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WASHINGTON, March 19 - Senior Bush
administration officials said this week that the
administration was avoiding direct intervention to
break the deadlock among Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish
factions, still trying to form a government in Iraq
six weeks after national elections.
The officials said they had concluded that despite
the bitter wrangling over how much power to
distribute among the factions, particularly Shiites
and Kurds, any attempt by the United States to
mediate would be likely to backfire.
"So far, we're letting it happen," a senior
administration official said, referring to the
Kurdish-Shiite dispute. "That's really by design. If
we try to impose a solution, then anyone who gets
the short end of the stick will hold a grudge, not
only against us, but against the deal that was
reached. It could lead to instability down the
road."
Another senior official said that Kurds, Shiites and
some of Iraq's Arab neighbors want the United States
to play a facilitating role in forming a new
government, but that Washington is resisting.
"There's pressure from the players out there, but
not here," he said. "We are comfortable exactly
where we are."
The passive American approach contrasts sharply with
the involvement early last year of L. Paul Bremer
III, who was the top civilian official of the
American occupation, in working with Iraqis to
produce a "transitional administration law" to guide
the country while it writes a constitution this
year. Mr. Bremer's efforts alienated the Kurds,
among others.
To a lesser extent, the approach contrasts with the
active American encouragement later last year in
trying to get an Iraqi government dominated by
former exiles to work with Sunni leaders to get them
to participate in the elections.
The detached American approach, described by
officials who did not want to be identified because
they said they wanted to keep the spotlight on Iraq,
has irritated some Kurds, who charge that the United
States could end up selling out the Kurds'
interests.
On the other hand, some administration officials say
that Kurdish leaders, in pressing "maximalist"
demands for power, are engaging in theatrics
intended to please their constituencies.
The Kurds have long been expected to press three
main demands once the government is formed. They
oppose establishment of Islam as the main source of
law, insist on keeping their own militia independent
and want to control substantial oil resources,
particularly in the oil-producing city of Kirkuk, in
the north.
What has happened, however, is that the Kurds are
pressing these demands even before the government is
formed, mainly because they have greater leverage
now, with a requirement of a two-thirds majority to
elect a president and two vice presidents.
It will take only a simple majority of the
275-member legislature to approve provisions in a
constitution, and once the president and two vice
presidents are selected, they are supposed to choose
a prime minister, who must then be approved by a
majority of the assembly.
Since the Kurds have 75 seats, they are close to
wielding an effective veto over the selection of a
government but would lose the veto in passing
elements of the constitution.
"Realistically, the Kurds realize that once the
government is formed, their leverage will decline
precipitously," one of the senior officials said.
Still other experts warn that the Kurds may be
overplaying their hand, however, especially by
entertaining the idea that they could eventually
break away from Iraq.
"Irrespective of what Kurdish leaders say, the
Kurds' passion is for independence," said Laith
Kubba, an Iraqi who is senior program officer for
the Middle East and North Africa at the National
Endowment for Democracy, a federally funded
independent vehicle for financing democracy
movements around the world. "But if that is what
they want, they have to take responsibility for it.
A Kurdish state would be surrounded by hostile
neighbors - Turkey, Iran and even Iraq."
www.nytimes.com
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