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WASHINGTON -
Although it was certainly not his intention, George
W. Bush broke up Iraq when he ordered the invasion
(Liberation) in 2003. The United States not only
removed Saddam Hussein, but it also smashed, and
later dissolved, the institutions that enabled
Iraq's Sunni Arab minority to rule the country: the
army, the security services and the Baath Party.
Kurdistan, free from Saddam's rule since 1991, moved
to consolidate its de facto independence. Iraq's
Shiites, suppressed since the founding of the Iraqi
state, have created a theocracy in southern Iraq and
have no intention of allowing a central government
in Baghdad to roll it back. Iraq's new constitution
merely ratifies this result.
There is no reason to mourn the passing of the
unified Iraqi state. For Iraq's 80-year history,
Sunni Arab dictators held the country together - and
kept themselves in power - with brutal force that
culminated in Saddam's genocide against the Kurds
and mass killings of Shiites. As a moral matter,
Iraq's Kurds are no less entitled to independence
than are Lithuanians, Croatians or Palestinians. And
if Iraq's Shiites want to run their own affairs, or
even have their own state, on what democratic
principle should they be denied? If the price of a
unified Iraq is another dictatorship, it is too high
a price to pay.
Iraq's Kurds, Shiites and Sunni Arabs do not share
the common values and aspirations that are essential
to building a unified state. The country's Kurds are
avowedly secular and among the most pro-American
people in the world. Almost unanimously they want
nothing to do with Iraq. Iraq's Shiites, whether we
like it or not, have voted overwhelmingly for
pro-Iranian religious parties. Iraq's Sunni Arabs,
through their own choice, boycotted the
constitutional assembly. Some of the leaders who
claim to speak for the Sunnis say they want a
unified state, though it seems their real concern is
that they no longer rule Iraq. Even if it had been
done competently, American-led nation-building could
not overcome these divisions.
The constitution accommodates all three groups. Each
can have its own region. Except for a few matters in
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
government, regional law prevails. Thus Kurdistan
can continue to be secular while the Shiites can
create an Islamic state in southern Iraq if their
constituents so choose. Regions can have their own
militaries and control part of their water and oil
resources.
Logic would suggest that once they come to terms
with the fact that they no longer rule Iraq, the
Sunni Arabs will realize that the constitutional
framework actually protects them from domination by
the Shiite majority. It does not leave the Sunni
Arabs penniless as some fear; they get a
proportionate share of Iraq's oil revenue. But
Kurdistan and the Shiite south will manage new oil
fields in their own regions. When the Sunni Arabs
were in charge, they used Iraq's oil to finance
their own development - and the destruction of
Kurdistan and the south. The Kurds and Shiites will
not let this happen again.
The United States should focus now not on preserving
the unity of Iraq but on avoiding a spreading civil
war. The constitution resolves the issues of oil,
territory and control of the central government that
might intensify conflict. Engaged diplomacy will be
required to make these provisions work, especially
with regard to the territorial dispute between
Kurdistan and Arab Iraq over the ethnically mixed
province of Kirkuk. A referendum will decide its
status by Dec. 31, 2007.
Meanwhile, the United States should promote a
special regime for Kirkuk with entrenched
power-sharing for all communities, so as to make the
referendum's outcome as painless as possible for the
losers.
Iraq's political settlement can pave the way for a
coalition exit. Foreign forces have no security role
in Kurdistan and only a minimal one in the south.
In the Sunni areas, the focus should be on
developing a regional army that is aligned with
moderate political elements. While the Bush
administration pretends there is an Iraqi army
today, it actually consists of homogenous Kurdish,
Shiite or Sunni Arab battalions loyal not to the
civilian authorities in Baghdad but to their own
communities.
It is hard to win hearts and minds in the Sunni Arab
areas when the Iraqi troops fighting there are seen
not as fellow citizens but as alien Kurds and
Shiites. There are tribes and other Sunni Arabs
willing to fight the terrorists, but not as
collaborators. The coalition could base its forces
in Kurdistan, where the population would welcome
them and where they can be ready to move in case the
Sunni Arab military proves unable or unwilling to
take on the terrorists.
As Iraq divides, the problem of Baghdad becomes
central. Religiously and ethnically mixed, Baghdad
is already the front line of the sectarian war
between Sunnis and Shiites. Kurdistan's departure
from Iraq - which seems inevitable in the
not-too-distant future - will not greatly affect the
city, but the separation of Sunni Arabs and Shiites
into independent states would cause havoc.
Fortunately, this is much less likely, especially if
federal arrangements work.
As Yugoslavia broke up in 1991, the first Bush
administration put all its diplomatic muscle into a
doomed effort to hold the country together, and it
did nothing to stop the coming war. We should not
repeat that mistake in Iraq.
Peter Galbraith, a former U.S. ambassador to
Croatia, is senior diplomatic fellow at the
Washington, D.C.-based Center for Arms Control and
Non-Proliferation. He has advised Kurdish leaders.
www.washingtonpost.com
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