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There's hope for the
draft constitution and stability, but the main
ethnic groups must accept decentralization
Amid contrasting claims of triumph and despair that
surround Iraq, Saturday's referendum on the draft
constitution reveals a complex reality. From six
trips to Iraq to work with its constitutional
drafters, my personal judgment is that the country
is messy and difficult, but the prospects for
stabilization are not without hope. As we wait for
the final word on the ballot outcome from Iraq's
Independent Electoral Commission, some popular myths
are being proved false.
One myth is that Iraqis are laying a firm basis for
their constitutional democracy. Early reports that
Iraqi voters have approved the draft constitution
are encouraging, and reports that voter turnout was
relatively high - around 65 percent - are also good.
But it is also true that one large minority in Iraq,
the Sunni Arabs, voted overwhelmingly against the
draft. This means the constitution has thus far not
met a basic test: broad-based consensus.
A second myth is that Sunni Arabs, because they
voted, are now part of the political process. That
Sunni Arabs voted is a good thing, even if they
voted against the constitution. Voting is addictive;
they may vote again. But they rejected a federalist
governmental model at this referendum, and they may
continue to reject federalism by refusing to
participate in the December parliamentary election
for a federal government.
Another myth is that this constitution is the next
step in the breakup of Iraq. This is also wrong. The
constitution prescribes a very loose federalism and
gives large powers to Kurdistan; to any future
southern, predominantly Shia federal region, and to
existing governorates. But federalism, far from
breaking up a country, is more likely to hold it
together.
Look at India, Spain, South Africa and Canada. In
each of these countries, federal and decentralized
constitutional structures bridge major differences
in ethnicity and culture. Given the strong ethnic
and sectarian identity of Iraqi Kurds and Shia, the
choice in Iraq was never between centralism and
regionalism, but regionalism or nothing.
A fourth myth is that this constitution will deepen
sectarian divisions in Iraq, fueling the insurgency.
Not necessarily. There are many moderate Sunni Arabs
who are beginning to see that Iraq needs to be a
federation. Indeed, in July and August most of the
Sunni Arab constitutional negotiators understood the
need to recognize Kurdish autonomy and the need for
non-Kurdish geographic federal units to form. The
problem was an all too brief constitutional process
that gave little time for leaders to enable their
constituents - Sunni Arab voters - to understand
what federalism is. With time and effort, Sunni
Arabs can be led to overcome their fear of
federalism, embrace this constitution and deprive
the insurgency of a support base.
Still another myth is that this constitution paves
the way for Iraq to become a theocracy. Also not
likely. The constitution prescribes that Islam will
be a main source of legislation and prohibits laws
from contradicting Islamic principles. But these
prescriptions will be interpreted by a Federal
Supreme Court that must be approved by two-thirds of
elected Iraqi legislators - too many for the
Islamists to control. Islam will clearly, therefore,
not be the only source of legislation. In any event,
those laws on which Islam impacts most heavily -
including criminal law and family law - will be
influenced by policy that is regional, not national.
No Shia Iraqis, however conservative, want another
Iran.
A final myth is that if the constitution can be
amended, then the Sunni Arabs can be brought on
board. Unlikely. The deal this week to establish a
commission to review the constitution after the next
election apparently brought in one of the Sunni Arab
groups, the Iraq Islamic Party. But it is not a
panacea. If the Kurds and Shia Arabs are prepared to
concede anything significant next year, why haven't
they made these concessions already?
Casting aside these misconceptions, the task at hand
is clear. The Kurdish and Shia politicians must show
their Sunni Arab brothers that federalism can
deliver Sunni Arabs true self-government, a
proportionate share of oil wealth and a stake in
Baghdad politics. The United States, which pressed
for a constitutional timetable that gave little
opportunity for consensus-building, must now make
the effort to work with Sunni Arab communities - not
just the elites - on these issues.
And, in turn, the Sunni Arabs themselves must work
to shake off their nostalgia for a centralized Iraqi
state. It is that nostalgia, more than anything
else, that provides the ideology for the insurgency
and gives a springboard to the religious lunacy of
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other foreign terrorists.
The days of Sunni Arab hegemony in Iraq are a thing
of the past, and a centralized Iraq is in nobody's
interest right now - least of all the Sunni Arab
minority. For all Iraqis, strategizing within the
terms of federalism is the way forward.
Jonathan Morrow is a lawyer at the U.S. Institute
of Peace and has travelled to Iraq in the last year
to support the constitution-making process. The
views in this article are his own.
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