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SULAIMANIYAH, Iraq -- Where is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi?
That question has confounded the U.S. military for
more than a year. U.S. and Iraqi officials insisted
for months that the most wanted man in Iraq was
hiding in the insurgent stronghold of Fallujah. But
after recapturing the city last month, U.S. forces
did not find al-Zarqawi there.
The Jordanian-born militant has achieved mythic
status as a master of disguise and escape. Although
al-Zarqawi has claimed responsibility for scores of
kidnappings, suicide bombings and beheadings of
foreigners, many Iraqis believe that al-Zarqawi does
not even exist. They say he was invented by the
United States to justify its raids and bombing
campaigns.
Al-Zarqawi's influence on the Iraqi insurgency is
more complicated than both the U.S. military and al-Zarqawi
make it out to be, according to Kurdish security
officials. They say al-Zarqawi is likely moving
around central and northern Iraq alone, finding
shelter in Sunni Muslim areas dominated by former
members of Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime.
"He can move around any number of Iraqi areas. He
can change his appearance, he can change his
papers," said Dana Ahmad Majid, head of security for
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, one of two parties
that control the autonomous Kurdish region of
northern Iraq. "He could be moving around alone
without any problem. Al-Zarqawi is a single man, and
it's always extremely difficult to capture a single
person."
Asked if he thought al-Zarqawi escaped during last
month's U.S. assault on Fallujah, Majid smiled, took
a drag on his cigarette and said, "Who knows that
al-Zarqawi was ever in Fallujah?"
In interviews over the past week, Majid and other
security officials painted a picture of how the
insurgency is operating in northern Iraq, especially
in the city of Mosul and surrounding areas that have
long been Baathist strongholds. The assessments of
these officials -- based on interrogation of dozens
of insurgents captured over the past year --
contradict some of the U.S. military's repeated
assertions about al-Zarqawi's role in the
insurgency.
Kurdish officials acknowledged that the most vexing
challenge in combating the insurgency is that
guerrillas have infiltrated nearly all branches of
the Iraqi government. "The terrorists' point of
strength is information," said Sadi Ahmed Pire, who
is in charge of the PUK's security operations in
Mosul. "They have exact information. They have
people in every government office and department:
police, national guard, the health and education
ministries, the municipalities. Some cooperate
willingly, while others are forced."
Pire said he has intelligence that al-Zarqawi has
spent time in Mosul, Iraq's third-largest city, and
has also found refuge in a desert area called Qaim,
near Iraq's border with Jordan and Syria.
Why doesn't Pire share such information on al-Zarqawi's
whereabouts with the U.S. military, so it can carry
out raids? "If we or the Americans get ready to
launch an operation, the terrorists will know about
it within an hour," Pire said.
One spectacular example of intelligence penetration
occurred just last month. During a series of
coordinated attacks by insurgents aimed at taking
over the Iraqi government infrastructure in Mosul,
most Iraqi police units in the city assisted the
guerrillas. "Many police commanders and the director
of police in Mosul were cooperating with the
terrorists," Pire said. "In one day, Nov. 9, they
gave them control of two-thirds of the police
stations in the city."
Among the other intelligence gleaned by Kurdish
officials from their interrogations of prisoners,
including several who have met with al-Zarqawi:
Islamic militant groups operate in small cells of
three or four people, each headed by an "emir," or
prince, who is empowered to make decisions about
when and where to launch attacks and suicide
bombings. "The general planning might be done by al-Zarqawi,
and perhaps he might also secure some material or
money," Majid said. "But the specific acts are being
carried out by small cells, and al-Zarqawi might not
even know about them until he hears it on the news."
Al-Zarqawi is working closely with a Kurdish
Islamist group, Ansar al-Islam ("Partisans of
Islam"), which once had about 700 members and has
provided scores of recruits for suicide bombings
since the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Ansar moved many of
its operations to Mosul after it was driven out of a
remote, mountainous part of northern Iraq by U.S.
bombardment during the war. The group also has a
presence in Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi and Baqubah --
cities where the insurgency has been entrenched.
Most of Ansar's leaders have been killed or
captured. But the group has become more difficult to
track because it has splintered into small cells and
some of its members have been absorbed into another
group led by al-Zarqawi: Tawhid wa Jihad ("Unity and
Holy War").
Most of the communication between various militant
groups, including al-Zarqawi and his supporters, is
done through Internet cafes. "Telephone
communications in Iraq are difficult," Majid said,
"but the Internet is everywhere and it is difficult
to track."
Insurgents are using proceeds from drug trafficking,
especially hashish smuggled from Afghanistan, to
finance some of their attacks. Some suicide bombers
also are being given sedatives and other drugs
before carrying out their attacks.
As an example, Majid cited a 20-year-old Kurd who
was killed in September as he tried to ram a car
packed with explosives into a hotel in the city of
Sulaimaniyah.
"When we examined his body, we found a small amount
of drugs in his system," Majid said.
Baathist and Islamic groups have liaison officers in
major cities such as Mosul to coordinate activities.
And both factions are paying unemployed young men to
carry out attacks against U.S. and Iraqi forces.
"They pay from $50 to thousands of dollars,
depending on the tasks," Pire said. "There's 75
percent unemployment in Mosul. Maybe some of these
young people are not terrorists, but they have to
make some money."
One of the major questions facing the U.S. military
is the extent of foreign involvement in the
insurgency. Kurdish officials say the majority of
insurgents they have arrested were Iraqi, but there
were also some Syrians, Jordanians and Palestinians.
In January, Majid's forces captured Hassan Ghul, a
Pakistani believed to be a mid-level operative in
al-Qaida. Ghul was carrying a CD with a 17-page
letter purportedly written by al-Zarqawi to Osama
bin Laden.
The letter appeals to bin Laden for help in setting
off a sectarian war through a campaign of bombings
against the Shia Muslim majority in Iraq.
Before invading Iraq in March 2003, the Bush
administration argued that al-Zarqawi was a top
lieutenant of bin Laden. U.S. officials said al-Zarqawi
had taken refuge in Baghdad and was a major link
between Hussein's regime and bin Laden's al-Qaida
network. But that assertion has never been proven,
and there are doubts about al-Zarqawi's
relationships with both bin Laden and Hussein's
government, as some Bush administration officials
have acknowledged in recent months.
To some Iraqis, the U.S. focus on al-Zarqawi is part
of a political strategy to portray the insurgency as
driven by Islamic militants and foreigners.
Kurdish officials say the insurgency found renewed
strength in northern Iraq in May, after the Baath
Party held a meeting in the Syrian town of Hasaka.
The party reorganized itself, expelling more than
half the membership, or anyone who had dealings with
the United States, the Iraqi government or even
humanitarian aid groups. The new Baath leaders are
Mohammad Younis al-Ahmad and Ibrahim Sabawi,
Hussein's half-brother and the former head of Iraq's
general security directorate.
The new leadership found support in Mosul, which had
been an important base for Hussein's military and
security apparatus, providing more than a third of
all Iraqi officers. "The insurgents are using the
infrastructure of the old Iraqi army," Pire said.
"In Mosul alone, there were more generals than in
all of America."
Majid noted that the focus on al-Zarqawi takes some
of the pressure off lesser-known Baathist leaders.
"These people like to remain anonymous," Majid said.
"If everyone is looking for al-Zarqawi, they have
more room to operate."
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