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That was
one of the starting points on which Gregory Hooker,
chief analyst of CENTCOM, the American command
running the war in Iraq, presupposed his detailed
forecast of election results.
This forecast, commissioned by CENTOM commander
General John Abizaid, was first revealed by DEBKA-Net-Weekly
190 on January 21.
The second premise was that orderly vote-counting
would likewise take place notwithstanding threats of
sabotage.
The Hooker forecast is essentially a simulation
exercise based on US and Iraqi intelligence data
gathered in the last six months, together with
estimates of opinion openly canvassed in towns up
and down the country.
The level of participation and the results of this
pivotal election will bear strongly on the Bush
administration’s second term Iraq policy, the tasks
facing US armed forces, the chances of the elected
national assembly taking up its responsibilities,
including the drafting of a new national
constitution, and the prospects of an elected
government exercising authority.
• Altogether 111 political entities – parties,
individuals or coalitions – are running for the 275
National Assembly seats.
• A total of 7,785 candidates are registered on the
national ballot
• Eligible voters in Iraq: 14.27 million
• Eligible voters outside Iraq: 1.2 – 2 million
(only one-quarter of whom registered).
• More than 130 lists were submitted by the December
15, 2004 deadline for registration. Nine were
multi-party coalition blocs while 102 were lists
presented by single Iraqi parties.
• There are two major political blocs – Shiite and
Kurdish:
The Shiite Unified Iraqi Alliance list submitted 228
candidates representing 16 Iraqi political groups
including the dominant Shiite factions. Abdul Aziz
al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq – SCIRI, heads this list,
followed by Ibrahim Al-Jafari, head of the al-Dawa
Party.
• The two Kurdish parties headed by Masoud Barzani
and Jalal Talabani decided to run together on the
Kurdish list.
• Both the Iraqi interim prime minister Iyad Allawi
and Iraqi president Ghazi al-Yawar submitted their
own lists of candidates. Allawi’s party, the Iraqi
National Accord – INC, submitted a 240-candidate
coalition, while al-Yawar leads an 80-member slate
representing the Iraqi Grouping.
Projected Results
For elections held now, Hooker projects the
following figures:
The Shiite Unified Iraqi Alliance list – 43.8%
= 120 national assembly seats.
The Kurdish list – a surprising 36.4%
(more than twice their 16-18% proportion of the
general population) = 100 seats.
The Iraqi National Accord – 8.1% = 22 seats.
(A formula is being actively sought to retain him as
premier even if his showing is low.)
The Iraqi Communist party (the best organized)
– 1.6% = 5 seats.
All the Assyrian, Turkomen and Yazdi
minorities together – 4 seats.
All the rest – 5 seats.
The first conclusion reached by our analysts is
that, while the leading Shiite UIA bloc can expect
to be the big winner of the election, the real
victor will be the Shiite cleric who assembled and
founded the alliance, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani
and his inner circle. The slate he drew up of
candidates to the legislature reflects his political
aspirations and cunning: of the 120 registered, the
first 60 are independents with no parties behind
them and will therefore be totally dependent on
Sistani himself for support.
Al-Hakim’s SCIRI will get no more than 14 assembly
seats, while al-Jafari’s al Dawa must be content
with 12. The former rebel cleric Moqtada Sadr’s
following will match al Dawa with 12 places in the
legislature
The slate he assembled also pushes pro-Tehran and
Iran’s chosen men down to the unrealistic bottom.
Sistani wants to see non-clerical ministers in the
post-election government but will insist on
incorporating Islamic law as the basis of the
national constitution.
The Kurds owe their projected big win to three
prime causes:
1. The union of the two principal lists,
which will help them carry districts in which each
faction is fragmentary, like Iraq’s second largest
town of Mosul and certain quarters of Baghdad.
2. Major concessions by Sistani in Kirkuk,
where he endorsed the transfer of tens of thousands
of Kurdish voters into the city. Quietly underway at
this moment is the largest demographic
transformation in Iraq since the war began, an
abrupt reversal of the population displacement
conducted by Saddam Hussein. Sunni families are
being pushed out of Kirkuk to the Sunni Triangle and
replaced by incoming Kurds. Turkomen, Assyrians and
Yazdis gnash their teeth but have not the power to
interfere in the Kurdish takeover of the mixed city.
3. Another key Sistani concession was his
consent to local elections taking place in Kurdish
regions for a Kurdish national assembly at the same
time as the general election. In return, the Kurdish
leaders have granted Sistani a powerful tool of
government, a promise to join his Unified Iraqi Bloc
in a coalition administration.
The Shiite cleric has little to fear from this
alliance. He knows the Kurds are only interested in
expanding their own self-government and will
therefore not muscle in on the central
administration with power-sharing demands. Their
backing, however, provides insurance for stable
Shiite-dominated government in the long term.
The Sunni Muslim minority can hardly be expected to
sit still as the Shiites and Kurds split up the
post-war spoils of power.
http://www.debka.com
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