially
transferred sovereignty to the interim Iraqi
government.
Where the various efforts to ensure Sunni
participation go next depends in part on who will
represent Sunni interests in the new government.
If the chosen Sunnis are seen as leftovers from the
U.S.-appointed interim government, they will
struggle to win the trust of their fellow Sunnis,
particularly those whose stated goal is to rid Iraq
of foreign troops. If the new officials are seen as
too pro-Sunni, however, they will struggle to get
much accomplished in a government dominated by
Shiites and Kurds.
Some Shiites already are rejecting calls for
accommodation with former regime members. They are
demanding another purge of ex-Baathists from public
office and the security forces, even though many
analysts blame the previous de-Baathification
program for fueling the insurgency.
That is why the decisions being made now are so
contentious. In a nation infected with suspicion and
unaccustomed to political give and take, the task of
sharing power is proving thornier than any of the
parties predicted.
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