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The
elections in Iraq on Sunday are not just for an
ordinary legislative body. The elected
representatives of the Iraqi people have a mandate
to draft the Iraqi constitution — the document that,
it is hoped, will hold that increasingly fragmented
country together. And what will the outcome of
elections tell us about the future constitution of
Iraq? Probably not much.
A common view is that if a Shiite majority is
installed in the elected assembly, that majority
will be large enough to ignore the wishes of the
United States, the Kurds and Sunni Arabs. In this
view, the new assembly, if dominated by the
followers of Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,
will write a constitution for a fundamentalist
Islamic state along the Iranian model, with massive
geopolitical consequences.
Therefore, the argument goes, we must pay close
attention to the election results, party by party,
to see whether this might happen.
Despite all this anticipation, however, the most
critical constitutional issues — the role of
religion in a new Iraq, the status of the Kurdistan
region and the Sunni areas, and the future of the
multiethnic, oil-rich city of Kirkuk — won't be
greatly affected by the electoral performance of
each political party.
The reality in Iraq now: Ethnic and sectarian
divisions have not diminished since the fall of
Saddam Hussein. The minority Sunni Arab population
(about 15% of Iraq's total) has been clumsily ousted
from privilege, providing manpower for a
Sunni-dominated insurgency. The majority Shiite Arab
population in the south (about 60%) is expecting to
dominate the government and the constitution after
its success in elections. The Kurds (about 20%) are
predominantly Sunni, but secular in their outlook.
The political reality
But despite their strength in numbers, the Shiites
will have to negotiate. This explains why the
competing Iraqi political parties are not bothering
to campaign on constitutional platforms. The fact is
that the constitution will be a negotiated, not an
elected, outcome.
It is true that a Shiite-dominated assembly would
wield a great deal of power. For starters, in a
climate where anti-Americanism is mainstream, the
assembly might quickly dispense with U.S. plans for
an Iraqi constitution. In March of last year, U.S.
Administrator Paul Bremer issued, with the support
of senior U.S.-appointed Iraqis, the "Transitional
Administrative Law," or the "interim constitution."
It provided for a "federal" Iraq with safeguards for
Kurdish autonomy and sought to cement in place some
judicial and human-rights protections. It also
attempted to put in place a clear post-elections
timetable.
Surely, one might then conclude, the elections'
results matter. If the religious Shiite parties
obtain sufficient majorities to do away with the
interim constitution, ignore its provisions limiting
the role of religion and ignore the provisions
dealing with Kurdish autonomy, isn't the game over?
What is to stop the exercise of raw power by a
religious Shiite government? The answer is simple:
the continued existence of Sunni Arabs and Kurds.
• The Sunnis: The insurgency will undoubtedly
continue after the elections and will undoubtedly
force any assembly, however strongly Shiite, to
listen to any Sunni constitutional demands. If not,
they'll face continued fighting.
• The Kurds: Less prominent, perhaps, but
more important, is the fact of Kurdish negotiating
strength. Though fewer in number than Shiite Arabs
and likely to win fewer seats, Iraqi Kurds have
control of a de facto state in the north, complete
with an elected parliament, an army, a revenue base
and petroleum resources. So, even if the Kurds do
poorly in the elections, the assembly couldn't
ignore the reality of the Kurds as a force.
The temperature of the troubled region of Kirkuk
will not be lowered by the elections, either. The
facts will be on the ground, not in the assembly. A
high voter turnout and a relatively peaceful polling
day will probably set the negotiations off to a good
start, but the party results will matter much less.
After elections, then what?
The important question, then, is: After the
elections, how ready are Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish
leaders to begin serious constitutional
negotiations? How positive and pragmatic will they
be in trying to reach a compromise? Will they
implement the terms of any deal that is struck? And
how ready is the international community to allow
that negotiation to occur? Is it possible that the
United States, Iran and Turkey can do the right
thing and step aside?
Iraqi leaders and intellectuals, whether Arab or
Kurd, religious or secular, continually express to
me their desire that the tradition of outside
interference end.
And on the question of pragmatism, there is also
reason for hope. Iraqi Shiite leaders are probably
able to accept a relatively autonomous and secular
Kurdish federal unit in return for the Kurds'
delegating to Baghdad certain powers, including
national defense and foreign affairs, with the
status of Kirkuk to be deferred as long as possible.
Indeed, "federalism" is a part of the Sistani list
platform. So Iraq will probably not look like Iran.
And the Kurds will probably accept a result that
falls short of full independence, because they know
they can benefit from being part of Iraq. For all of
their pride, they have no plans to secede.
Shiites and Kurds alike will probably agree to enter
into negotiations with Sunni leaders to give them
greater constitutional influence. The question is
whether these negotiations can be carried out
without aggravation by violence or outside meddling.
If so, it is possible that a constitution can be
drafted by the assembly in a transparent and
participatory way, so that it is supported by most
Iraqis — a constitution that might, therefore, be
implemented.
For now, let's hope the elections are peaceful and
look beyond them: Let's give the assembly and its
political masters some time, some space and
resources to negotiate a deal — a constitution — to
bring the country together.
Jonathan Morrow is a constitutional lawyer at the
United States Institute of Peace, which is working
with Iraqi leaders and officials to support an
inclusive process for drafting a constitution. The
views expressed here are his own.
http://www.usatoday.com
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