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Iraq's
historic election left the country with a problem
that everyone saw coming but no one took serious
steps to try to address. Instead of dealing with the
alienation of the Sunni community before the vote,
leaders of the Shiite majority, both religious and
secular, insisted on holding the election first and
working to bring the minority Sunnis - who mostly
stayed away from the polls - in later.
Later has arrived. The Sunni boycott means that the
Shiites and the Kurdish parties will be
significantly overrepresented in a new government.
That carries its own dangers. If either group
overplays its already strong hand, the vision of a
peaceful, democratic and unified Iraq evoked by the
election will quickly shatter. That would poorly
repay those voters for their bravery and
determination. It would also leave American troops
fighting a prolonged, and perhaps unwinnable,
counterinsurgency war in the Sunni provinces. The
victorious parties must accept that winning back the
Sunni provinces is a political challenge they must
take on themselves, not a military chore that can be
handed off to American troops.
There is some hopeful talk coming from Iraqi
political leaders of all communities as they float
at least tentative ideas about possible cooperation
in writing Iraq's new constitution. This talk flows
in part from the arithmetic of constitutional
ratification. A two-thirds majority vote against the
constitution in any 3 of Iraq's 18 provinces could
block final approval. That provision was originally
designed to protect the three Kurdish-majority
provinces. But now it forces attention to the
concerns of the three Sunni-Arab-majority provinces
as well. Those provinces are certain to be severely
underrepresented in the newly elected constitutional
assembly.
The final allocation of National Assembly seats
won't be known for a while. But one certain result
is that Iraq's long-oppressed Shiite majority will
now wield decisive political power. We hope Iraq's
Shiite leaders understand the difference between
leadership and dominance, and treat other groups
better than they were treated during the long
decades of Sunni dictatorship.
The slate of Shiite religious parties that almost
certainly drew the most votes is unlikely to be able
to rule alone, since it will take two-thirds of the
new assembly to choose a new government and adopt a
new constitution. The coalition partners available
to them will include the secular Shiite slate led by
the interim prime minister, Ayad Allawi; the bloc
formed by the two main Kurdish parties; and a
scattering of Sunnis and independents. The wisest
course would be to reach out widely, leaving as few
groups as possible feeling left out and embittered.
In a country experimenting with democracy for the
first time, the concept of a loyal opposition hasn't
had enough time to take root.
For their part, Sunni leaders need to begin making
concrete proposals about how their voices and votes
can be added to the constitutional debate. Sunnis -
not Shiites, Kurds or the American Embassy - should
be deciding which Sunnis to include and how. Once
this happens, Shiites and Kurds should respond
generously, recognizing that anything that draws
Sunnis away from the insurgency and helps preserve a
unified Iraq is in their interests as well.
http://www.nytimes.com
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